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Attack Tree Analysis for yewstack/yew

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Client-Side Code or Manipulate Application State via Yew

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      [Attacker's Goal]
                                                        |
                                      ===================================================
                                      ||                                                 
                      [Exploit Component Lifecycle/Update Logic]       [[Exploit Yew's Virtual DOM Handling]]
                                      |                                                 ||
                      ===================================               ===================================
                                      |                                                 ||
                      [Abuse Component Creation]                                     [[XSS via Unsanitized HTML]]
                                      ||
                      =================
                      ||              ||
         [[Create Components     [[Inject Malicious
            Dynamically]]           Props]]

Attack Tree Path: [[Exploit Yew's Virtual DOM Handling]] -> [[XSS via Unsanitized HTML]]

  • Description: This path represents the most critical vulnerability: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) through the injection of malicious HTML/JavaScript. Yew's html! macro provides built-in escaping, but if developers bypass this mechanism (e.g., using VNode::from_html_unchecked or similar methods) with untrusted data, it creates a direct XSS vulnerability.

  • Attack Vector:

    • User input (e.g., form fields, URL parameters, data from external APIs) that is directly inserted into the DOM as HTML without proper sanitization.
    • Misuse of Yew's VNode::from_html_unchecked or equivalent functions with data derived from untrusted sources.

  • Mitigation:

    • Strictly Avoid VNode::from_html_unchecked with Untrusted Data: Never use this function (or similar methods) with data that originates from user input or any untrusted source.
    • Prioritize the html! Macro: Always prefer Yew's html! macro for constructing HTML, as it provides automatic escaping of potentially dangerous characters.
    • Implement Robust HTML Sanitization: If you absolutely must use raw HTML from an untrusted source, use a well-vetted and actively maintained HTML sanitization library (e.g., ammonia in Rust) to remove any malicious tags, attributes, or JavaScript code. This should be a last resort, and the sanitization library should be kept up-to-date.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strong Content Security Policy (CSP) to restrict the sources from which scripts can be loaded. This provides an additional layer of defense against XSS, even if an injection vulnerability exists.
    • Input Validation: While sanitization is crucial, also perform input validation to ensure that user-provided data conforms to expected formats and lengths. This can help prevent some injection attacks.

  • Likelihood: Medium (Higher if developers bypass Yew's safe HTML handling)

  • Impact: Very High (Complete client-side compromise, data theft, website defacement, session hijacking)

  • Effort: Low (Finding an unsanitized input field is often trivial)

  • Skill Level: Beginner to Intermediate

  • Detection Difficulty: Easy to Medium (Standard XSS detection techniques apply; harder if the injection is obfuscated)

Attack Tree Path: [Exploit Component Lifecycle/Update Logic] -> [Abuse Component Creation] -> [[Create Components Dynamically]] / [[Inject Malicious Props]]

  • Description: This path focuses on abusing the dynamic creation of Yew components. If the application creates components based on user input without proper controls, an attacker can cause various issues.

  • 2.a [[Create Components Dynamically]]

    • Attack Vector:

      • User input that controls the number of components created. An attacker might provide a very large number, leading to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack by exhausting browser resources.
      • User input that influences the type of component created. If the application doesn't strictly validate the component type, an attacker might be able to trigger the creation of unexpected components, potentially leading to logic errors or even vulnerabilities within those components.

    • Mitigation:

      • Strictly Limit Component Creation: Impose hard limits on the number of components that can be created dynamically based on user input. This limit should be based on the application's legitimate needs and should be enforced rigorously.
      • Whitelist Allowed Component Types: If the application allows users to influence the type of component created, maintain a strict whitelist of allowed component types. Reject any attempts to create components that are not on this whitelist.
      • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting on the actions that trigger component creation to prevent rapid, repeated attempts to create excessive components.

    • Likelihood: Medium

    • Impact: Medium to High (DoS, potential for unexpected behavior)

    • Effort: Low to Medium

    • Skill Level: Intermediate

    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard

  • 2.b [[Inject Malicious Props]]

    • Attack Vector:

      • User input that is directly or indirectly used as props for dynamically created components. If these props are not properly validated and sanitized, an attacker could inject malicious values.
      • This could be combined with "Create Components Dynamically" to inject malicious props into a large number of components.

    • Mitigation:

      • Thorough Prop Validation: Rigorously validate all props passed to components, especially those derived from user input. Use strong typing and define custom validation logic to ensure that props conform to expected formats and constraints.
      • Sanitize Props (if necessary): If props are used to render HTML (even indirectly), ensure they are properly sanitized to prevent XSS. This is especially important if the component uses VNode::from_html_unchecked internally.
      • Consider Immutable Props: Where possible, use immutable data structures for props to reduce the risk of unintended modification.

    • Likelihood: Medium

    • Impact: Medium to High (Depends on how the malicious props are used; could lead to XSS, logic errors, or other vulnerabilities)

    • Effort: Low to Medium

    • Skill Level: Intermediate

    • Detection Difficulty: Medium