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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for timberio/vector

Attack Surface: Network Input Source Flooding (DoS/DDoS)

  • Description: Attackers flood network-based input sources (TCP, UDP, HTTP) with excessive data, overwhelming Vector or the network.
  • Vector Contribution: Vector's core function as a data aggregator, listening on network ports for various input sources, makes it a direct target for DoS attacks.
  • Example: An attacker sends millions of UDP packets per second to a Vector instance configured to receive syslog data on UDP port 514.
  • Impact: Vector becomes unresponsive, preventing legitimate log data processing. Network congestion may impact other services relying on the same network.
  • Risk Severity: High (potentially Critical if Vector is essential for security monitoring or other critical functions).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Rate Limiting (Vector Config): Configure Vector's limit transform (or equivalent) to restrict the rate of incoming data from each source IP address or network. This is a direct Vector mitigation.
    • Resource Limits (OS-Level, but Vector-Aware): Configure operating system resource limits (e.g., ulimit in Linux) specifically for the Vector process to prevent it from consuming excessive resources. This is OS-level, but done because of Vector.
    • Traffic Shaping/QoS (Network-Level, but Vector-Aware): Use network traffic shaping or Quality of Service (QoS) mechanisms, configured with awareness of Vector's traffic, to prioritize legitimate traffic. This is network-level, but done because of Vector.

Attack Surface: Malicious Payload Injection (via Input Sources)

  • Description: Attackers inject crafted data into input sources to exploit vulnerabilities in Vector's parsing, transformation, or sink logic.
  • Vector Contribution: Vector's support for numerous input formats (JSON, XML, syslog, raw TCP/UDP, etc.) and its powerful VRL transformation language directly create a large attack surface for injection vulnerabilities. The parsing and processing logic within Vector is the target.
  • Example: An attacker sends a specially crafted JSON payload to a Vector instance, exploiting a deserialization vulnerability in Vector's internal JSON parsing library. Or, an attacker sends a malicious syslog message designed to trigger a buffer overflow in Vector's syslog parser.
  • Impact: Arbitrary code execution (most severe), information disclosure, denial of service, data corruption.
  • Risk Severity: Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Input Validation (Vector Config): Implement strict input validation within Vector's configuration for all input sources. Use Vector's features (if available) to validate data types, lengths, and formats. Prioritize allowlists over blocklists. This is a direct Vector mitigation.
    • Sanitization (Vector Config): Use Vector's transformation capabilities (e.g., VRL) to sanitize input data, removing or escaping potentially dangerous characters before further processing. This is a direct Vector mitigation.
    • Regular Expression Security (Vector Config): Carefully review and test all regular expressions used within Vector's configuration (e.g., in regex transforms) to prevent ReDoS attacks. Use tools to analyze regex complexity. This is a direct Vector mitigation.
    • VRL Sandboxing (Inherent to Vector): Rely on Vector's inherent design, which provides some level of sandboxing for VRL execution, to limit the impact of malicious VRL code. This is a direct aspect of Vector's architecture.
    • Dependency Management (Vector Updates): Keep Vector itself up-to-date to patch vulnerabilities in its internal components and bundled libraries. This is directly related to Vector's security.
    • Least Privilege (OS-Level, but Vector-Specific): Run the Vector process with the least privileges necessary to perform its tasks. This limits the impact of a successful exploit. This is OS-level, but done because of Vector.

Attack Surface: VRL Code Injection

  • Description: Attackers inject malicious VRL code into Vector's configuration, leading to arbitrary code execution within Vector's context.
  • Vector Contribution: VRL, being a core component of Vector and a powerful scripting language, directly introduces this attack surface. The vulnerability lies within Vector's VRL interpreter.
  • Example: An attacker gains access to Vector's configuration file and modifies a VRL transform to execute arbitrary shell commands (e.g., using VRL's ability to interact with the system, if such features exist and are enabled).
  • Impact: Arbitrary code execution (most severe), information disclosure, denial of service, data corruption.
  • Risk Severity: Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Configuration File Security (OS-Level, but Vector-Specific): Protect Vector's configuration files with strong file permissions, restricting access to authorized users only. This is crucial because of Vector's reliance on configuration.
    • Configuration Validation (Vector-Specific): Implement strict validation of Vector's configuration within Vector itself (if possible) or through external tools, including validation of the VRL code. This is a direct Vector mitigation.
    • Code Review (Vector Config): Regularly review VRL code within Vector's configuration for potential security vulnerabilities. This is a direct Vector mitigation.
    • Least Privilege (OS-Level, but Vector-Specific): Run the Vector process with the least privileges necessary. This limits the impact of malicious VRL code. This is OS-level, but done because of Vector.
    • Monitoring (Vector Logs): Monitor Vector's logs and resource usage for signs of suspicious activity related to VRL execution. This is a direct Vector mitigation.

Attack Surface: Sink Credential Exposure

  • Description: Attackers gain access to credentials (API keys, passwords) used by Vector to authenticate with sinks (e.g., cloud services).
  • Vector Contribution: Vector directly requires and manages these credentials to send data to various sinks. The way Vector stores and handles these credentials is the key factor.
  • Example: An attacker gains access to Vector's configuration file, which contains an unencrypted AWS S3 access key.
  • Impact: Data breaches, unauthorized access to cloud services, financial losses.
  • Risk Severity: High (potentially Critical depending on the sensitivity of the connected sink).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Environment Variables (OS-Level, but Vector-Specific): Store credentials in environment variables rather than directly in Vector's configuration file. This is a common practice, made necessary because of Vector's need for credentials.
    • Secret Management Systems (External, but Vector-Integrated): Use a secret management system (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager) and configure Vector to retrieve credentials from it. This is an integration with Vector.
    • Configuration File Encryption (OS/Tool-Level, but Vector-Specific): Encrypt Vector's configuration file if it must contain sensitive information. This is done because of Vector's configuration.
    • Least Privilege (Sink-Specific, but Vector-Driven): Grant Vector only the necessary permissions to access the sink. This is configured on the sink side, but driven by Vector's requirements.
    • Regular Credential Rotation (Sink and Vector): Regularly rotate credentials to limit the impact of a compromise.

Attack Surface: Dependency Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Vector relies on external libraries, which may contain vulnerabilities.
  • Vector Contribution: Vector, as a software project, directly introduces this risk through its dependencies. The vulnerabilities are within Vector's codebase (via its dependencies).
  • Example: A vulnerability is discovered in a logging library used internally by Vector, allowing for remote code execution.
  • Impact: Varies, but could include arbitrary code execution, information disclosure, denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: Varies (High to Critical).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Software Composition Analysis (SCA) (Tooling, Vector-Focused): Use an SCA tool to identify and track Vector's dependencies and their known vulnerabilities. This is done specifically for Vector.
    • Regular Updates (Vector Updates): Keep Vector itself up-to-date. This is the primary mitigation, as updates often include patched dependencies. This is directly related to Vector's security.
    • Dependency Pinning (Vector Config): If possible, pin Vector's dependency versions to specific, known-good versions (though this can hinder security updates). This is a configuration choice within Vector's build/deployment process.

Attack Surface: Unauthenticated/Unauthorized API Access

  • Description: If Vector exposes an API, attackers could access it without proper authentication or authorization.
    • Vector Contribution: If Vector's API feature is enabled, Vector directly exposes this attack surface. The vulnerability lies in the API's implementation within Vector.
    • Example: An attacker sends requests to Vector's API to modify its configuration or retrieve internal data without providing any credentials.
    • Impact: Configuration tampering, data exfiltration, denial of service.
    • Risk Severity: High (potentially Critical).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Authentication (Vector Config): Implement strong authentication mechanisms for Vector's API (e.g., API keys, JWTs, mutual TLS) within Vector's configuration. This is a direct Vector mitigation.
      • Authorization (Vector Config): Implement authorization checks within Vector's API implementation to ensure that only authorized users can access specific API endpoints and resources. This is a direct Vector mitigation.
      • Input Validation (Vector API): Validate all input to Vector's API to prevent injection attacks. This is part of the API's implementation within Vector.
      • Rate Limiting (Vector Config): Implement rate limiting for Vector's API within Vector's configuration to prevent denial-of-service attacks. This is a direct Vector mitigation.
      • Disable if Unnecessary (Vector Config): If Vector's API is not needed, disable it entirely within Vector's configuration. This is a direct Vector mitigation.