attack-surface.md

Attack Surface Analysis for timberio/vector

Attack Surface: Source Input Parsing Vulnerabilities

• Description: Flaws in how Vector parses data from various input sources, leading to potential exploits.
• Vector Contribution: Vector's architecture necessitates parsing diverse input formats, creating opportunities for vulnerabilities in its parsing logic.
• Example: A malicious actor sends a crafted payload to a Vector socket source exploiting a buffer overflow in the socket input parser, leading to remote code execution.
• Impact: Denial of Service, Remote Code Execution, Information Disclosure.
• Risk Severity: High to Critical.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Keep Vector updated: Regularly update Vector to the latest version to patch known parser vulnerabilities.
  • Input Validation: Implement input validation and sanitization before data enters Vector if possible.
  • Robust Sources: Utilize well-tested and robust input source components.
  • Fuzzing: Conduct fuzzing and security testing specifically on Vector's input parsers.

Attack Surface: Lua Transform Code Injection

• Description: Execution of arbitrary code through the lua transform component, enabling attackers to compromise Vector.
• Vector Contribution: The lua transform feature in Vector directly enables execution of Lua scripts, creating a code injection vulnerability if misused.
• Example: An attacker injects malicious Lua code into a Vector configuration. When a remap transform using lua processes data, the malicious code executes, granting the attacker control over the Vector process.
• Impact: Remote Code Execution, Data Exfiltration, Privilege Escalation, Denial of Service.
• Risk Severity: Critical.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Avoid lua Transform: Minimize or eliminate the use of the lua transform, especially with untrusted or dynamic configurations.
  • Control Lua Scripts: If lua is necessary, strictly control the source and content of Lua scripts.
  • Input Sanitization for Lua: Implement rigorous input validation before data is processed by Lua scripts.
  • Least Privilege: Run Vector with minimal privileges to limit the impact of potential code execution.
  • Use VRL: Prefer using Vector Remap Language (VRL) in remap transforms as a safer alternative to Lua.

Attack Surface: Sink Output Injection

• Description: Injection of malicious data into sink destinations due to flaws in Vector's output handling, potentially compromising downstream systems.
• Vector Contribution: Vector's responsibility to output data to various sinks requires formatting and handling data for different systems, creating injection risks if not properly implemented.
• Example: Vector writes logs to a database sink. A malicious log entry containing SQL injection code is processed by Vector and written to the database unsanitized, leading to database compromise.
• Impact: Data Breach, Data Manipulation, Unauthorized Access to Sink Systems, Lateral Movement.
• Risk Severity: High to Critical.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Output Sanitization: Sanitize and validate data within Vector before sending it to sinks, especially for databases, message queues, and APIs.
  • Parameterized Queries: Utilize parameterized queries or prepared statements when writing to databases via Vector sinks, if supported by the sink.
  • Sink Permissions: Apply the principle of least privilege to sink connections, granting Vector only necessary permissions.
  • Configuration Review: Regularly review and test sink configurations for security vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Vector API Authentication Bypass

• Description: Circumventing or exploiting weaknesses in Vector's management API authentication, allowing unauthorized control.
• Vector Contribution: Vector's management API, if not properly secured, becomes a direct entry point for attackers to control Vector instances.
• Example: Vector's API is exposed with weak default credentials or lacks proper authentication mechanisms. An attacker gains unauthorized API access and modifies Vector's configuration for malicious purposes.
• Impact: Full Control of Vector Instance, Data Exfiltration, Denial of Service, Configuration Tampering.
• Risk Severity: Critical.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Strong API Authentication: Enforce strong authentication for Vector's API (e.g., API keys, mutual TLS, strong passwords).
  • HTTPS/TLS: Use HTTPS/TLS to encrypt API traffic and protect credentials during transmission.
  • Restrict API Access: Limit API access to authorized networks and users using firewalls and network segmentation.
  • API Access Auditing: Regularly review and audit API access logs for suspicious activity.
  • Disable API (if unused): Disable the API entirely if it is not required for management in the deployment environment.

Attack Surface: Insecure Configuration Storage

• Description: Storing Vector's configuration in a manner that exposes sensitive information to unauthorized access.
• Vector Contribution: Vector relies on configuration files that can contain sensitive credentials and connection details. Insecure storage directly exposes these secrets.
• Example: Vector's configuration file containing API keys is stored with overly permissive file permissions. An attacker gains access to the system, reads the configuration file, and compromises the external APIs using the exposed keys.
• Impact: Credential Compromise, Data Breach, Unauthorized Access to Downstream Systems, Configuration Tampering.
• Risk Severity: High.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Secure Configuration Files: Store Vector's configuration files with restricted permissions, accessible only to the Vector process user.
  • External Secret Management: Avoid storing sensitive credentials directly in configuration files. Utilize environment variables or dedicated secrets management systems.
  • Configuration Encryption: Encrypt sensitive data within configuration files if Vector or external tools provide such capabilities.
  • Regular Audits: Regularly audit configuration file permissions and storage locations to ensure ongoing security.