Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
291 lines (249 loc) · 28.2 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

291 lines (249 loc) · 28.2 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for vectordotdev/vector

Objective: Compromise Application via Vector Exploitation

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise Application via Vector Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[OR]─ 1. Exploit Vector Configuration Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ 1.1 Configuration Injection [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └───[OR]─ 1.1.1 Inject Malicious Configuration via External Source (e.g., Environment Variables, Files) │ │ └───[AND]─ 1.1.1.2 Inject Malicious Configuration Payload [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └───[OR]─ 1.1.2 Exploit Dynamic Configuration Reload Vulnerability │ └───[AND]─ 1.1.2.3 Inject Malicious Configuration during Reload [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR]─ 1.2 Configuration Misconfiguration │ │ ├───[OR]─ 1.2.1 Overly Permissive Sinks │ │ │ └───[AND]─ 1.2.1.2 Leverage Sink to Write Malicious Files or Data [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[OR]─ 1.2.2 Insecure Credential Management in Configuration │ │ │ └───[AND]─ 1.2.2.3 Use Stolen Credentials to Access Downstream Systems [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[OR]─ 2. Exploit Vector Source Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ 2.1 Malicious Data Injection via Sources [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───[OR]─ 2.1.1 Exploit Vulnerable Source Input Validation [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └───[AND]─ 2.1.1.2 Inject Malicious Payloads into Source Input [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[AND]─ 2.1.1.3 Trigger Vulnerability in Vector or Downstream Application via Malicious Data [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[OR]─ 2.1.2 Source Impersonation/Spoofing │ │ │ └───[AND]─ 2.1.2.3 Application Processes Spoofed Data as Legitimate [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[OR]─ 3. Exploit Vector Transform Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ 3.1 Transform Logic Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───[OR]─ 3.1.1 Vulnerabilities in Built-in Transforms [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └───[AND]─ 3.1.1.2 Craft Input to Trigger Vulnerability [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[AND]─ 3.1.1.3 Impact Application via Malformed or Missing Data [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[OR]─ 3.1.2 Vulnerabilities in Custom Transforms (if used) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └───[AND]─ 3.1.2.2 Analyze Custom Transform Code for Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[AND]─ 3.1.2.3 Exploit Vulnerabilities to Manipulate Data or Gain Code Execution [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[OR]─ 4. Exploit Vector Sink Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ 4.1 Sink Injection/Redirection [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └───[AND]─ 4.1.2 Redirect Data to Attacker-Controlled Sink [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR]─ 4.2 Sink Credential Theft (if applicable) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └───[AND]─ 4.2.2 Exploit Vector or Application to Steal Sink Credentials [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └───[AND]─ 4.2.3 Use Stolen Credentials to Access Sink System [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR]─ 4.3 Sink Data Manipulation [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └───[AND]─ 4.3.1 Exploit Vulnerabilities to Modify Data Before Reaching Sink [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └───[AND]─ 4.3.2 Inject Malicious Data or Corrupt Legitimate Data in Sink [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[OR]─ 5. Exploit Vector Process/System Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ 5.1 Vulnerabilities in Vector Core Code [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └───[AND]─ 5.1.2 Exploit Vulnerability for Code Execution, DoS, or Information Disclosure [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR]─ 5.2 Dependency Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └───[AND]─ 5.2.2 Exploit Dependency Vulnerability via Vector [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR]─ 5.3 Privilege Escalation (if Vector runs with elevated privileges) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └───[AND]─ 5.3.2 Exploit Vulnerability in Vector to Escalate Privileges on the System [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Configuration Injection - Inject Malicious Configuration Payload [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

  • Threat: Attacker injects malicious configuration into Vector by exploiting insecure external configuration sources.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker identifies vulnerabilities in how Vector loads configuration from external sources like environment variables or files (e.g., insecure file permissions, exposed environment variables).
    • Attacker injects a malicious configuration payload into these sources. This payload could:
      • Modify sinks to redirect data to attacker-controlled locations for exfiltration.
      • Add malicious transforms to inject or manipulate data.
      • Disable security features within Vector.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigations:
    • Secure Configuration Sources: Restrict access to configuration files and environment variables using strong permissions.
    • Configuration Validation: Implement strict validation of Vector configuration during startup and reload.
    • Immutable Infrastructure: Consider immutable infrastructure for configuration management.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Run Vector with minimal privileges to access configuration sources.

Attack Tree Path: Configuration Injection - Inject Malicious Configuration during Reload [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

  • Threat: Attacker injects malicious configuration by exploiting vulnerabilities in Vector's dynamic configuration reload mechanism.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker identifies Vector's dynamic configuration reload mechanism (e.g., API endpoint, signal handling).
    • Attacker bypasses authentication/authorization (if any) for the reload mechanism.
    • Attacker injects a malicious configuration payload during the reload process, similar to the payload described in path 1.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigations:
    • Secure Dynamic Reload Mechanism: Implement strong authentication and authorization for the configuration reload mechanism.
    • Configuration Validation: Implement strict validation of Vector configuration during reload.
    • Rate Limiting and Monitoring: Implement rate limiting and monitoring for configuration reload attempts.

Attack Tree Path: Configuration Misconfiguration - Leverage Sink to Write Malicious Files or Data [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

  • Threat: Attacker leverages overly permissive sink configurations to write malicious files or data to sensitive locations.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Application developers misconfigure Vector with sinks that have write access to sensitive locations (e.g., application directories, web roots).
    • Attacker gains control over data flowing through Vector (e.g., via source spoofing or data injection).
    • Attacker crafts malicious data payloads that, when processed by Vector and written to the overly permissive sink, result in writing malicious files (like web shells) or data to compromise the application.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigations:
    • Principle of Least Privilege for Sinks: Configure sinks to write only to necessary locations with minimal permissions.
    • Input Validation and Sanitization: Sanitize data flowing through Vector to prevent injection of malicious payloads.
    • File Integrity Monitoring: Implement file integrity monitoring on sensitive locations to detect unauthorized file creation or modification.

Attack Tree Path: Configuration Misconfiguration - Use Stolen Credentials to Access Downstream Systems [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

  • Threat: Attacker steals credentials stored insecurely in Vector configuration and uses them to access downstream systems.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Application developers store sink or source credentials in plaintext or using weak encryption within Vector configuration files.
    • Attacker gains access to Vector configuration files (e.g., via configuration injection, system access).
    • Attacker extracts the insecurely stored credentials.
    • Attacker uses the stolen credentials to access downstream systems (e.g., databases, cloud services) connected to Vector sinks or sources.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigations:
    • Secure Credential Management: Use Vector's built-in secret management features or external secret management solutions (like HashiCorp Vault).
    • Avoid Plaintext Storage: Never store credentials in plaintext in configuration files.
    • Access Control: Restrict access to Vector configuration files.

Attack Tree Path: Malicious Data Injection via Sources - Inject Malicious Payloads into Source Input [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

  • Threat: Attacker injects malicious payloads into Vector's sources to exploit input validation vulnerabilities in Vector or downstream applications.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker identifies sources processing external input (e.g., HTTP, Kafka, Syslog).
    • Attacker identifies or discovers input validation vulnerabilities in Vector's source components (e.g., format string bugs, buffer overflows in source parsing).
    • Attacker crafts malicious payloads and injects them into the source input to trigger these vulnerabilities. This could lead to code execution within Vector, data corruption, or DoS.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigations:
    • Input Validation and Sanitization: Implement robust input validation and sanitization in Vector's source components and custom sources.
    • Regular Vector Updates: Keep Vector updated to patch known vulnerabilities in source components.
    • Fuzzing and Security Testing: Conduct fuzzing and security testing of Vector's source components.

Attack Tree Path: Malicious Data Injection via Sources - Trigger Vulnerability in Vector or Downstream Application via Malicious Data [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

  • Threat: Malicious data injected through sources triggers vulnerabilities in Vector's processing or in downstream applications that consume Vector's output.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker injects malicious data through Vector sources (even if Vector's source input validation is bypassed or flawed).
    • This malicious data is processed by Vector's transforms and sinks.
    • The malicious data triggers vulnerabilities in:
      • Vector's transform logic (see path 7 and 8).
      • Downstream applications that receive data from Vector sinks (e.g., SQL injection in a database application logging data).
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigations:
    • Secure Transform Logic: Implement secure coding practices in custom transforms and keep Vector updated to patch built-in transform vulnerabilities.
    • Output Sanitization: Sanitize data output by Vector sinks to prevent injection vulnerabilities in downstream applications.
    • Security Testing of Downstream Applications: Conduct security testing of applications that consume data from Vector sinks, considering potentially malicious data flowing through Vector.

Attack Tree Path: Source Impersonation/Spoofing - Application Processes Spoofed Data as Legitimate [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

  • Threat: Attacker spoofs a legitimate source and injects malicious data, which the application processes as legitimate due to lack of source authentication.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker identifies sources that lack strong authentication or authorization mechanisms.
    • Attacker spoofs the identity of a legitimate source and sends malicious data to Vector.
    • The application logic, relying on data processed by Vector, processes this spoofed data as legitimate, leading to application logic compromise or data integrity issues.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigations:
    • Secure Source Authentication/Authorization: Implement strong authentication and authorization for sources, especially those exposed to external networks.
    • Data Validation: Implement data validation within the application to verify the legitimacy and integrity of data received from Vector, regardless of the source.
    • Network Segmentation: Segment the network to limit the ability of attackers to spoof sources.

Attack Tree Path: Transform Logic Exploitation - Craft Input to Trigger Vulnerability [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

  • Threat: Attacker crafts specific input data to trigger vulnerabilities in Vector's built-in transform logic.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker identifies vulnerabilities in Vector's built-in transforms (e.g., regex denial of service, buffer overflows in data manipulation functions).
    • Attacker crafts input data specifically designed to trigger these vulnerabilities when processed by the vulnerable transforms. This could lead to DoS, code execution within Vector, or data corruption.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigations:
    • Regular Vector Updates: Keep Vector updated to patch vulnerabilities in built-in transforms.
    • Fuzzing and Security Testing: Conduct fuzzing and security testing of Vector's built-in transforms.
    • Resource Limits for Transforms: Implement resource limits for transforms to mitigate DoS attacks.

Attack Tree Path: Transform Logic Exploitation - Impact Application via Malformed or Missing Data [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

  • Threat: Exploiting transform vulnerabilities leads to malformed or missing data, impacting application logic.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker successfully exploits vulnerabilities in Vector's transforms (as described in path 7).
    • This exploitation results in data being malformed, corrupted, or dropped during the transformation process.
    • Downstream applications relying on this data receive incomplete or incorrect information, leading to application logic errors, incorrect decisions, or data integrity issues.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigations:
    • Secure Transform Logic (as in path 7): Prevent transform vulnerabilities.
    • Data Validation in Application: Implement robust data validation in the application to handle potentially malformed or missing data from Vector.
    • Monitoring Data Quality: Monitor data quality throughout the Vector pipeline and in downstream applications to detect data corruption or loss.

Attack Tree Path: Transform Logic Exploitation - Analyze Custom Transform Code for Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

  • Threat: Vulnerabilities in custom transforms (Lua, WASM) are exploited to manipulate data or gain code execution.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Application uses custom transforms (e.g., Lua scripts, WASM modules) within Vector.
    • Attacker analyzes the code of these custom transforms and identifies vulnerabilities (e.g., code injection, logic flaws, insecure dependencies).
    • Attacker crafts input data or exploits configuration vulnerabilities to trigger these vulnerabilities in the custom transforms. This could lead to code execution within Vector, data manipulation, or application compromise.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigations:
    • Secure Custom Transform Development: Follow secure coding practices when developing custom transforms.
    • Code Review and Security Testing: Conduct thorough code reviews and security testing of custom transforms.
    • Sandboxing for Custom Transforms: Use sandboxing or isolation techniques for custom transforms to limit the impact of vulnerabilities.
    • Principle of Least Privilege for Custom Transforms: Grant custom transforms only the necessary permissions.

Attack Tree Path: Transform Logic Exploitation - Exploit Vulnerabilities to Manipulate Data or Gain Code Execution [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

  • Threat: Exploiting vulnerabilities in custom transforms leads to data manipulation or code execution within Vector.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker successfully exploits vulnerabilities in custom transforms (as described in path 9).
    • This exploitation allows the attacker to:
      • Manipulate data being processed by Vector, potentially corrupting data in sinks or injecting malicious data.
      • Gain code execution within the Vector process, potentially leading to system compromise.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigations:
    • Secure Custom Transform Development (as in path 9): Prevent vulnerabilities in custom transforms.
    • Principle of Least Privilege for Vector Process: Run Vector with minimal privileges to limit the impact of code execution within the process.
    • System Monitoring: Monitor Vector process for suspicious activity that might indicate code execution.

Attack Tree Path: Sink Injection/Redirection - Redirect Data to Attacker-Controlled Sink [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

  • Threat: Attacker redirects Vector's output to an attacker-controlled sink, leading to data exfiltration or manipulation.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker exploits configuration vulnerabilities or runtime vulnerabilities in Vector to change the sink destination.
    • Attacker redirects data intended for legitimate sinks to an attacker-controlled sink (e.g., a network listener, a malicious storage service).
    • Attacker intercepts sensitive data, manipulates data before it reaches the intended sink, or uses the sink to pivot to other systems.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigations:
    • Secure Configuration Management: Prevent unauthorized modification of sink configurations.
    • Sink Destination Validation: Implement validation to ensure sink destinations are within expected and authorized locations.
    • Network Segmentation: Segment the network to limit the impact of compromised sinks.
    • Output Monitoring: Monitor Vector's output and sink destinations for unexpected changes.

Attack Tree Path: Sink Credential Theft - Exploit Vector or Application to Steal Sink Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

  • Threat: Attacker steals credentials used by Vector to access sinks, gaining unauthorized access to sink systems.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Vector stores sink credentials in memory or configuration in a way that is vulnerable to theft (e.g., plaintext in memory, weak encryption).
    • Attacker exploits vulnerabilities in Vector or the application to gain access to the Vector process memory or configuration.
    • Attacker extracts the sink credentials.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigations:
    • Secure Credential Management: Use secure credential management practices (as in path 4).
    • Process Isolation: Isolate the Vector process to limit access from other parts of the application or system.
    • Memory Protection: Implement memory protection mechanisms to prevent unauthorized memory access.

Attack Tree Path: Sink Credential Theft - Use Stolen Credentials to Access Sink System [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

  • Threat: Stolen sink credentials are used to gain unauthorized access to the sink system.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker successfully steals sink credentials (as described in path 12).
    • Attacker uses these stolen credentials to directly access the sink system (e.g., database, cloud service), bypassing Vector entirely.
    • Attacker can then perform unauthorized actions on the sink system, such as data exfiltration, data manipulation, or lateral movement.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigations:
    • Secure Credential Management (as in path 4 and 12): Prevent credential theft in the first place.
    • Principle of Least Privilege for Sink Credentials: Grant sink credentials only the necessary permissions on the sink system.
    • Authentication Monitoring on Sink System: Monitor authentication logs on the sink system for suspicious activity or unauthorized access attempts.

Attack Tree Path: Sink Data Manipulation - Exploit Vulnerabilities to Modify Data Before Reaching Sink [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

  • Threat: Attacker exploits vulnerabilities to modify data before it reaches the sink, corrupting data or injecting malicious data into the sink.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker exploits vulnerabilities in Vector's transforms or core code to manipulate data during processing.
    • Attacker modifies data before it is written to the sink, either corrupting legitimate data or injecting malicious data.
    • This can lead to data integrity issues in the sink and potentially compromise applications that rely on this data.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigations:
    • Secure Transform Logic (as in path 7 and 8): Prevent vulnerabilities in transforms.
    • Data Integrity Checks: Implement data integrity checks at the sink level or in the application to detect and mitigate data manipulation.
    • Output Monitoring: Monitor data written to sinks for unexpected changes or anomalies.

Attack Tree Path: Sink Data Manipulation - Inject Malicious Data or Corrupt Legitimate Data in Sink [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

  • Threat: Malicious or corrupted data is injected into the sink due to vulnerabilities in Vector's data processing.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker successfully manipulates data before it reaches the sink (as described in path 14).
    • This results in malicious data being injected into the sink or legitimate data being corrupted within the sink.
    • Applications relying on data from the sink are then affected by this corrupted or malicious data, potentially leading to application logic errors, data integrity issues, or further compromise.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigations:
    • Secure Transform Logic and Data Processing (as in path 7, 8, and 14): Prevent data manipulation vulnerabilities.
    • Data Validation in Application: Implement robust data validation in applications consuming data from the sink to handle potentially corrupted or malicious data.
    • Data Quality Monitoring: Monitor data quality in sinks to detect data corruption or injection.

Attack Tree Path: Vulnerabilities in Vector Core Code - Exploit Vulnerability for Code Execution, DoS, or Information Disclosure [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

  • Threat: Attacker exploits vulnerabilities in Vector's core code to gain code execution, cause DoS, or disclose sensitive information.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker identifies known or zero-day vulnerabilities in Vector's core code (e.g., buffer overflows, remote code execution, information disclosure).
    • Attacker crafts exploits to leverage these vulnerabilities.
    • Successful exploitation can lead to:
      • Code execution within the Vector process, potentially leading to system compromise.
      • Denial of Service (DoS) by crashing or making Vector unavailable.
      • Information disclosure by leaking sensitive data from Vector's memory or processes.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigations:
    • Regular Vector Updates: Stay up-to-date with Vector security advisories and apply patches promptly.
    • Vulnerability Scanning: Regularly scan Vector and the underlying system for known vulnerabilities.
    • Security Hardening: Harden the system where Vector is running.
    • Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS): Implement IDS/IPS to detect and prevent exploitation attempts.

Attack Tree Path: Dependency Vulnerabilities - Exploit Dependency Vulnerability via Vector [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

  • Threat: Attacker exploits vulnerabilities in third-party libraries or dependencies used by Vector, compromising Vector and potentially the application.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker identifies vulnerable dependencies used by Vector (e.g., using vulnerability scanning tools or public vulnerability databases).
    • Attacker finds a way to exploit these dependency vulnerabilities through Vector's usage of the dependencies.
    • Successful exploitation can lead to code execution within Vector, system compromise, or DoS.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigations:
    • Dependency Scanning: Regularly scan Vector's dependencies for known vulnerabilities.
    • Dependency Updates: Keep Vector's dependencies updated to patched versions.
    • Vendor Security Advisories: Monitor security advisories from Vector and its dependency vendors.
    • Supply Chain Security: Implement measures to ensure the security of Vector's supply chain and dependencies.

Attack Tree Path: Privilege Escalation - Exploit Vulnerability in Vector to Escalate Privileges on the System [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

  • Threat: If Vector runs with elevated privileges, an attacker could exploit a vulnerability in Vector to escalate privileges on the system, gaining full system control.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Vector is misconfigured or unnecessarily run with elevated privileges (e.g., root, service account with broad permissions).
    • Attacker exploits a vulnerability in Vector (e.g., code execution vulnerability).
    • Because Vector is running with elevated privileges, the attacker can leverage the vulnerability to escalate their privileges on the system, gaining root or administrator access.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigations:
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Run Vector with the minimum necessary privileges. Avoid running Vector as root if possible. Use dedicated service accounts with restricted permissions.
    • Security Hardening: Harden the system to limit the impact of privilege escalation even if it occurs.
    • Regular Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits to ensure Vector is running with least privilege and that system configurations are secure.