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Threat Model Analysis for timberio/vector

Threat: Unauthorized Vector Instance Deployment

  • Threat: Unauthorized Vector Instance Deployment

    • Description: An attacker deploys a rogue Vector instance within the network, masquerading as a legitimate instance. The attacker configures their instance to listen on the same ports or use the same service discovery mechanisms as the legitimate instance, intercepting data or injecting malicious data.
    • Impact:
      • Data interception and theft.
      • Injection of fabricated data into the pipeline.
      • Disruption of legitimate data flow (DoS).
      • Potential for lateral movement within the network.
    • Affected Component: Vector's service discovery mechanisms (if used), network configuration, and any component that interacts with Vector based on its network presence (sources and sinks).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Network Segmentation.
      • Strong Authentication (e.g., mTLS) between Vector and other components.
      • Secure Service Discovery Configuration.
      • Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS).
      • Centralized, Secure Configuration Management.

Threat: Configuration File Tampering (Transforms)

  • Threat: Configuration File Tampering (Transforms)

    • Description: An attacker with write access to Vector's configuration file modifies the transforms section. They alter existing transformations or introduce new ones to manipulate data, potentially removing redaction rules, changing aggregation logic, or adding a transform that sends data to an unauthorized location.
    • Impact:
      • Data corruption or loss.
      • Exposure of sensitive data.
      • Incorrect data analysis and reporting.
      • Data exfiltration.
    • Affected Component: The transforms component of Vector; specifically, the configuration parsing and execution of transform logic.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Restrict File System Permissions.
      • Secure Configuration Management with version control and change auditing.
      • File Integrity Monitoring (FIM).
      • Input Validation (for dynamic configurations).
      • Regular Configuration Audits.

Threat: Configuration File Tampering (Sinks)

  • Threat: Configuration File Tampering (Sinks)

    • Description: An attacker with write access to the Vector configuration file modifies the sinks section, changing data destinations, adding unauthorized sinks, or modifying authentication credentials for existing sinks.
    • Impact:
      • Data exfiltration.
      • Data loss.
      • Denial of service.
    • Affected Component: The sinks component of Vector; specifically, the configuration parsing and connection management to output destinations.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Restrict File System Permissions.
      • Secure Configuration Management.
      • File Integrity Monitoring (FIM).
      • Secrets Management (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager).
      • Regular Configuration Audits.

Threat: Exploitation of Vector Source Vulnerability (e.g., file source)

  • Threat: Exploitation of Vector Source Vulnerability (e.g., file source)

    • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in a specific Vector source component. For example, a crafted log file could trigger a buffer overflow in the file source's parsing logic.
    • Impact:
      • Denial of service (Vector crashes).
      • Potential for arbitrary code execution.
      • Data corruption.
    • Affected Component: The specific source component being exploited (e.g., file, journald, kafka, http, syslog). This impacts the input handling and parsing logic of that source.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the vulnerability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Keep Vector Updated.
      • Input Validation within the source component (Vector developer responsibility).
      • Fuzz Testing of source components.
      • Security Audits of Vector's codebase (source components).
      • Least Privilege for Vector's access to source data.

Threat: Exploitation of Vector Sink Vulnerability (e.g., http sink)

  • Threat: Exploitation of Vector Sink Vulnerability (e.g., http sink)

    • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in a specific Vector sink component. For example, a vulnerability in the HTTP client library used by the http sink could be exploited.
    • Impact:
      • Denial of service (Vector cannot send data).
      • Potential for arbitrary code execution.
      • Data loss.
    • Affected Component: The specific sink component being exploited (e.g., http, elasticsearch, kafka, s3). This impacts the output handling and communication logic of that sink.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the vulnerability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Keep Vector Updated.
      • Input Validation (for sink configurations).
      • Fuzz Testing of sink components.
      • Security Audits.
      • Network Segmentation.

Threat: Resource Exhaustion via Malicious Input (Sources)

  • Threat: Resource Exhaustion via Malicious Input (Sources)

    • Description: An attacker sends a large volume of data or specially crafted data to a Vector source, designed to consume excessive resources (CPU, memory, disk).
    • Impact:
      • Denial of service (Vector becomes unresponsive or crashes).
      • Data loss.
      • Potential for cascading failures.
    • Affected Component: The specific source component receiving the input, and potentially the entire Vector process.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Rate Limiting on sources.
      • Input Validation.
      • Resource Limits (memory, message size).
      • Monitoring and Alerting for unusual resource usage.
      • Circuit Breakers.

Threat: Dependency Vulnerabilities

  • Threat: Dependency Vulnerabilities

    • Description: A vulnerability is discovered in one of Vector's external library dependencies (Rust crates). An attacker crafts input or exploits a configuration weakness to trigger the vulnerability within Vector.
    • Impact:
      • Denial of Service.
      • Arbitrary Code Execution (gaining control of the Vector process).
      • Data Corruption or Loss.
    • Affected Component: Potentially any component of Vector that uses the vulnerable dependency.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the vulnerability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Dependency Management (e.g., cargo).
      • Vulnerability Scanning (e.g., cargo audit).
      • Prompt Patching of dependencies.
      • Vendor Monitoring for security advisories.

Threat: Tampering with Vector Binary

  • Threat: Tampering with Vector Binary

    • Description: An attacker replaces the Vector binary with a modified version containing malicious code.
    • Impact:
      • Complete compromise of Vector's functionality.
      • Data exfiltration.
      • Arbitrary code execution with Vector's privileges.
      • Denial of Service.
    • Affected Component: The entire Vector application.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Code Signing and Verification.
      • Secure Boot mechanisms.
      • File Integrity Monitoring.
      • Secure Build Process.
      • Limited Access to the system.