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Attack Tree Analysis for valeriansaliou/sonic

Objective: Disrupt Service, Exfiltrate Data, or Manipulate Search Results via Sonic

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Disrupt Service, Exfiltrate Data, or Manipulate Search Results via Sonic
├── 1. Disrupt Service Availability (Denial of Service - DoS) [HIGH-RISK]
│   ├── 1.1 Resource Exhaustion
│   │   ├── 1.1.1  Push Channel Overload [HIGH-RISK]
│   │   │   ├── 1.1.1.1  Flood with Excessive Push Requests [HIGH-RISK] [CRITICAL]
│   │   │   └── 1.1.1.2  Push Extremely Large Documents [HIGH-RISK]
│   │   ├── 1.1.2  Query Channel Overload [HIGH-RISK]
│   │   │   ├── 1.1.2.1  Flood with Excessive Search Queries [HIGH-RISK] [CRITICAL]
│   │   │   └── 1.1.2.2  Send Complex/Expensive Queries [HIGH-RISK]
│   │   └── 1.1.3 Control Channel Overload
│   │       └── 1.1.3.1 Flood with Excessive Control Commands [HIGH-RISK]
├── 2. Exfiltrate Data
│   ├── 2.1  Unauthorized Query Access
│   │   └── 2.1.1  Bypass Authentication/Authorization [CRITICAL]
│   └── 2.3 Exploit Sonic Configuration
│       └── 2.3.1 Read Unprotected .kv files [CRITICAL]
└── 3. Manipulate Search Results
    ├── 3.1  Unauthorized Data Modification
    │   └── 3.1.1  Bypass Authentication/Authorization (Push Channel) [CRITICAL]
    └── 3.2  Influence Query Results
        ├── 3.1.3  Poison the Index [HIGH-RISK]
        └── 3.2.1  Keyword Stuffing (if not properly handled) [HIGH-RISK]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Disrupt Service Availability (Denial of Service - DoS) [HIGH-RISK]

  • 1.1 Resource Exhaustion

    • 1.1.1 Push Channel Overload [HIGH-RISK]

      • 1.1.1.1 Flood with Excessive Push Requests [HIGH-RISK] [CRITICAL]

        • Description: An attacker sends a massive number of requests to add, update, or delete documents in the Sonic index, overwhelming the server's capacity to process them.
        • Likelihood: High
        • Impact: High (Service outage)
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Low
        • Detection Difficulty: Low
        • Mitigation: Implement strict rate limiting on the push channel, based on IP address, user (if applicable), or other relevant factors.

      • 1.1.1.2 Push Extremely Large Documents [HIGH-RISK]

        • Description: An attacker sends documents with excessively large text content, consuming a disproportionate amount of memory and processing time during indexing.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: High (Service degradation or outage)
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Low
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium
        • Mitigation: Enforce strict limits on the maximum size of documents that can be pushed to the index.

    • 1.1.2 Query Channel Overload [HIGH-RISK]

      • 1.1.2.1 Flood with Excessive Search Queries [HIGH-RISK] [CRITICAL]

        • Description: An attacker sends a massive number of search queries to Sonic, overwhelming its ability to process them.
        • Likelihood: High
        • Impact: High (Service outage)
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Low
        • Detection Difficulty: Low
        • Mitigation: Implement strict rate limiting on the query channel, similar to the push channel.

      • 1.1.2.2 Send Complex/Expensive Queries [HIGH-RISK]

        • Description: An attacker crafts search queries that are computationally expensive to process, such as those with many terms, leading wildcards, or complex combinations of terms.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: High (Service degradation or outage)
        • Effort: Medium
        • Skill Level: Medium
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium
        • Mitigation: Implement limits on query complexity (e.g., maximum number of terms, restrictions on wildcard usage). Monitor query performance and identify slow queries.

    • 1.1.3 Control Channel Overload

      • 1.1.3.1 Flood with Excessive Control Commands [HIGH-RISK]
        • Description: An attacker sends a large number of control commands (e.g., FLUSH, PING) to disrupt normal operation.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: Medium
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Low
        • Detection Difficulty: Low
        • Mitigation: Implement rate limiting on control commands.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exfiltrate Data

  • 2.1 Unauthorized Query Access

    • 2.1.1 Bypass Authentication/Authorization [CRITICAL]
      • Description: An attacker gains access to the Sonic query channel without proper credentials, allowing them to retrieve any indexed data. This could be due to flaws in the application's authentication logic, misconfigured Sonic access controls, or stolen credentials.
      • Likelihood: Low (assuming proper authentication is implemented)
      • Impact: Very High (Complete data breach)
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Medium
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation: Implement strong authentication and authorization for all Sonic channels. Ensure the application properly integrates with Sonic's security mechanisms. Use strong passwords and consider multi-factor authentication.

  • 2.3 Exploit Sonic Configuration

    • 2.3.1 Read Unprotected .kv files [CRITICAL]
      • Description: If Sonic is misconfigured or the server is compromised at the operating system level, an attacker might gain direct access to the .kv files where Sonic stores its indexed data.
      • Likelihood: Very Low (requires OS-level compromise or severe misconfiguration)
      • Impact: Very High (Complete data breach)
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Medium
      • Detection Difficulty: Low (if OS-level compromise occurs)
      • Mitigation: Ensure Sonic is configured securely, following best practices. Harden the underlying operating system and restrict access to the Sonic data directory. Consider encryption at rest for the .kv files.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Manipulate Search Results

  • 3.1 Unauthorized Data Modification

    • 3.1.1 Bypass Authentication/Authorization (Push Channel) [CRITICAL]
      • Description: Similar to bypassing authentication for the query channel, but targeting the push channel. If an attacker bypasses authentication, they can add, modify, or delete documents in the index, directly manipulating search results.
      • Likelihood: Low (assuming proper authentication is implemented)
      • Impact: High (Compromised search results)
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Medium
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation: Implement strong authentication and authorization for the push channel, just as with the query channel.

  • 3.2 Influence Query Results

    • 3.1.3 Poison the Index [HIGH-RISK]

      • Description: An attacker adds documents to the index that contain misleading or malicious content, designed to skew search results. This could be used for SEO poisoning, spreading misinformation, or other malicious purposes.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: Medium (Distorted search results)
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Low
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation: Implement input validation and sanitization to prevent malicious content from being indexed. Monitor search results for unexpected or manipulated content. Consider content analysis techniques to identify and flag suspicious documents.

    • 3.2.1 Keyword Stuffing (if not properly handled) [HIGH-RISK]

      • Description: An attacker adds documents with an excessive number of specific keywords to artificially boost their ranking in search results.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: Low (Minor distortion of search results)
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Low
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation: Implement mechanisms to detect and mitigate keyword stuffing. This might involve analyzing document content for keyword density and penalizing documents that exceed a threshold. Sonic's built-in ranking algorithm should also be reviewed and potentially adjusted to be less susceptible to this.