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Attack Tree Analysis for tauri-apps/tauri

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Access and Control over User's System via Tauri Application

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Gain Unauthorized Access and Control over User's System via Tauri Application

└── OR ─────────────── ├── [HIGH RISK PATH] 1. Exploit Tauri Framework Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── OR ─────────────── │ ├── [HIGH RISK PATH] 1.1. Exploit Tauri API Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └── OR ─────────────── │ │ ├── [HIGH RISK PATH] 1.1.1. API Misuse for Arbitrary Code Execution │ │ │ └── AND ─────────────── │ │ │ ├── 1.1.1.1. Identify vulnerable Tauri API function (e.g., file system access, process spawning) │ │ │ ├── 1.1.1.2. Craft malicious frontend code to call vulnerable API function with malicious parameters │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.3. Bypass any Tauri-level security checks (if present and insufficient) │ │ ├── [HIGH RISK PATH] 1.1.2. API Vulnerabilities Leading to Privilege Escalation │ │ │ └── AND ─────────────── │ │ │ ├── 1.1.2.1. Identify API function with insufficient privilege checks │ │ │ ├── 1.1.2.2. Exploit API to perform actions with elevated privileges (e.g., system commands, file manipulation outside sandbox) │ │ │ └── 1.1.2.3. Escalate privileges beyond intended application scope │ │ ├── 1.1.3. API Vulnerabilities Leading to Data Leakage │ │ │ └── AND ─────────────── │ │ │ ├── 1.1.3.1. Identify API function that exposes sensitive data (e.g., system information, local files) │ │ │ ├── 1.1.3.2. Craft frontend code to access and exfiltrate sensitive data via API │ │ │ └── 1.1.3.3. Bypass any Tauri-level access controls on sensitive data │ ├── [HIGH RISK PATH] 1.2. Exploit Webview Vulnerabilities (Chromium/WebKit) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └── OR ─────────────── │ │ ├── [HIGH RISK PATH] 1.2.1. Exploit Known Webview Vulnerabilities │ │ │ └── AND ─────────────── │ │ │ ├── 1.2.1.1. Identify WebView version used by Tauri application │ │ │ ├── 1.2.1.2. Research known vulnerabilities for that WebView version (e.g., CVEs) │ │ │ ├── 1.2.1.3. Craft malicious web content to trigger WebView vulnerability within Tauri app │ │ │ └── 1.2.1.4. Achieve code execution or sandbox escape via WebView exploit │ │ ├── [HIGH RISK PATH] 1.2.2. Exploit Webview Configuration Issues in Tauri │ │ │ └── AND ─────────────── │ │ │ ├── 1.2.2.1. Identify insecure WebView configurations within Tauri (e.g., disabled security features, overly permissive permissions) │ │ │ ├── 1.2.2.2. Leverage insecure configurations to bypass WebView sandbox or security restrictions │ │ │ └── 1.2.2.3. Achieve code execution or access to native resources due to misconfiguration │ ├── [HIGH RISK PATH] 1.3. Exploit Tauri Updater Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └── OR ─────────────── │ │ ├── [HIGH RISK PATH] 1.3.1. Man-in-the-Middle Attack on Update Channel │ │ │ └── AND ─────────────── │ │ │ ├── 1.3.1.1. Intercept update requests from Tauri application (e.g., network sniffing, DNS poisoning) │ │ │ ├── 1.3.1.2. Serve malicious update package instead of legitimate update │ │ │ └── 1.3.1.3. Application installs and executes malicious update, compromising system │ │ ├── [HIGH RISK PATH] 1.3.2. Vulnerabilities in Update Verification Process │ │ │ └── AND ─────────────── │ │ │ ├── 1.3.2.1. Identify weaknesses in how Tauri application verifies update integrity (e.g., weak signatures, no signature verification) │ │ │ ├── 1.3.2.2. Craft malicious update package that bypasses verification checks │ │ │ └── 1.3.2.3. Application installs and executes malicious update, compromising system │ ├── [HIGH RISK PATH] 1.4.2. Vulnerabilities in Third-Party Tauri Plugins [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └── AND ─────────────── │ │ ├── [HIGH RISK PATH] 1.4.2.1. Identify vulnerabilities in community-developed or third-party Tauri plugins (increased risk due to less scrutiny) │ │ │ ├── 1.4.2.2. Exploit plugin vulnerabilities via frontend interaction │ │ │ └── 1.4.2.3. Gain unauthorized access or control through third-party plugin exploit │ └── 1.5. Build Process and Distribution Compromise (Tauri Specific) [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── OR ─────────────── │ ├── 1.5.1. Compromise Tauri Build Tools/Dependencies [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └── AND ─────────────── │ │ ├── 1.5.1.1. Compromise Rust toolchain, Node.js, or other build dependencies used by Tauri │ │ ├── 1.5.1.2. Inject malicious code during the build process via compromised tools │ │ └── 1.5.1.3. Distribute application with pre-injected malware │ ├── 1.5.2. Distribution Channel Compromise (Tauri Specific) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └── AND ─────────────── │ │ ├── 1.5.2.1. Compromise the distribution channel used for Tauri application (e.g., developer website, app store - focusing on developer-controlled channels) │ │ ├── 1.5.2.2. Replace legitimate Tauri application with a malicious version in the distribution channel │ │ └── 1.5.2.3. Users download and install the malicious application from the compromised channel │ └── 1.5.3. Supply Chain Attacks via Tauri Templates/Starters [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── AND ─────────────── │ ├── 1.5.3.1. Compromise popular Tauri templates or starter projects (e.g., on GitHub) │ ├── 1.5.3.2. Inject malicious code into templates that is carried over to new projects created using them │ └── 1.5.3.3. Developers unknowingly build and distribute applications containing pre-existing malware from compromised templates └── [HIGH RISK PATH] 2. Exploit Application-Specific Vulnerabilities (Leveraging Tauri Features) [CRITICAL NODE] └── OR ─────────────── ├── [HIGH RISK PATH] 2.1. Insecure Usage of Tauri APIs in Application Code [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── AND ─────────────── │ ├── [HIGH RISK PATH] 2.1.1. Developer misuses Tauri APIs (e.g., insecure file handling, command injection via API calls) │ │ └── OR ─────────────── │ │ ├── [HIGH RISK PATH] 2.1.1.1. Insecure File System API Usage │ │ │ └── AND ─────────────── │ │ │ ├── 2.1.1.1.1. Application allows frontend to specify arbitrary file paths via Tauri API │ │ │ ├── 2.1.1.1.2. Attacker crafts frontend code to access or modify sensitive files outside intended scope │ │ │ └── 2.1.1.1.3. Achieve unauthorized file access or manipulation │ │ ├── 2.1.1.3. Insecure Inter-Process Communication (IPC) via Tauri Events/Commands │ │ └── AND ─────────────── │ │ ├── 2.1.1.3.1. Application uses Tauri events or commands for sensitive IPC │ │ ├── 2.1.1.3.2. Attacker crafts malicious frontend code to manipulate IPC messages or events │ │ └── 2.1.1.3.3. Exploit IPC vulnerabilities to gain control or access sensitive data ├── [HIGH RISK PATH] 2.2.1. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Tauri Frontend (Context Specific) [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── AND ─────────────── │ ├── 2.2.1.1. Identify XSS vulnerabilities in the frontend code of the Tauri application │ │ ├── 2.2.1.2. Exploit XSS to execute malicious JavaScript within the WebView │ │ ├── 2.2.1.3. Leverage XSS to interact with Tauri API or native backend (beyond typical browser XSS impact) │ │ └── 2.2.1.4. Achieve more significant compromise due to Tauri's native capabilities (e.g., file system access via API from XSS)

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Tauri Framework Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Critical Node Justification: The Tauri framework is the foundation of the application. Vulnerabilities here can affect all applications built with that version and provide broad attack surfaces.
  • High-Risk Path Breakdown:

    • 1.1. Exploit Tauri API Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]:

      • Critical Node Justification: The Tauri API is the primary interface between the untrusted frontend and the trusted backend. Exploiting API vulnerabilities directly leads to native system access.
      • Attack Vectors:
        • 1.1.1. API Misuse for Arbitrary Code Execution:
          • Attack Vector: Identify Tauri API functions (e.g., file system, process spawning) that can be misused to execute arbitrary code on the user's system.
          • Exploitation Steps:
            • Find an API function that takes parameters controlling system actions.
            • Craft malicious frontend JavaScript to call this API with attacker-controlled parameters designed to execute code (e.g., writing a script to a known location and executing it).
            • Bypass any insufficient security checks in Tauri or the application's backend.
        • 1.1.2. API Vulnerabilities Leading to Privilege Escalation:
          • Attack Vector: Exploit API functions that have insufficient privilege checks, allowing the frontend to perform actions with elevated privileges beyond the application's intended scope.
          • Exploitation Steps:
            • Identify an API function that performs privileged operations (e.g., system settings, user data access).
            • Call this API from the frontend in a way that bypasses intended privilege restrictions.
            • Escalate privileges to perform actions outside the application's sandbox.
        • 1.1.3. API Vulnerabilities Leading to Data Leakage:
          • Attack Vector: Exploit API functions that expose sensitive data (system information, local files) without proper access controls, allowing exfiltration of this data.
          • Exploitation Steps:
            • Find an API function that retrieves sensitive information.
            • Craft frontend JavaScript to call this API and send the retrieved data to an attacker-controlled server.
            • Bypass any insufficient access controls on sensitive data within Tauri or the application.

    • 1.2. Exploit Webview Vulnerabilities (Chromium/WebKit) [CRITICAL NODE]:

      • Critical Node Justification: The WebView is the component rendering the frontend. Vulnerabilities in it can lead to sandbox escape and native code execution.
      • Attack Vectors:
        • 1.2.1. Exploit Known Webview Vulnerabilities:
          • Attack Vector: Leverage publicly known vulnerabilities (CVEs) in the WebView version used by Tauri to achieve code execution or sandbox escape.
          • Exploitation Steps:
            • Determine the WebView version used by the Tauri application.
            • Research known vulnerabilities for that specific version.
            • Craft malicious web content (HTML, JavaScript) that triggers the vulnerability when loaded in the WebView.
            • Gain code execution or escape the WebView sandbox.
        • 1.2.2. Exploit Webview Configuration Issues in Tauri:
          • Attack Vector: Exploit insecure WebView configurations within Tauri applications (e.g., disabled security features, overly permissive permissions) to bypass security restrictions.
          • Exploitation Steps:
            • Identify insecure WebView settings in the Tauri application's configuration.
            • Leverage these misconfigurations to bypass security features like the sandbox or Content Security Policy.
            • Achieve code execution or access native resources due to the weakened security posture.

    • 1.3. Exploit Tauri Updater Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]:

      • Critical Node Justification: The updater is a critical trust point. Compromising it allows attackers to distribute malware as legitimate updates to a wide user base.
      • Attack Vectors:
        • 1.3.1. Man-in-the-Middle Attack on Update Channel:
          • Attack Vector: Intercept update requests and serve malicious update packages instead of legitimate ones, especially if the update channel is not properly secured.
          • Exploitation Steps:
            • Position themselves in the network path between the application and the update server (e.g., on public Wi-Fi, via DNS poisoning).
            • Intercept update requests from the Tauri application.
            • Serve a crafted malicious update package.
            • The application installs and executes the malicious update.
        • 1.3.2. Vulnerabilities in Update Verification Process:
          • Attack Vector: Identify and exploit weaknesses in how the Tauri application verifies the integrity and authenticity of updates, allowing malicious updates to bypass checks.
          • Exploitation Steps:
            • Analyze the application's update verification process (e.g., signature verification, checksums).
            • Identify weaknesses (e.g., weak signatures, no verification, bypassable checks).
            • Craft a malicious update package that bypasses these verification weaknesses.
            • The application installs and executes the malicious update.

    • 1.4.2. Vulnerabilities in Third-Party Tauri Plugins [CRITICAL NODE]:

      • Critical Node Justification: Third-party plugins often receive less security scrutiny than core Tauri components or official plugins, making them a higher risk.
      • Attack Vectors:
        • 1.4.2.1. Identify vulnerabilities in community-developed or third-party Tauri plugins:
          • Attack Vector: Discover vulnerabilities (API misuse, logic errors, dependency issues) within third-party plugins that can be exploited from the frontend.
          • Exploitation Steps:
            • Analyze the code of third-party plugins used by the application.
            • Identify vulnerabilities similar to Tauri API vulnerabilities (1.1) within the plugin's exposed functionality.
            • Craft frontend JavaScript to interact with the vulnerable plugin functionality.
            • Exploit the plugin vulnerability to gain unauthorized access or control.

    • 1.5. Build Process and Distribution Compromise (Tauri Specific) [CRITICAL NODE]:

      • Critical Node Justification: Compromising the build or distribution process allows for injecting malware directly into the application before it reaches users, leading to widespread compromise.
      • Attack Vectors:
        • 1.5.1. Compromise Tauri Build Tools/Dependencies [CRITICAL NODE]:
          • Critical Node Justification: Build tools and dependencies are essential for creating the application. Compromising them injects malware at the source.
          • Attack Vector: Compromise build tools (Rust toolchain, Node.js) or dependencies used in the Tauri build process to inject malicious code into the application during compilation.
          • Exploitation Steps:
            • Compromise developer's build environment or dependency repositories.
            • Inject malicious code into build tools or dependencies.
            • During the build process, the malicious code is incorporated into the application binary.
            • Distribute the compromised application.
        • 1.5.2. Distribution Channel Compromise (Tauri Specific) [CRITICAL NODE]:
          • Critical Node Justification: The distribution channel is the final point of delivery. Compromising it ensures malware reaches users directly.
          • Attack Vector: Compromise the distribution channel (developer website, app store - focusing on developer-controlled channels) to replace the legitimate Tauri application with a malicious version.
          • Exploitation Steps:
            • Compromise the developer's website or other distribution infrastructure.
            • Replace the legitimate application binary with a malicious one.
            • Users download and install the malicious application from the compromised channel.
        • 1.5.3. Supply Chain Attacks via Tauri Templates/Starters [CRITICAL NODE]:
          • Critical Node Justification: Templates are reused across many projects. Compromising them has a multiplier effect, infecting multiple applications.
          • Attack Vector: Compromise popular Tauri templates or starter projects to inject malicious code that is carried over to new applications built using these templates.
          • Exploitation Steps:
            • Identify and compromise popular Tauri templates or starter projects (e.g., on GitHub).
            • Inject malicious code into the template.
            • Developers unknowingly use the compromised template to create new applications.
            • The malicious code is included in the newly built applications and distributed to users.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Application-Specific Vulnerabilities (Leveraging Tauri Features) [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Critical Node Justification: Application-specific vulnerabilities, especially when combined with Tauri's native capabilities, can lead to severe compromise.
  • High-Risk Path Breakdown:

    • 2.1. Insecure Usage of Tauri APIs in Application Code [CRITICAL NODE]:

      • Critical Node Justification: Developers might misuse Tauri APIs, creating vulnerabilities specific to their application logic that can be exploited via the frontend.
      • Attack Vectors:
        • 2.1.1. Developer misuses Tauri APIs (e.g., insecure file handling, command injection via API calls):
          • Attack Vector: Developers introduce vulnerabilities by incorrectly using Tauri APIs, such as allowing arbitrary file path access or enabling command injection through API calls.
          • Exploitation Steps:
            • 2.1.1.1. Insecure File System API Usage:
              • Attack Vector: Application allows the frontend to control file paths passed to Tauri file system APIs, leading to unauthorized file access or manipulation.
              • Exploitation Steps:
                • Identify API calls in the backend that handle file system operations based on frontend input.
                • Craft frontend JavaScript to send malicious file paths to the backend API.
                • Access or modify sensitive files outside the intended application scope.
            • 2.1.1.3. Insecure Inter-Process Communication (IPC) via Tauri Events/Commands:
              • Attack Vector: Application uses Tauri's IPC mechanisms (events, commands) insecurely, allowing manipulation of sensitive data or control flow between frontend and backend.
              • Exploitation Steps:
                • Analyze how the application uses Tauri events and commands for communication.
                • Identify vulnerabilities in IPC message handling or event processing.
                • Craft malicious frontend JavaScript to manipulate IPC messages or events to gain control or access sensitive data.

    • 2.2.1. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Tauri Frontend (Context Specific) [CRITICAL NODE]:

      • Critical Node Justification: XSS in a Tauri application is more dangerous than in a typical web browser because it can be leveraged to interact with the native backend via Tauri APIs.
      • Attack Vectors:
        • 2.2.1.1. Identify XSS vulnerabilities in the frontend code of the Tauri application:
          • Attack Vector: Find and exploit Cross-Site Scripting vulnerabilities in the frontend JavaScript code.
          • Exploitation Steps:
            • Identify input points in the frontend that are not properly sanitized or encoded.
            • Inject malicious JavaScript code into these input points (e.g., through URL parameters, form inputs, or data sources).
            • The injected script executes within the WebView context.
        • 2.2.1.2. Exploit XSS to execute malicious JavaScript within the WebView:
          • Attack Vector: Once XSS is achieved, execute malicious JavaScript code within the WebView.
          • Exploitation Steps:
            • Use the XSS vulnerability to inject JavaScript code.
            • The injected JavaScript can perform actions within the WebView's context.
        • 2.2.1.3. Leverage XSS to interact with Tauri API or native backend (beyond typical browser XSS impact):
          • Attack Vector: Use XSS to call Tauri APIs from the malicious JavaScript, bridging the gap from the frontend to the native backend and system.
          • Exploitation Steps:
            • From the XSS-injected JavaScript, use Tauri's JavaScript API bindings to call backend functions.
            • This allows the attacker to leverage the native capabilities of Tauri from within the compromised WebView.
        • 2.2.1.4. Achieve more significant compromise due to Tauri's native capabilities (e.g., file system access via API from XSS):
          • Attack Vector: Combine XSS with Tauri API access to achieve system-level compromise, such as file system access, process execution, or data exfiltration.
          • Exploitation Steps:
            • Use XSS to call Tauri APIs related to file system access, process spawning, or other sensitive native functionalities.
            • Perform actions that would not be possible with typical browser-based XSS, leading to a more severe compromise of the user's system.