attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for tauri-apps/tauri

Objective: Gain Arbitrary Code Execution on User's System [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Visualization

Gain Arbitrary Code Execution on User's System [CRITICAL] | --------------------------------------------------- | | Exploit Tauri's IPC Mechanism [HIGH RISK] Exploit Tauri's API (tauri.conf.json & Rust Backend) | | ------------------------------- --------------------------------- | | |

1. Bypass IPC 2. Inject Malicious 3. Exploit Custom Allowlist [CRITICAL] Commands/Events [CRITICAL] Protocols/Schemes | | | ----------------- ----------------- | | | | 1a. Find Flaws in 2a. Craft Malicious 3a. Insecure File Handling [HIGH RISK] Allowlist Logic Payloads [HIGH RISK] (e.g., Regex) [HIGH RISK] | |
2. Command Injection into Allowed Commands [HIGH RISK]

Attack Tree Path: Gain Arbitrary Code Execution on User's System [CRITICAL]

• Description: This is the ultimate objective of the attacker. Achieving this allows the attacker to run any code they want on the user's machine, effectively taking complete control.
• Why Critical: This is the root node and represents the worst-case scenario.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Tauri's IPC Mechanism [HIGH RISK]

• Description: Tauri's Inter-Process Communication (IPC) is the bridge between the frontend (JavaScript) and the backend (Rust). It's a critical security boundary because it controls the flow of commands and data between these two environments.
• Why High Risk: The IPC is a direct pathway for the frontend to interact with the backend, which often performs privileged operations. Exploiting this mechanism is a direct route to code execution.

Attack Tree Path: 1. Bypass IPC Allowlist [CRITICAL]

• Description: Tauri allows developers to define an "allowlist" of commands that the frontend is permitted to invoke. Bypassing this allowlist is a crucial step for an attacker, as it removes the primary restriction on which backend functions can be called.
• Why Critical: The allowlist is the main defense against unauthorized command execution. If bypassed, the attacker gains significant freedom.

Attack Tree Path: 1a. Find Flaws in Allowlist Logic (e.g., Regex) [HIGH RISK]

• Description: The allowlist is often implemented using regular expressions (regex). Poorly written or overly permissive regexes can be bypassed, allowing unintended commands to be executed. Attackers can craft specific inputs that exploit weaknesses in the regex to match commands that should be blocked.
• Why High Risk: Regex vulnerabilities are relatively common and can be subtle. This is a practical and often successful attack vector.
  • Example: A regex intended to allow command_foo might accidentally allow command_foobar due to a missing end-of-string anchor ($).
• Mitigation:
  • Use a robust regex testing tool.
  • Test with a wide variety of inputs, including edge cases.
  • Consider using a simpler allowlist mechanism (e.g., a list of exact string matches) if possible.
  • Use a linter to identify potentially dangerous regex patterns.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Inject Malicious Commands/Events [CRITICAL]

• Description: Once the allowlist is bypassed (or if a command is inherently dangerous but allowed), the attacker can send arbitrary commands or events to the backend.
• Why Critical: This is the direct precursor to code execution. The attacker is now able to control what the backend does.

Attack Tree Path: 2a. Craft Malicious Payloads [HIGH RISK]

• Description: Even if a command is allowed, the data passed to that command (the payload) can be malicious. The attacker crafts a payload specifically designed to exploit vulnerabilities in the backend code that handles the command. This might involve overflowing buffers, injecting code, or manipulating data structures.
• Why High Risk: This is a common and effective attack technique. Even with an allowlist, vulnerabilities in the handling of command arguments can lead to exploitation.
  • Example: A command that takes a filename as an argument might be vulnerable to path traversal if the backend doesn't properly sanitize the filename.
• Mitigation:
  • Treat all input from the frontend as untrusted.
  • Implement strict input validation and sanitization for all command arguments.
  • Use a schema validation library to enforce expected data types and formats.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Command Injection into Allowed Commands [HIGH RISK]

• Description: This occurs when user-supplied data is used to construct a command (e.g., a shell command or SQL query) without proper sanitization. The attacker can inject their own code into the command, which is then executed by the backend.
• Why High Risk: This is a very direct and powerful attack, leading to immediate code execution. It's a classic vulnerability pattern.
  • Example: If the backend uses user input to build a shell command like run_command $user_input, an attacker could provide input like ; rm -rf /, leading to disastrous consequences.
• Mitigation:
  • Never construct shell commands or SQL queries directly from user input.
  • Use parameterized queries for SQL.
  • For shell commands, use safe alternatives whenever possible. If unavoidable, use a well-vetted escaping/quoting library.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Tauri's API (tauri.conf.json & Rust Backend)

• Description: This branch covers vulnerabilities that arise from misconfigurations or flaws within the Rust backend code itself, or through the misuse of Tauri's provided APIs.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Custom Protocols/Schemes

• Description: Tauri allows developers to define custom URI schemes (e.g., myapp://...). These schemes are handled by custom Rust code, and if not implemented securely, they can be exploited.

Attack Tree Path: 3a. Insecure File Handling [HIGH RISK]

• Description: A custom protocol handler might be used to access files on the user's system. If the handler doesn't properly validate and sanitize file paths, an attacker could use it to read or write arbitrary files, potentially leading to code execution (e.g., by overwriting a system library or configuration file).
• Why High Risk: File system access is inherently dangerous. Improperly handled file paths are a common source of vulnerabilities.
  • Example: A protocol handler that allows accessing files via myapp://files/path/to/file might be vulnerable to path traversal if it doesn't prevent access to paths like myapp://files/../../etc/passwd.
• Mitigation:
  • Implement strict path validation and sanitization.
  • Use a whitelist of allowed file paths or directories, if possible.
  • Consider using a sandbox or chroot environment to restrict file access.
  • Avoid exposing file system access through custom protocols unless absolutely necessary.