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Threat Model Analysis for tauri-apps/tauri

Threat: Webview Engine Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Attackers exploit known or zero-day vulnerabilities in the underlying system webview engine (Chromium, WebKit, Gecko) used by Tauri. This can be achieved by serving malicious web content within the Tauri application, potentially leading to remote code execution within the webview sandbox or even sandbox escape to the native system.
    • Impact: Complete compromise of the webview sandbox, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution on the user's machine if sandbox escape is achieved. Data theft, application malfunction, and denial of service are also possible.
    • Tauri Component Affected: System Webview Engine (used by Tauri), Tauri Core (indirectly).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Encourage users to keep their operating systems and webview engines updated.
      • Utilize Tauri's built-in update mechanisms to ensure the application uses a reasonably recent webview.
      • Implement a strong Content Security Policy (CSP) to limit the capabilities of web content and reduce the impact of potential webview vulnerabilities.

Threat: Bypassing Webview Security Features via Tauri APIs

  • Description: Attackers leverage poorly designed or insecurely implemented Tauri APIs to circumvent standard webview security features like Content Security Policy (CSP) or Same-Origin Policy (SOP). By injecting malicious scripts into the webview, attackers can use exposed Tauri APIs to bypass these restrictions and escalate web-based attacks to the native system level.
    • Impact: Circumvention of web security measures, allowing for more impactful Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. Potential for accessing native system resources, executing commands, or stealing sensitive data through the exposed APIs.
    • Tauri Component Affected: Tauri API layer, Custom Commands, IPC mechanisms.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Conduct rigorous security reviews of all Tauri API usage and custom commands.
      • Implement the principle of least privilege for API access, only exposing necessary functionalities to the frontend.
      • Carefully configure and enforce Content Security Policy (CSP) and other web security headers, ensuring Tauri APIs do not undermine them.
      • Implement robust authorization and authentication for sensitive API calls.

Threat: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) with Native Context Impact

  • Description: Attackers inject malicious scripts into the web frontend of the Tauri application. Due to Tauri's architecture, successful XSS can be leveraged to call Tauri APIs, gaining access to native system functionalities beyond the typical web browser sandbox. This allows attackers to escalate the impact of XSS vulnerabilities significantly.
    • Impact: Elevated impact of XSS vulnerabilities. Attackers can potentially execute arbitrary code on the user's system via Tauri APIs, access local files, or perform other privileged operations. Data theft and application compromise are likely outcomes.
    • Tauri Component Affected: Web Frontend, Tauri API layer, Custom Commands, IPC mechanisms.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement robust input validation and output encoding in the web frontend to prevent XSS vulnerabilities.
      • Follow secure coding practices for web development, including using frameworks that mitigate XSS.
      • Minimize the surface area of exposed Tauri APIs.
      • Enforce strict authorization and input validation for all Tauri API calls, especially those handling user-provided data.

Threat: Vulnerabilities in Tauri Core or Custom Commands

  • Description: Attackers exploit bugs or security flaws within the Tauri core framework itself or in developer-implemented custom commands in the Rust backend. This could involve sending crafted inputs or exploiting logic errors to trigger vulnerabilities, potentially leading to remote code execution in the backend process or privilege escalation.
    • Impact: Compromise of the Tauri backend process. Potential for arbitrary code execution on the user's system, denial of service, data corruption, or privilege escalation.
    • Tauri Component Affected: Tauri Core Framework, Custom Commands (Rust backend).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Regularly update the Tauri framework to the latest stable version to benefit from security patches.
      • Conduct thorough security audits and code reviews of custom commands and backend code.
      • Follow secure coding practices in Rust, paying close attention to memory safety, input validation, and error handling.

Threat: Insecurely Implemented Custom Commands

  • Description: Developers create custom commands in the Rust backend that are vulnerable to injection attacks (command injection, SQL injection), insecure data handling, or authorization bypasses. Attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities by sending malicious requests from the web frontend to the vulnerable custom commands via Tauri's IPC.
    • Impact: Backend vulnerabilities exposed to the frontend. Potential for arbitrary command execution on the server (command injection), database compromise (SQL injection), data breaches, or unauthorized access to backend functionalities.
    • Tauri Component Affected: Custom Commands (Rust backend), IPC mechanisms.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Apply secure coding principles when developing custom commands.
      • Implement robust input validation and sanitization for all data received from the frontend in custom commands.
      • Use parameterized queries or ORMs to prevent injection attacks when interacting with databases.
      • Enforce proper authorization and access control for sensitive custom commands.

Threat: Exposure of Sensitive Backend Functionality to the Frontend

  • Description: Tauri APIs or custom commands are designed in a way that exposes sensitive backend functionalities or data to the web frontend without proper authorization or access control. Attackers, potentially through XSS or a compromised frontend, can then access and misuse these exposed functionalities.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive backend functionalities and data. Potential for data breaches, privilege escalation, and misuse of backend resources.
    • Tauri Component Affected: Tauri API layer, Custom Commands, IPC mechanisms.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Follow the principle of least privilege when designing Tauri APIs and custom commands.
      • Only expose necessary functionalities to the frontend.
      • Implement robust authorization and authentication mechanisms for sensitive API calls.
      • Carefully review the API surface and minimize its exposure.

Threat: Supply Chain Attacks on Tauri Dependencies

  • Description: Attackers compromise dependencies used by the Tauri application during the build process (Rust crates, Node.js packages). This can be done by injecting malicious code into popular packages or through dependency confusion attacks. Compromised dependencies can introduce malicious code into the final application binary during build time.
    • Impact: Introduction of malicious code into the application. Potential for widespread compromise of user systems, data theft, and application malfunction.
    • Tauri Component Affected: Build Process, Dependencies (Rust crates, Node.js packages).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Use dependency scanning tools (e.g., cargo audit, npm audit) to identify known vulnerabilities in dependencies.
      • Pin dependency versions in Cargo.toml and package.json to ensure consistent builds and reduce the risk of unexpected updates introducing vulnerabilities.
      • Regularly audit dependencies and their licenses.

Threat: Compromised Build Environment or Tooling

  • Description: Attackers compromise the development or build environment (developer machines, CI/CD pipelines, build tools). A compromised environment allows attackers to inject malicious code into the application during the build process, leading to the distribution of backdoored applications to users.
    • Impact: Introduction of malicious code into the application. Potential for widespread compromise of user systems, data theft, and application malfunction.
    • Tauri Component Affected: Build Process, Build Environment, Development Environment.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure development machines and CI/CD pipelines with strong access controls and monitoring.
      • Implement least privilege principles for access to build environments.
      • Use trusted and verified build tools and environments.
      • Employ code signing to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the distributed application.

Threat: Injection Attacks via IPC Channels

  • Description: Attackers inject malicious commands or data through the IPC channels used for communication between the web frontend and the Rust backend. This can happen if data passed via IPC is not properly validated and sanitized on the backend side, allowing attackers to manipulate backend operations.
    • Impact: Backend vulnerabilities exploited from the frontend. Potential for arbitrary command execution on the server, data manipulation, or denial of service.
    • Tauri Component Affected: IPC mechanisms, Custom Commands (Rust backend).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement robust input validation and sanitization for all data received from the frontend via IPC in the backend.
      • Treat IPC messages as untrusted input.
      • Use structured data formats for IPC (e.g., JSON) and validate the structure and content on both sides.

Threat: Insecure Update Channel (Man-in-the-Middle Attacks)

  • Description: Attackers perform man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks on the update channel if it's not properly secured (e.g., using unencrypted HTTP). By intercepting communication between the application and the update server, attackers can replace legitimate updates with malicious ones, distributing malware to users.
    • Impact: Distribution of malicious updates to users. Widespread compromise of user systems, data theft, and application malfunction.
    • Tauri Component Affected: Tauri Updater, Update Channel.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Always use HTTPS for update channels to ensure encrypted communication.
      • Implement code signing for updates to ensure authenticity and integrity.
      • Verify signatures of downloaded updates before applying them.

Threat: Compromised Update Server

  • Description: Attackers compromise the update server hosting application updates. A compromised update server allows attackers to distribute malicious updates to all users of the application, potentially leading to widespread malware distribution.
    • Impact: Distribution of malicious updates to users. Widespread compromise of user systems, data theft, and application malfunction.
    • Tauri Component Affected: Update Server, Tauri Updater (indirectly).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure the update server infrastructure with strong access controls, regular security updates, and monitoring.
      • Implement intrusion detection and prevention systems for the update server.
      • Regularly audit the security of the update server.

Threat: Insecure Update Verification Process

  • Description: The update verification process in the Tauri application is flawed or weak. Attackers might be able to bypass signature verification or other integrity checks, allowing them to install malicious updates even if they are not properly signed or from a trusted source.
    • Impact: Installation of malicious updates despite security measures. Widespread compromise of user systems, data theft, and application malfunction.
    • Tauri Component Affected: Tauri Updater, Update Verification Logic.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement robust and cryptographically sound update verification.
      • Verify digital signatures of updates using trusted public keys.
      • Ensure the verification process is resistant to bypass attempts and logic errors.