Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
124 lines (111 loc) · 8.03 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

124 lines (111 loc) · 8.03 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for vercel/turborepo

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code OR Exfiltrate Sensitive Data (via Turborepo)

Attack Tree Visualization

                                     +-----------------------------------------------------+
                                     |  Execute Arbitrary Code OR Exfiltrate Sensitive Data |
                                     +-----------------------------------------------------+
                                                        |
         +--------------------------------+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
         |                                |                               |
+--------+--------+             +--------+--------+            +--------+--------+
| Remote Cache   |             | Local Cache    |            |  Configuration |
| Poisoning      |             | Tampering      |            |  Errors         |
+--------+--------+             +--------+--------+            +--------+--------+
         |                                |                               |
         |                                |                               |
+--------+--------+             +--------+--------+            +--------+--------+
| 1.1 Spoof Cache|             | 2.1 Modify     |            | 4.1 Weak       |
|     Server     |             |     Cache      |            |     Remote     |
| [HIGH RISK]    |             |     Files      |            |     Cache      |
+--------+--------+             | [HIGH RISK]    |            |     Auth       |
                                                                | [CRITICAL]     |
                                                                +--------+--------+
                                                                        |
                                                                +--------+--------+
                                                                | 4.4 Leaked     |
                                                                |     Remote     |
                                                                |     Cache      |
                                                                |     Secrets    |
                                                                | [CRITICAL]     |
                                                                +--------+--------+
         +--------------------------------+
         |
+--------+--------+
| Task Pipeline  |
| Manipulation   |
+--------+--------+
         |
         |
+--------+--------+
| 3.1 Inject     |
|     Malicious  |
|     Task       |
| [HIGH RISK]    |
+--------+--------+

Attack Tree Path: 1. Remote Cache Poisoning

  • 1.1 Spoof Cache Server [HIGH RISK]
    • Description: The attacker sets up a fake server that pretends to be the legitimate remote cache provider (e.g., Vercel, AWS S3). The attacker then manipulates network traffic or uses social engineering to trick Turborepo into using this malicious server. The fake server provides poisoned cache artifacts containing malicious code or altered data.
    • Likelihood: Low to Medium
    • Impact: High to Very High
    • Effort: Medium to High
    • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
    • Mitigations:
      • Use strong, unique credentials for your remote cache provider.
      • Employ network security measures like DNSSEC and VPNs to prevent DNS spoofing and man-in-the-middle attacks.
      • Educate developers about social engineering tactics that might be used to trick them into using a malicious cache server.
      • Monitor network traffic for suspicious connections to unexpected servers.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Local Cache Tampering

  • 2.1 Modify Cache Files [HIGH RISK]
    • Description: The attacker gains access to the local machine (developer workstation or CI/CD server) where Turborepo's cache is stored. They directly modify the files within the cache directory, replacing legitimate build artifacts with malicious ones. This could involve injecting malicious code into compiled binaries, scripts, or other cached data.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High to Very High
    • Effort: Low to Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Mitigations:
      • Implement strict file system permissions on the Turborepo cache directory, limiting access to only authorized users and processes.
      • Use file integrity monitoring (FIM) tools to detect unauthorized changes to files within the cache directory.
      • Regularly audit access logs to identify any suspicious activity related to the cache.
      • Consider using a dedicated, isolated build environment (e.g., containers) to limit the impact of a compromised cache.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Task Pipeline Manipulation

  • 3.1 Inject Malicious Task [HIGH RISK] * Description: The attacker adds a new task to the turbo.json configuration file (or equivalent configuration) that executes malicious code. This new task is then triggered as part of the build process, leading to arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine or CI/CD server. * Likelihood: Medium * Impact: High to Very High * Effort: Low to Medium * Skill Level: Intermediate * Detection Difficulty: Easy to Medium * Mitigations:
    • Enforce mandatory code reviews for all changes to the turbo.json file and any other files that define the build pipeline.
    • Use a version control system (e.g., Git) and require pull requests for all changes, ensuring that multiple developers review the code before it's merged.
    • Implement automated checks to scan for suspicious patterns or commands within the task definitions.
    • Limit the permissions of the user account that runs the Turborepo build process.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Configuration Errors

  • 4.1 Weak Remote Cache Auth [CRITICAL]

    • Description: The remote cache is configured with weak or no authentication, allowing anyone with network access to read from and write to the cache. This makes it trivial for an attacker to poison the cache with malicious artifacts.
    • Likelihood: Low to Medium
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Very Low
    • Skill Level: Novice
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy
    • Mitigations:
      • Always use strong, unique passwords or API keys for your remote cache provider.
      • Enable multi-factor authentication (MFA) if supported by the provider.
      • Regularly review the authentication settings for your remote cache to ensure they are configured correctly.
      • Use short-lived, scoped credentials.

  • 4.4 Leaked Remote Cache Secrets [CRITICAL]

    • Description: The credentials (API keys, access tokens, passwords) used to access the remote cache are accidentally exposed. This could happen through various means, such as committing them to a public repository, exposing them in logs, or sharing them insecurely.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Very Low
    • Skill Level: Novice
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
    • Mitigations:
      • Never commit secrets to version control. Use environment variables or a dedicated secret management solution (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault).
      • Use .gitignore (or equivalent) to prevent accidental commits of files containing secrets.
      • Regularly scan your codebase and logs for potential secret leaks using automated tools.
      • Educate developers about the importance of secret management and the risks of exposing credentials.
      • Rotate secrets regularly to minimize the impact of a potential leak.