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Threat Model Analysis for valeriansaliou/sonic

  • Threat: Unauthorized Data Access (Read)
  • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized read access to the Sonic index directly. This implies a failure in Sonic's authentication or a network exposure allowing direct, unauthenticated access to the Sonic instance. The attacker connects directly to the Sonic port and issues QUERY commands.
  • Impact:
    • Exposure of all indexed data, regardless of application-level permissions.
    • Complete loss of confidentiality for indexed data.
    • Potential regulatory violations.
  • Sonic Component Affected:
    • sonic-server: The main server process, specifically its network listener and authentication logic (or lack thereof).
    • Data files on disk (e.g., store.db, store.log): If the attacker gains OS-level access, these files are directly vulnerable.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Authentication: Always set a strong, unique password for Sonic using the -p or --password option. This is a direct Sonic mitigation.
    • Network Segmentation: Isolate Sonic on a private network. This prevents direct external access.
  • Threat: Unauthorized Data Modification (Write)
  • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized write access to the Sonic index directly. This means they can connect to the Sonic instance (bypassing application controls) and issue PUSH, POP, or FLUSH commands without proper authentication.
  • Impact:
    • Data corruption: The index can be rendered unusable or filled with incorrect data.
    • Potential for denial of service by corrupting the index.
  • Sonic Component Affected:
    • sonic-server: The main server process, specifically its network listener and authentication logic for the ingest channel.
    • ingest channel: The channel used for write operations.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Authentication: Enforce strong password authentication for Sonic. This is a direct Sonic mitigation.
    • Network Segmentation: Isolate Sonic on a private network to prevent direct external access.
  • Threat: Denial of Service (Resource Exhaustion)
  • Description: An attacker sends a large number of requests, or crafted requests to the sonic server, exhausting resources.
  • Impact:
    • Search functionality becomes unavailable.
    • Application downtime.
  • Sonic Component Affected:
    • sonic-server: The main server process.
    • search channel: The channel used for search queries.
    • Internal data structures (e.g., the inverted index).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Resource Allocation: Provision sufficient resources (CPU, memory, disk I/O) for Sonic.
    • Monitoring and Alerting: Monitor Sonic's resource usage and set up alerts for unusual activity.
  • Threat: Denial of Service (Sonic-Specific Vulnerability)
  • Description: An attacker exploits a previously unknown vulnerability within Sonic's code (e.g., a bug in the query parsing, indexing, or network handling) to cause a crash, hang, or other denial-of-service condition. This is not simply resource exhaustion, but a flaw in Sonic's logic.
  • Impact:
    • Search functionality becomes unavailable.
    • Application downtime.
  • Sonic Component Affected:
    • Potentially any part of sonic-server, depending on the vulnerability. This could be the query parser, indexing engine, network code, etc.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Stay Updated: Keep Sonic updated to the latest version. This is the primary direct mitigation, as it includes security patches.
    • Vulnerability Scanning: Use vulnerability scanners to identify known issues in Sonic's dependencies.