Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
86 lines (75 loc) · 8.13 KB

attack-surface.md

File metadata and controls

86 lines (75 loc) · 8.13 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for tauri-apps/tauri

Attack Surface: Insecure Tauri API Design and Implementation

  • Description: Tauri's invoke system allows developers to expose Rust functions to the frontend. Poorly designed or implemented APIs become critical attack vectors, enabling malicious actions on the backend. This includes overly permissive APIs, lack of input validation, and privilege escalation vulnerabilities.
  • Tauri Contribution: Tauri's core functionality of bridging frontend and backend via invoke directly creates this attack surface. The ease of exposing Rust functions can lead to developers inadvertently creating insecure APIs.
  • Example: A Tauri application exposes an API endpoint execute_shell_command(command: String) that directly executes the provided string as a shell command without sanitization. An attacker could craft a malicious frontend request to execute arbitrary commands on the user's system.
  • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), privilege escalation, data exfiltration, denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Design APIs with minimal necessary functionality and permissions.
      • Input Validation and Sanitization: Rigorously validate and sanitize all input from the frontend in API handlers.
      • Secure API Design: Follow secure coding practices, avoid exposing sensitive operations directly, implement authorization.
      • Regular Security Audits: Conduct security audits and code reviews of the Tauri API layer.
    • Users:
      • Keep the application updated.
      • Be cautious about running applications from untrusted sources.

Attack Surface: WebView Vulnerabilities (Tauri Context Amplified)

  • Description: Tauri applications rely on system WebViews (Chromium, WKWebView, WebView2). While Tauri doesn't introduce WebView vulnerabilities, it inherits them. The Tauri context amplifies the impact because XSS or other WebView exploits can be leveraged to interact with the privileged Rust backend via invoke.
  • Tauri Contribution: Tauri's architecture depends on the WebView. The bridge between WebView and Rust backend makes WebView vulnerabilities more critical in Tauri applications.
  • Example: A known Chromium vulnerability allows sandbox escape. In a Tauri app, an attacker exploiting this via malicious content in the WebView could potentially use XSS to call invoke and execute arbitrary Rust code, bypassing the WebView sandbox and interacting with the system.
  • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), sandbox escape, information disclosure, denial of service, potentially leading to backend compromise.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Keep Tauri and Dependencies Updated: Regularly update Tauri and dependencies for WebView security patches.
      • Implement Content Security Policy (CSP): Use a strong CSP to mitigate XSS and limit the impact of WebView exploits.
      • WebView Isolation: Explore WebView isolation techniques to limit the impact of compromise.
    • Users:
      • Keep OS and WebView components updated.
      • Be cautious with untrusted content within the application.

Attack Surface: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Frontend (Tauri Backend Bridge Exploitation)

  • Description: XSS in the frontend of a Tauri application is particularly dangerous. Attackers can inject malicious scripts that, due to Tauri's architecture, can be used to directly interact with the privileged Rust backend via the invoke system, bypassing typical frontend security boundaries.
  • Tauri Contribution: Tauri's bridge between frontend and backend elevates the severity of XSS vulnerabilities. XSS is no longer just a frontend issue; it becomes a potential gateway to backend compromise in Tauri applications.
  • Example: An XSS vulnerability in the frontend allows injecting JavaScript. An attacker injects code that calls invoke to execute a Rust function that reads local files and sends them to an external server.
  • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE) via backend API exploitation, access to local file system or system resources, data theft, session hijacking, complete application compromise.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Robust Input Sanitization and Output Encoding: Implement rigorous input sanitization and output encoding in the frontend.
      • Use Frontend Frameworks with XSS Prevention: Utilize frameworks with built-in XSS mitigation.
      • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strict CSP to limit injected script capabilities.
      • Regular Security Testing: Perform security testing, including XSS scanning and penetration testing.
    • Users:
      • Keep the application updated.
      • Be cautious with untrusted content or links within the application.

Attack Surface: Insecure Update Mechanism

  • Description: Vulnerabilities in Tauri's update process can allow attackers to distribute malicious updates, leading to system compromise. This includes insecure channels, lack of integrity checks, and flaws in the update process itself.
  • Tauri Contribution: Tauri provides built-in update mechanisms. Misconfiguration or vulnerabilities in these mechanisms directly contribute to this critical attack surface.
  • Example: A Tauri application uses HTTP for updates and lacks signature verification. An attacker performs a MITM attack, replacing a legitimate update with malware. Upon installation, the attacker gains control of the user's system.
  • Impact: Installation of malware, complete system compromise upon update, data theft, denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Use HTTPS for Update Downloads: Always use HTTPS for secure update communication.
      • Implement Update Integrity Checks: Use digital signatures to verify update authenticity and integrity.
      • Secure Key Management: Securely manage private keys for signing updates.
      • Regular Security Audits of Update Process: Audit the update process for vulnerabilities.
    • Users:
      • Verify updates are from trusted sources.
      • Ensure automatic updates are enabled (if applicable).

Attack Surface: Custom Protocol Handler Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Tauri allows registering custom protocol handlers. Vulnerabilities in the handler logic can be exploited, including injection flaws and protocol hijacking.
  • Tauri Contribution: Tauri's feature to register custom protocol handlers introduces this attack surface if not implemented securely.
  • Example: A Tauri app registers myapp://open?file=filepath. Without validation, myapp://open?file=/etc/passwd could be used to access sensitive files.
  • Impact: Arbitrary file access, command injection, other vulnerabilities depending on handler logic, potential protocol hijacking.
  • Risk Severity: High (depending on handler functionality)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Input Validation and Sanitization in Protocol Handlers: Validate and sanitize all input to protocol handlers.
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Design handlers with minimal necessary functionality.
      • Secure Protocol Handler Logic: Follow secure coding practices, avoid injection vulnerabilities.
    • Users:
      • Be cautious clicking custom protocol links from untrusted sources.
      • Understand permissions of apps registering custom protocols.
      • Install applications from trusted sources to avoid protocol hijacking.