Mitigation Strategy: Input Path Sanitization (for swc
)
-
Description:
- Identify
swc
Input Points: Within your build scripts or application code, pinpoint precisely where file/directory paths are fed directly toswc
(command-line arguments toswc
CLI, paths passed toswc
's Node.js API functions liketransform
,transformFileSync
,parse
,parseFileSync
, etc.). - Implement Sanitization Before
swc
Call: Immediately before calling anyswc
function, use a path sanitization library (e.g.,path-absolutize
in Node.js, Rust'sPath
andPathBuf
). - Relative Paths Enforcement: Ensure all paths are relative to the project root. Reject absolute paths or those with
../
that could escape the project directory. swc
-Specific Whitelist (Optional): If feasible, create a whitelist of directories specifically forswc
's access, rejecting paths outside this list. This is distinct from a general project whitelist.swc
-Focused Testing: Create test cases that specifically targetswc
with malicious paths to verify your sanitization's effectiveness againstswc
.
- Identify
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Path Traversal (via
swc
) (Severity: High): Prevents attackers from crafting input paths that would makeswc
read/write files outside the intended project directory, potentially leading to information disclosure or code execution throughswc
. - Arbitrary File Access (via
swc
) (Severity: High): A subset of path traversal, specifically preventingswc
from accessing sensitive system files.
- Path Traversal (via
-
Impact:
- Path Traversal (via
swc
): Risk significantly reduced (High to Low/Negligible). - Arbitrary File Access (via
swc
): Risk significantly reduced (High to Low/Negligible).
- Path Traversal (via
-
Currently Implemented:
- Example (Hypothetical): Partially implemented in
build.js
for CLI arguments, but not for paths within a configuration file read bybuild.js
and then passed toswc.transform()
.
- Example (Hypothetical): Partially implemented in
-
Missing Implementation:
- Example (Hypothetical): Needs implementation for all paths passed to
swc
's API, including those derived from configuration files or other indirect sources. - Example (Hypothetical): Requires dedicated test cases targeting
swc
with malicious paths.
- Example (Hypothetical): Needs implementation for all paths passed to
Mitigation Strategy: Resource Limits (for swc
Process)
-
Description:
- Identify
swc
Execution: Determine howswc
is run (CLI, Node.js API, within a larger process). - Apply Limits to
swc
: Use appropriate OS mechanisms to limit resources specifically for theswc
process:ulimit
(Linux): Ifswc
is run via the CLI, useulimit -t <cpu_seconds> -m <memory_kb> -n <file_descriptors> -u <processes>
before invokingswc
.- Node.js
child_process
Options: If usingswc
via Node.js'schild_process
, explore options likemaxBuffer
(for stdout/stderr) and potentially custom resource limiting logic. This is less robust thanulimit
. - Container Limits (Docker/Kubernetes): If
swc
runs within a container, set resource limits in the container configuration.
swc
-Specific Limits: Tailor the limits (CPU time, memory, file descriptors, processes) to what's reasonable for yourswc
usage. Start conservatively.- Test
swc
Under Limits: Test your build process with the limits in place to ensure they don't break legitimateswc
operations. - Monitor
swc
: Monitorswc
's resource usage to detect attempts to exceed the limits.
- Identify
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Denial of Service (DoS) against
swc
(Severity: Medium/High): Prevents attackers from crafting input that causesswc
itself to consume excessive resources, making the build system or application unavailable.
- Denial of Service (DoS) against
-
Impact:
- Denial of Service (DoS) against
swc
: Risk significantly reduced (Medium/High to Low).
- Denial of Service (DoS) against
-
Currently Implemented:
- Example (Hypothetical): No resource limits are currently set specifically for
swc
.
- Example (Hypothetical): No resource limits are currently set specifically for
-
Missing Implementation:
- Example (Hypothetical): Needs implementation for all
swc
execution contexts (CLI, Node.js API, containers).
- Example (Hypothetical): Needs implementation for all
Mitigation Strategy: Secure swc
Configuration
-
Description:
- Review
.swcrc
(and API Options): Carefully examine your.swcrc
file (or equivalent configuration passed toswc
's API). Understand every option. - Disable Unnecessary Features: Turn off any
swc
features you don't absolutely need. This reduces the attack surface. - Avoid Experimental/Unstable: Do not use experimental or unstable
swc
options in production. swc
-Specific Security Review: Conduct a security-focused review of yourswc
configuration, looking for potentially risky settings.- Document Configuration Choices: Clearly document the rationale behind your
swc
configuration choices, especially any security-related decisions.
- Review
-
Threats Mitigated:
swc
Misconfiguration (Severity: Variable, can be High): Reduces the risk of configuringswc
in a way that introduces vulnerabilities throughswc
's own features. For example, enabling an insecure plugin or an unstable feature that has undiscovered vulnerabilities.
-
Impact:
swc
Misconfiguration: Risk reduced (severity depends on the specific misconfiguration, but generally from High/Medium to Low).
-
Currently Implemented:
- Example (Hypothetical): Basic
.swcrc
review done, but no formal security-focused review.
- Example (Hypothetical): Basic
-
Missing Implementation:
- Example (Hypothetical): Needs a dedicated security review of the
swc
configuration. - Example (Hypothetical): Configuration choices should be documented.
- Example (Hypothetical): Needs a dedicated security review of the
Mitigation Strategy: Secure swc
API Usage
-
Description:
- Code Reviews (Focus on
swc
): If you useswc
's API (e.g.,swc.transform
in Node.js), conduct code reviews with a specific focus on howswc
is being used. - Validate All API Inputs: Carefully validate all inputs passed to
swc
's API functions, not just file paths. This includes options objects, source code strings, etc. - Error Handling (Around
swc
Calls): Implement robust error handling around all calls toswc
's API. Do not expose internalswc
error messages to users. - Least Privilege (for Code Using
swc
): Ensure the code that callsswc
's API runs with the minimum necessary privileges.
- Code Reviews (Focus on
-
Threats Mitigated:
swc
API Misuse (Severity: Variable, can be High): Reduces the risk of introducing vulnerabilities through incorrect or insecure use ofswc
's API. This could include passing malformed options, mishandling errors, or exposing sensitive information.
-
Impact:
swc
API Misuse: Risk reduced (severity depends on the specific misuse, but generally from High/Medium to Low).
-
Currently Implemented:
- Example (Hypothetical): General code reviews are done, but not with a specific focus on
swc
API usage.
- Example (Hypothetical): General code reviews are done, but not with a specific focus on
-
Missing Implementation:
- Example (Hypothetical): Code review checklists need to include specific checks for secure
swc
API usage. - Example (Hypothetical): Error handling around
swc
API calls needs to be reviewed and potentially improved.
- Example (Hypothetical): Code review checklists need to include specific checks for secure
Mitigation Strategy: Plugin Vetting and Isolation (for swc
Plugins)
-
Description:
- Minimize
swc
Plugins: Use only essentialswc
plugins. - Source Code Review (of Plugin): Before using a plugin, thoroughly review its source code, looking for potential vulnerabilities or suspicious code.
- Reputation Check (Plugin Author): Investigate the plugin author and the plugin's history.
swc
Plugin Isolation (Ideal): If possible, isolateswc
plugins:- Sandboxed Process (for
swc
): Use OS-level sandboxing (e.g.,seccomp
on Linux) to restrict the entireswc
process (and thus the plugin) when plugins are enabled. This is more robust than trying to sandbox the plugin withinswc
. - Containerization (for
swc
): Run the entireswc
process (with plugins) within a container (Docker, etc.) with limited privileges.
- Sandboxed Process (for
- Regular Updates (of Plugin): Keep
swc
plugins updated. - Monitor
swc
with Plugins: If possible, monitor the behavior ofswc
when plugins are active to detect anomalies.
- Minimize
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Vulnerable
swc
Plugins (Severity: Variable, often High): Reduces the risk of using a plugin with vulnerabilities that could be exploited throughswc
. - Malicious
swc
Plugins (Severity: High): Reduces the risk of intentionally malicious plugins compromising the system viaswc
.
- Vulnerable
-
Impact:
- Vulnerable
swc
Plugins: Risk significantly reduced (severity depends on the vulnerability). - Malicious
swc
Plugins: Risk significantly reduced (High to Low/Negligible) with effective isolation.
- Vulnerable
-
Currently Implemented:
- Example (Hypothetical): No formal plugin vetting or isolation.
-
Missing Implementation:
- Example (Hypothetical): Needs a plugin vetting process.
- Example (Hypothetical): Needs to investigate and implement isolation techniques (sandboxing or containerization) for the
swc
process when plugins are used.