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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for vectordotdev/vector

Attack Surface: Input Injection via Source Components

  • Description: Attackers inject malicious payloads into the data pipeline through Vector's source components by exploiting insufficient input validation or sanitization within Vector or its configured sources.
  • Vector Contribution: Vector sources are the direct entry points for external data into the pipeline. Vector's architecture relies on sources to ingest data, and if these sources (or Vector's handling of source data) lack robust input validation, it directly contributes to this attack surface. Vector's configuration options for sources can also influence the level of inherent input validation.
  • Example: An attacker sends crafted log messages to an HTTP source configured in Vector. These messages contain SQL injection payloads. Vector processes and forwards these messages without default sanitization to a database sink. The database sink then executes the malicious SQL. Vector's role is in accepting and forwarding potentially malicious input from the source to the sink without inherent protection.
  • Impact: Data breaches, data manipulation, command execution on downstream systems, log manipulation, XSS/HTML injection in dashboards.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Input Validation and Sanitization in Vector Transforms: Implement robust input validation and sanitization within Vector transforms. This is a direct mitigation within the Vector pipeline itself.
    • Secure Source Configuration: Configure Vector sources to use secure protocols and authentication mechanisms where possible. Limit exposure of sources to untrusted networks.
    • Content Security Policies (CSP) for Dashboards: If Vector data is displayed in dashboards, implement CSP to mitigate XSS risks arising from unsanitized data processed by Vector.
    • Regular Expression Hardening: If using regular expressions in Vector transforms, ensure they are robust and not vulnerable to ReDoS attacks.

Attack Surface: Source Misconfiguration Leading to Data Exposure

  • Description: Incorrectly configured Vector sources within Vector's configuration can inadvertently expose sensitive data by reading from unintended locations or protocols, or by allowing unauthorized data injection.
  • Vector Contribution: Vector's configuration system and the wide range of source types it supports directly contribute to this risk. The complexity of Vector's configuration and the potential for user error in defining sources increase the likelihood of misconfiguration leading to data exposure. Vector's design allows for flexible source configuration, which, if misused, becomes a vulnerability.
  • Example: A developer mistakenly configures a file source in Vector to read from a directory containing application secrets instead of application logs. Vector starts ingesting these secrets and potentially forwards them to monitoring systems or external sinks. The misconfiguration is within Vector's configuration itself.
  • Impact: Exposure of sensitive data (secrets, credentials, PII), unauthorized data access, potential compliance violations.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Configuration Review and Auditing (Vector-Specific): Implement a rigorous configuration review process specifically for Vector deployments, focusing on source configurations. Regularly audit Vector configurations for potential misconfigurations.
    • Principle of Least Privilege for Source Access (Vector-Focused): Grant Vector processes only the minimum necessary permissions to access data sources. This is about securing the Vector process itself.
    • Secure Configuration Storage (Vector-Specific): Store Vector configurations securely and use version control to track changes and facilitate audits.
    • Automated Configuration Validation (Vector-Specific): Use configuration validation tools or scripts to automatically check Vector configurations for common misconfigurations and security best practices.

Attack Surface: Sink Injection Vulnerabilities in Downstream Systems

  • Description: Vector sinks, if not properly configured to sanitize output data within Vector's pipeline, can become conduits for injection attacks in downstream systems when writing processed data.
  • Vector Contribution: Vector acts as a pipeline forwarding data to various sinks. Vector's role in data transformation and forwarding means it can propagate injection vulnerabilities if it doesn't include sanitization steps. Vector's design as a data pipeline necessitates considering output sanitization as part of its security posture.
  • Example: Vector receives user input from a source and processes it. It then forwards this data to a database sink (e.g., Elasticsearch) without proper escaping or sanitization within Vector's transforms. An attacker injects malicious code within the user input. When Vector writes this data to Elasticsearch, the malicious code is stored and potentially executed. Vector is the intermediary that could have prevented the injection by sanitizing the data before sending it to the sink.
  • Impact: Injection attacks in downstream systems (SQL injection, command injection, NoSQL injection), data corruption in destination systems, unauthorized access to downstream systems.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Output Sanitization in Transforms (Vector-Centric): Implement data sanitization and escaping within Vector transforms before data reaches sinks. This is the primary mitigation within the Vector pipeline.
    • Secure Sink Configuration (Vector Context): Ensure Vector sinks are configured with strong authentication and authorization to prevent unauthorized access to destination systems from Vector.
    • Regular Security Audits of Downstream Systems: Regularly audit and patch downstream systems for known injection vulnerabilities (general best practice, but less directly Vector-specific).

Attack Surface: Insecure Vector Configuration Storage and Management

  • Description: Storing Vector configuration files insecurely or using weak management practices can expose sensitive information and allow unauthorized modification of Vector's behavior.
  • Vector Contribution: Vector relies on configuration files for its core operation. The security of these configuration files is directly tied to Vector's security. Vector's configuration mechanism itself is the point of vulnerability if not managed securely.
  • Example: Vector configuration files, containing database credentials and API keys, are stored in a world-readable directory on the server. An attacker gains access to the server, reads the configuration files, and obtains the credentials, allowing them to compromise systems connected to Vector. The vulnerability is in how Vector's configuration is handled.
  • Impact: Exposure of sensitive credentials, unauthorized access to downstream systems, data exfiltration, manipulation of Vector's behavior, denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Configuration File Permissions (Vector-Specific): Restrict access to Vector configuration files to only authorized users and processes.
    • Configuration File Encryption (Vector-Specific): Encrypt sensitive data within Vector configuration files, using Vector's secret management or external solutions.
    • Centralized Configuration Management (Vector Context): Use centralized configuration management systems to securely store and manage Vector configurations and secrets.
    • Version Control for Configurations (Vector-Focused): Use version control systems to track changes to Vector configurations.
    • Disable Unnecessary APIs (Vector API): If Vector's API is not required, disable it. If enabled, enforce strong authentication and authorization for the Vector API.

Attack Surface: Dependency Vulnerabilities in Vector and its Ecosystem

  • Description: Vector, like any software, relies on external dependencies. Vulnerabilities in these dependencies can be exploited to compromise Vector itself.
  • Vector Contribution: Vector's software architecture includes dependencies. Vulnerabilities in these dependencies directly impact the security of Vector deployments. Vector's reliance on external libraries is a direct factor in this attack surface.
  • Example: A critical vulnerability is discovered in a widely used library that Vector depends on. An attacker exploits this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted HTTP request to a Vector source, leading to remote code execution on the Vector server. The vulnerability is within Vector's dependency chain.
  • Impact: Remote code execution, denial of service, information disclosure, privilege escalation on the Vector system.
  • Risk Severity: Medium to Critical (Severity can be high or critical depending on the specific vulnerability). While listed as potentially medium in the previous list, dependency vulnerabilities can easily be critical, so retaining as High to Critical for this refined list.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Dependency Scanning and Management (Vector-Focused): Implement automated dependency scanning tools to regularly check Vector's dependencies for known vulnerabilities.
    • Regular Updates (Vector and Dependencies): Keep Vector and its dependencies updated to the latest versions.
    • Vulnerability Monitoring (Vector Ecosystem): Subscribe to security advisories and vulnerability databases to stay informed about new vulnerabilities affecting Vector and its dependencies.
    • Supply Chain Security Practices: Use trusted package repositories and verify the integrity of downloaded packages used by Vector.