attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for apache/spark

Objective: Compromise Application Using Apache Spark

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise Application Using Apache Spark [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[OR]─ Exploit Spark Component Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR]─ Exploit Driver Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───[OR]─ Web UI Exploitation (if enabled) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├───[OR]─ Unauthenticated Access to Web UI [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ │ └───[AND]─ Web UI enabled without authentication [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ ├───[OR]─ Web UI Remote Code Execution (RCE) (if vulnerabilities exist) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH - CRITICAL IMPACT] │ │ ├───[OR]─ Deserialization Vulnerabilities in RPC Communication [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH - CRITICAL IMPACT] │ ├───[OR]─ Exploit Executor Vulnerabilities │ │ ├───[OR]─ Code Injection via User-Defined Functions (UDFs) or Spark Jobs [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├───[OR]─ Malicious UDF Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ │ └───[AND]─ Application allows users to define and submit UDFs without proper sanitization/sandboxing. [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ ├───[OR]─ Malicious Job Submission [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ │ └───[AND]─ Attacker gains access to job submission mechanism (e.g., via compromised application logic or credentials). [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───[OR]─ Exploit Master/Worker Node Vulnerabilities (Cluster Mode) │ │ │ ├───[OR]─ Resource Manager Exploitation (e.g., YARN, Mesos, Standalone Master) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH - CRITICAL IMPACT] ├───[OR]─ Exploit Spark Configuration Misconfigurations [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR]─ Insecure Authentication/Authorization Settings [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[OR]─ Disabled or Weak Authentication [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[AND]─ Spark security features (authentication, authorization) are disabled or configured with weak/default credentials. [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ Insecure Network Configuration [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[OR]─ Unencrypted Communication Channels [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[AND]─ Communication between Spark components (Driver, Executors, Master, Workers) is not encrypted (e.g., using TLS/SSL). [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ Insecure Storage Configuration [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[OR]─ Weak Access Controls on Data Storage (HDFS, S3, etc.) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[AND]─ Spark application accesses data stored in locations with weak or misconfigured access controls. [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[OR]─ Exploit Dependencies and Environment │ ├───[OR]─ Vulnerabilities in Spark Dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[OR]─ Outdated or Vulnerable Libraries [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[AND]─ Spark application uses outdated or vulnerable versions of libraries (e.g., Hadoop, Netty, Jackson, Log4j). [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ Vulnerabilities in Underlying Operating System or Infrastructure │ │ ├───[OR]─ OS Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[AND]─ Spark nodes run on operating systems with known vulnerabilities. [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[OR]─ Social Engineering and Insider Threats (Less Spark-Specific, but relevant in context) │ ├───[OR]─ Compromise Developer/Operator Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH - CRITICAL IMPACT] │ │ └───[AND]─ Attacker gains access to credentials of users with administrative access to Spark or the application. [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ Malicious Insider [HIGH-RISK PATH - CRITICAL IMPACT] │ │ └───[AND]─ Insider with legitimate access abuses their privileges to compromise the application. [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Spark Component Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

• Exploit Driver Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]:
  • Web UI Exploitation (if enabled) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Unauthenticated Access to Web UI [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: Web UI enabled without authentication.
      • Action: Access sensitive information, modify configurations, submit malicious jobs.
    • Web UI Remote Code Execution (RCE) (if vulnerabilities exist) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH - CRITICAL IMPACT]:
      • Attack Vector: Exploit known or zero-day RCE vulnerability in Web UI components.
      • Action: Gain shell access to Driver node.
  • Deserialization Vulnerabilities in RPC Communication [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH - CRITICAL IMPACT]:
    • Attack Vector: Exploit known deserialization flaws in Spark's RPC framework (e.g., using Java serialization).
    • Action: Execute arbitrary code on Driver or Executors.
• Exploit Executor Vulnerabilities:
  • Code Injection via User-Defined Functions (UDFs) or Spark Jobs [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Malicious UDF Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: Application allows users to define and submit UDFs without proper sanitization/sandboxing. [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Action: Execute arbitrary code within Executor context, access data on Executor node.
    • Malicious Job Submission [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: Attacker gains access to job submission mechanism (e.g., via compromised application logic or credentials). [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Action: Submit jobs that perform malicious actions, data exfiltration, or resource abuse.
  • Exploit Master/Worker Node Vulnerabilities (Cluster Mode):
    • Resource Manager Exploitation (e.g., YARN, Mesos, Standalone Master) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH - CRITICAL IMPACT]:
      • Attack Vector: Exploit vulnerabilities in the underlying resource manager used by Spark.
      • Action: Gain control over cluster resources, potentially impact other applications sharing the cluster.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Spark Configuration Misconfigurations [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

• Insecure Authentication/Authorization Settings [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
  • Disabled or Weak Authentication [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Spark security features (authentication, authorization) are disabled or configured with weak/default credentials. [CRITICAL NODE]
    • Action: Unauthenticated access to Spark components, job submission, data access.
• Insecure Network Configuration [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
  • Unencrypted Communication Channels [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Communication between Spark components (Driver, Executors, Master, Workers) is not encrypted (e.g., using TLS/SSL). [CRITICAL NODE]
    • Action: Eavesdropping on sensitive data, MitM attacks.
• Insecure Storage Configuration [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
  • Weak Access Controls on Data Storage (HDFS, S3, etc.) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Spark application accesses data stored in locations with weak or misconfigured access controls. [CRITICAL NODE]
    • Action: Unauthorized data access, modification, or deletion.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Dependencies and Environment:

• Vulnerabilities in Spark Dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
  • Outdated or Vulnerable Libraries [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Spark application uses outdated or vulnerable versions of libraries (e.g., Hadoop, Netty, Jackson, Log4j). [CRITICAL NODE]
    • Action: Exploit known vulnerabilities in dependencies to compromise Spark components or the application environment.
• Vulnerabilities in Underlying Operating System or Infrastructure:
  • OS Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Spark nodes run on operating systems with known vulnerabilities. [CRITICAL NODE]
    • Action: System-level compromise of Spark nodes.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Social Engineering and Insider Threats (Less Spark-Specific, but relevant in context):

• Compromise Developer/Operator Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH - CRITICAL IMPACT]:
  • Attack Vector: Attacker gains access to credentials of users with administrative access to Spark or the application. [CRITICAL NODE]
  • Action: Full control over Spark application and potentially underlying infrastructure.
• Malicious Insider [HIGH-RISK PATH - CRITICAL IMPACT]:
  • Attack Vector: Insider with legitimate access abuses their privileges to compromise the application. [CRITICAL NODE]
  • Action: Data theft, sabotage, unauthorized modifications.