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Mitigation Strategies Analysis for swc-project/swc

  • Description:

    1. Identify swc Input Points: Within your build scripts or application code, pinpoint precisely where file/directory paths are fed directly to swc (command-line arguments to swc CLI, paths passed to swc's Node.js API functions like transform, transformFileSync, parse, parseFileSync, etc.).
    2. Implement Sanitization Before swc Call: Immediately before calling any swc function, use a path sanitization library (e.g., path-absolutize in Node.js, Rust's Path and PathBuf).
    3. Relative Paths Enforcement: Ensure all paths are relative to the project root. Reject absolute paths or those with ../ that could escape the project directory.
    4. swc-Specific Whitelist (Optional): If feasible, create a whitelist of directories specifically for swc's access, rejecting paths outside this list. This is distinct from a general project whitelist.
    5. swc-Focused Testing: Create test cases that specifically target swc with malicious paths to verify your sanitization's effectiveness against swc.
  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Path Traversal (via swc) (Severity: High): Prevents attackers from crafting input paths that would make swc read/write files outside the intended project directory, potentially leading to information disclosure or code execution through swc.
    • Arbitrary File Access (via swc) (Severity: High): A subset of path traversal, specifically preventing swc from accessing sensitive system files.
  • Impact:

    • Path Traversal (via swc): Risk significantly reduced (High to Low/Negligible).
    • Arbitrary File Access (via swc): Risk significantly reduced (High to Low/Negligible).
  • Currently Implemented:

    • Example (Hypothetical): Partially implemented in build.js for CLI arguments, but not for paths within a configuration file read by build.js and then passed to swc.transform().
  • Missing Implementation:

    • Example (Hypothetical): Needs implementation for all paths passed to swc's API, including those derived from configuration files or other indirect sources.
    • Example (Hypothetical): Requires dedicated test cases targeting swc with malicious paths.
  • Description:

    1. Identify swc Execution: Determine how swc is run (CLI, Node.js API, within a larger process).
    2. Apply Limits to swc: Use appropriate OS mechanisms to limit resources specifically for the swc process:
      • ulimit (Linux): If swc is run via the CLI, use ulimit -t <cpu_seconds> -m <memory_kb> -n <file_descriptors> -u <processes> before invoking swc.
      • Node.js child_process Options: If using swc via Node.js's child_process, explore options like maxBuffer (for stdout/stderr) and potentially custom resource limiting logic. This is less robust than ulimit.
      • Container Limits (Docker/Kubernetes): If swc runs within a container, set resource limits in the container configuration.
    3. swc-Specific Limits: Tailor the limits (CPU time, memory, file descriptors, processes) to what's reasonable for your swc usage. Start conservatively.
    4. Test swc Under Limits: Test your build process with the limits in place to ensure they don't break legitimate swc operations.
    5. Monitor swc: Monitor swc's resource usage to detect attempts to exceed the limits.
  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Denial of Service (DoS) against swc (Severity: Medium/High): Prevents attackers from crafting input that causes swc itself to consume excessive resources, making the build system or application unavailable.
  • Impact:

    • Denial of Service (DoS) against swc: Risk significantly reduced (Medium/High to Low).
  • Currently Implemented:

    • Example (Hypothetical): No resource limits are currently set specifically for swc.
  • Missing Implementation:

    • Example (Hypothetical): Needs implementation for all swc execution contexts (CLI, Node.js API, containers).

Mitigation Strategy: Secure swc Configuration

  • Description:

    1. Review .swcrc (and API Options): Carefully examine your .swcrc file (or equivalent configuration passed to swc's API). Understand every option.
    2. Disable Unnecessary Features: Turn off any swc features you don't absolutely need. This reduces the attack surface.
    3. Avoid Experimental/Unstable: Do not use experimental or unstable swc options in production.
    4. swc-Specific Security Review: Conduct a security-focused review of your swc configuration, looking for potentially risky settings.
    5. Document Configuration Choices: Clearly document the rationale behind your swc configuration choices, especially any security-related decisions.
  • Threats Mitigated:

    • swc Misconfiguration (Severity: Variable, can be High): Reduces the risk of configuring swc in a way that introduces vulnerabilities through swc's own features. For example, enabling an insecure plugin or an unstable feature that has undiscovered vulnerabilities.
  • Impact:

    • swc Misconfiguration: Risk reduced (severity depends on the specific misconfiguration, but generally from High/Medium to Low).
  • Currently Implemented:

    • Example (Hypothetical): Basic .swcrc review done, but no formal security-focused review.
  • Missing Implementation:

    • Example (Hypothetical): Needs a dedicated security review of the swc configuration.
    • Example (Hypothetical): Configuration choices should be documented.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure swc API Usage

  • Description:

    1. Code Reviews (Focus on swc): If you use swc's API (e.g., swc.transform in Node.js), conduct code reviews with a specific focus on how swc is being used.
    2. Validate All API Inputs: Carefully validate all inputs passed to swc's API functions, not just file paths. This includes options objects, source code strings, etc.
    3. Error Handling (Around swc Calls): Implement robust error handling around all calls to swc's API. Do not expose internal swc error messages to users.
    4. Least Privilege (for Code Using swc): Ensure the code that calls swc's API runs with the minimum necessary privileges.
  • Threats Mitigated:

    • swc API Misuse (Severity: Variable, can be High): Reduces the risk of introducing vulnerabilities through incorrect or insecure use of swc's API. This could include passing malformed options, mishandling errors, or exposing sensitive information.
  • Impact:

    • swc API Misuse: Risk reduced (severity depends on the specific misuse, but generally from High/Medium to Low).
  • Currently Implemented:

    • Example (Hypothetical): General code reviews are done, but not with a specific focus on swc API usage.
  • Missing Implementation:

    • Example (Hypothetical): Code review checklists need to include specific checks for secure swc API usage.
    • Example (Hypothetical): Error handling around swc API calls needs to be reviewed and potentially improved.
  • Description:

    1. Minimize swc Plugins: Use only essential swc plugins.
    2. Source Code Review (of Plugin): Before using a plugin, thoroughly review its source code, looking for potential vulnerabilities or suspicious code.
    3. Reputation Check (Plugin Author): Investigate the plugin author and the plugin's history.
    4. swc Plugin Isolation (Ideal): If possible, isolate swc plugins:
      • Sandboxed Process (for swc): Use OS-level sandboxing (e.g., seccomp on Linux) to restrict the entire swc process (and thus the plugin) when plugins are enabled. This is more robust than trying to sandbox the plugin within swc.
      • Containerization (for swc): Run the entire swc process (with plugins) within a container (Docker, etc.) with limited privileges.
    5. Regular Updates (of Plugin): Keep swc plugins updated.
    6. Monitor swc with Plugins: If possible, monitor the behavior of swc when plugins are active to detect anomalies.
  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Vulnerable swc Plugins (Severity: Variable, often High): Reduces the risk of using a plugin with vulnerabilities that could be exploited through swc.
    • Malicious swc Plugins (Severity: High): Reduces the risk of intentionally malicious plugins compromising the system via swc.
  • Impact:

    • Vulnerable swc Plugins: Risk significantly reduced (severity depends on the vulnerability).
    • Malicious swc Plugins: Risk significantly reduced (High to Low/Negligible) with effective isolation.
  • Currently Implemented:

    • Example (Hypothetical): No formal plugin vetting or isolation.
  • Missing Implementation:

    • Example (Hypothetical): Needs a plugin vetting process.
    • Example (Hypothetical): Needs to investigate and implement isolation techniques (sandboxing or containerization) for the swc process when plugins are used.