Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
104 lines (87 loc) · 11.4 KB

threat-modeling.md

File metadata and controls

104 lines (87 loc) · 11.4 KB

Threat Model Analysis for timberio/vector

Threat: Malicious Data Injection

  • Description: An attacker injects crafted malicious data through Vector sources (e.g., logs, metrics). This data could contain exploits, commands, or payloads designed to be executed by downstream systems or Vector itself. Attackers might leverage vulnerabilities in parsing logic or exploit lack of input validation within Vector.
    • Impact: Downstream system compromise, data corruption, denial of service, information disclosure if malicious data triggers unintended actions or reveals sensitive information.
    • Affected Vector Component: Sources, Transforms (if parsing is done in transforms), Sinks (if sinks are vulnerable to injected data).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement strict input validation and sanitization in Vector transforms.
      • Use Vector's built-in parsing and filtering capabilities to neutralize suspicious data.
      • Apply least privilege principles to downstream systems to limit the impact of successful injection.
      • Regularly update Vector and its dependencies to patch potential parsing vulnerabilities.

Threat: Vulnerabilities in Transform Functions (Especially Custom Transforms)

  • Description: Custom transforms, particularly those written in Lua or WASM, may contain security vulnerabilities such as injection flaws, resource exhaustion bugs, or logic errors. Even built-in transforms might have undiscovered vulnerabilities within Vector. Attackers could exploit these vulnerabilities by crafting specific input data that triggers malicious behavior during transformation within Vector.
    • Impact: Code execution within Vector process, denial of service, data corruption, information disclosure, potentially wider system compromise if Vector process has elevated privileges.
    • Affected Vector Component: Transforms (especially custom transforms), Vector core if built-in transform is vulnerable.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (if code execution is possible)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Thoroughly review and security test all custom transforms, including static analysis and dynamic testing.
      • Follow secure coding practices when developing custom transforms (input validation, output encoding, resource management).
      • Keep Vector and its dependencies updated to patch known vulnerabilities in built-in transforms and underlying libraries.
      • Consider using Vector's built-in transforms whenever possible to reduce the attack surface of custom code.
      • Implement sandboxing or isolation for custom transform execution if possible.

Threat: Data Exfiltration via Misconfigured Sinks

  • Description: Operators misconfigure Vector sinks, unintentionally routing sensitive data to unauthorized or insecure destinations through Vector. This could be due to configuration errors within Vector, lack of understanding of sink configurations, or malicious intent by insiders modifying Vector configuration.
    • Impact: Data leakage, exposure of sensitive information to unauthorized parties, compliance violations, reputational damage.
    • Affected Vector Component: Sinks, Sink configurations within Vector.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the sensitivity of leaked data)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Carefully review and validate sink configurations in Vector to ensure data is routed only to authorized and secure destinations.
      • Implement the principle of least privilege for sink configurations within Vector, limiting the available sink destinations.
      • Implement access controls and network segmentation to restrict sink destinations and prevent unauthorized outbound connections from Vector.
      • Regularly audit sink configurations in Vector for misconfigurations and unauthorized changes.
      • Use infrastructure-as-code and configuration management to enforce consistent and secure sink configurations for Vector.

Threat: Sink Compromise and Data Interception/Manipulation

  • Description: An attacker compromises a sink destination (e.g., monitoring system, SIEM, database) that Vector is sending data to. Data sent by Vector to this compromised sink can be intercepted, manipulated, or stolen after leaving Vector. Attackers might exploit vulnerabilities in the sink system itself or its network infrastructure, impacting data originating from Vector.
    • Impact: Data breach, loss of confidentiality, data integrity compromise, manipulation of monitoring data leading to missed alerts or false positives, tampering with security logs in SIEM, all impacting data processed by Vector.
    • Affected Vector Component: Sinks, Data in transit from Vector to sinks.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the sensitivity of data and the criticality of the sink system)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Ensure the security of all sink destinations by applying security best practices (patching, hardening, access control) independently of Vector.
      • Use secure communication protocols (e.g., TLS/SSL) for data transmission from Vector to sinks to encrypt data in transit.
      • Implement authentication and authorization for sinks to restrict access to authorized systems only from Vector.
      • Monitor the security posture of sink systems and promptly address any vulnerabilities, considering the data flow from Vector.
      • Consider using mutual TLS (mTLS) for sink connections from Vector for stronger authentication.

Threat: Credential Leakage in Sink Configurations

  • Description: Sink configurations within Vector often require credentials (API keys, passwords, tokens) to authenticate with destination systems. If these credentials are not securely managed within Vector's configuration, they could be leaked through configuration files, environment variables, logs, or other means related to Vector's management. Attackers gaining access to these credentials from Vector's configuration can then access the sink systems and potentially wider systems.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to sink systems, data breach in sink systems, potential lateral movement to other systems if credentials are reused, reputational damage, all stemming from leaked credentials managed by Vector.
    • Affected Vector Component: Sink configurations within Vector, Credential management within Vector.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the scope of access granted by leaked credentials)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Utilize secure credential management practices within Vector.
      • Use Vector's secrets management features or integrate with external secrets management systems (e.g., HashiCorp Vault) for Vector.
      • Avoid storing credentials directly in Vector configuration files or environment variables.
      • Encrypt credentials at rest if stored locally by Vector.
      • Implement least privilege access for credentials used by Vector, granting only necessary permissions.
      • Regularly rotate credentials used by Vector and audit credential usage.

Threat: Unauthorized Access to Vector Configuration

  • Description: Attackers gain unauthorized access to Vector's configuration files or management interfaces. This could be through exploiting vulnerabilities in the system running Vector, social engineering, or insider threats targeting Vector's configuration. Once access is gained, attackers can modify Vector's behavior for malicious purposes.
    • Impact: Data leakage by redirecting sinks via Vector configuration, denial of service by disrupting pipelines through Vector configuration, data manipulation by altering transforms in Vector configuration, system compromise if configuration changes introduce vulnerabilities in Vector's operation.
    • Affected Vector Component: Vector configuration files, Management interfaces (if exposed by Vector).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Restrict access to Vector's configuration files and management interfaces using strong access controls (file system permissions, network firewalls, authentication and authorization).
      • Implement role-based access control (RBAC) if Vector provides it or through underlying system security mechanisms managing Vector access.
      • Regularly audit access to Vector configuration and management interfaces.
      • Use secure channels (e.g., SSH, HTTPS) for accessing and managing Vector configuration.

Threat: Configuration Injection

  • Description: Vector's configuration is dynamically generated or loaded from untrusted sources (e.g., external APIs, Git repositories). Attackers could inject malicious configuration data into these sources, altering Vector's behavior when the configuration is loaded by Vector.
    • Impact: Data leakage, denial of service, data manipulation, system compromise, similar to unauthorized configuration access but achieved through configuration injection into Vector's configuration loading process.
    • Affected Vector Component: Configuration loading mechanism in Vector, Sources of configuration data for Vector.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Ensure that Vector's configuration is loaded from trusted sources only.
      • Implement integrity checks and validation for configuration files before loading them into Vector.
      • Use version control and code review processes for configuration changes, even if dynamically generated for Vector.
      • Digitally sign configuration files to ensure authenticity and integrity when loaded by Vector.
      • Sanitize and validate any external data used to generate Vector configuration.

Threat: Vulnerabilities in Vector Core Code

  • Description: Vector itself, being software, may contain vulnerabilities in its core Rust codebase. These vulnerabilities could be exploited by attackers to gain unauthorized access to Vector, cause denial of service of Vector, or execute arbitrary code within the Vector process.
    • Impact: Vector process compromise, denial of service of Vector, data breach through Vector, potential wider system compromise if Vector process has elevated privileges.
    • Affected Vector Component: Vector core codebase, Vector process.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the nature of vulnerability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Keep Vector updated to the latest version to patch known vulnerabilities.
      • Subscribe to Vector's security advisories and promptly apply security updates.
      • Implement vulnerability scanning and penetration testing for Vector deployments to proactively identify vulnerabilities.
      • Run Vector with least privilege to limit the impact of potential exploits.