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Attack Surface Analysis for yewstack/yew

  • Description: Vulnerabilities arising from insufficient validation or sanitization of data passed as props to components or used in component state. This is a core aspect of Yew's component model.
  • Yew Contribution: Yew's component-based architecture relies entirely on props and state for data flow. The framework provides the mechanism (props and state), but the responsibility for validation and sanitization rests entirely with the developer.
  • Example:
    • A component accepts a String prop intended for display as text. An attacker provides a string containing <script>alert('XSS')</script>, which is directly rendered into the DOM because the component doesn't use Yew's escaping features correctly.
    • A component uses a numeric prop as an array index without bounds checking, leading to a panic (DoS). This is a direct consequence of how Yew handles data within components.
  • Impact: Client-side XSS, Denial of Service (DoS), application logic errors, unexpected behavior.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the specific usage and impact).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Strict Prop Validation: Implement robust validation for all props, using Rust's type system and custom validation logic. This is essential in Yew.
      • Sanitization: Sanitize any prop data used in HTML rendering, even if it appears safe. While Yew's html! macro generally handles escaping, be extra cautious with innerHTML or similar attributes, or when constructing HTML strings manually. A dedicated HTML sanitization library might be necessary in complex cases. Understand how Yew handles escaping and where it might not be sufficient.
      • Defensive State Updates: Ensure state updates are triggered only by validated input and handle potential errors gracefully. Avoid directly modifying state based on raw user input. This is crucial for preventing logic flaws within Yew's state management.
      • Input validation: Validate all data that is coming from user.
  • Description: Memory safety vulnerabilities introduced by incorrect use of unsafe blocks, primarily when interacting with JavaScript APIs or low-level WebAssembly operations. This is directly related to how Yew interacts with the browser.
  • Yew Contribution: Yew requires unsafe for certain operations, particularly when interfacing with the browser's DOM and other JavaScript APIs through web-sys and js-sys. The framework necessitates the use of unsafe in these cases.
  • Example:
    • Incorrect pointer arithmetic within an unsafe block when manipulating DOM elements (accessed via web-sys, which Yew uses), leading to a memory access violation (crash).
    • Failing to properly release resources allocated within an unsafe block (again, likely related to web-sys interaction), causing a memory leak.
  • Impact: Application crashes (DoS), potential for arbitrary code execution (though less likely in a browser context compared to native Rust, but still a high-severity risk), memory leaks.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Minimize unsafe: Use Yew's abstractions (e.g., html!, component lifecycle methods, Scope) whenever possible to avoid direct unsafe code. This is the primary defense.
      • Isolate unsafe: If unsafe is unavoidable (and it often is with Yew and web-sys), keep the unsafe blocks as small and self-contained as possible.
      • Thorough Review: Carefully review all unsafe code for potential memory safety issues, pointer arithmetic errors, and resource leaks.
      • Use Safe Wrappers: Prefer well-vetted libraries (like web-sys and js-sys) that provide safe wrappers around JavaScript APIs, but understand that even these require careful usage. Don't assume they are inherently safe.
      • Testing: Use tools like Miri to detect undefined behavior in unsafe code during testing.
  • Description: Vulnerabilities introduced by incorrect or insecure use of the web-sys and js-sys crates. This is directly tied to Yew's interaction with the browser.
  • Yew Contribution: Yew relies heavily on web-sys and js-sys for interacting with the browser. These crates are fundamental to how Yew operates.
  • Example:
    • Using web-sys to directly set innerHTML with unsanitized user input, leading to XSS. This is a common pitfall when developers bypass Yew's html! macro.
    • Calling a JavaScript function through js-sys that is vulnerable to injection attacks (e.g., passing unsanitized data to eval).
  • Impact: XSS, manipulation of the DOM, potential for other JavaScript-based attacks.
  • Risk Severity: High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Prefer Yew Abstractions: Use Yew's higher-level abstractions (e.g., html!, event handling) whenever possible, instead of directly using web-sys. This is the most important mitigation.
      • Sanitize Data: Carefully sanitize any data passed to web-sys or js-sys functions, especially when dealing with user input or data from external sources.
      • Avoid eval: Do not use eval or similar functions that execute arbitrary JavaScript code.
      • Understand API Security: Be aware of the security implications of the specific web-sys and js-sys functions you are using. Consult the documentation and security best practices for those APIs. Don't assume these crates are inherently safe.