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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for mengto/spring

Attack Surface: Insecure Deserialization via Vulnerable Dependencies

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in deserialization libraries (like Jackson, XStream) present in Spring application dependencies when processing untrusted data. Leads to Remote Code Execution (RCE).
  • How Spring Contributes: Spring applications rely on numerous dependencies, and Spring Boot's dependency management can include vulnerable deserialization libraries if not actively managed.
  • Example: Crafted JSON payload sent to a Spring MVC REST endpoint using Jackson, triggering deserialization vulnerability in a vulnerable Jackson version, leading to RCE.
  • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), data breach, complete system compromise.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Dependency Scanning: Regularly scan dependencies for vulnerabilities.
    • Dependency Updates: Keep deserialization libraries and all dependencies updated to patched versions.
    • Secure Deserialization: Avoid deserializing untrusted data if possible. If necessary, use safe serialization practices and validate input.

Attack Surface: Spring Expression Language (SpEL) Injection

  • Description: Injecting malicious SpEL expressions into application inputs evaluated by Spring. Leads to unauthorized access, data manipulation, or Remote Code Execution (RCE).
  • How Spring Contributes: Spring uses SpEL in Spring Security annotations, Spring Integration, and configuration. User-controlled input in SpEL expressions without sanitization is vulnerable.
  • Example: Malicious SpEL expression in user input used in @PreAuthorize annotation, bypassing authorization or executing arbitrary code.
  • Impact: Authentication bypass, authorization bypass, Remote Code Execution (RCE), data breach.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoid SpEL with User Input: Do not use SpEL expressions directly incorporating user-controlled input.
    • Input Sanitization (Complex and Discouraged): If unavoidable, rigorously sanitize user input intended for SpEL, which is error-prone.
    • Secure Alternatives: Use safer alternatives to dynamic expression evaluation.

Attack Surface: Data Binding Vulnerabilities (Mass Assignment)

  • Description: Exploiting Spring MVC's data binding to modify unintended object properties via request parameters. Leads to unauthorized data manipulation or privilege escalation.
  • How Spring Contributes: Spring MVC automatically binds request parameters to object properties. Misconfiguration allows binding to sensitive fields not intended for user modification.
  • Example: Modifying isAdmin property of a User object via request parameter due to unrestricted data binding, leading to privilege escalation.
  • Impact: Authorization bypass, data manipulation, privilege escalation, data integrity compromise.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use Data Transfer Objects (DTOs): Bind request parameters to DTOs, not directly to domain objects.
    • Explicitly Define Bindable Fields: Control data binding to only allowed fields.
    • Validation with @Validated: Use validation annotations to enforce input constraints.

Attack Surface: Path Traversal via Static Resource Handling

  • Description: Accessing files outside intended static resource directories by manipulating file paths in requests. Exposes sensitive files.
  • How Spring Contributes: Misconfigured ResourceHttpRequestHandler in Spring MVC can allow path traversal if it doesn't restrict access to specific directories and sanitize file paths.
  • Example: Requesting /static/../../../../etc/passwd to access /etc/passwd due to misconfigured static resource handling.
  • Impact: Information disclosure, access to sensitive files, potential further exploitation.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Properly Configure Resource Handlers: Restrict ResourceHttpRequestHandler to specific directories and prevent parent directory traversal.
    • Restrict Access: Limit access to defined resource locations only.
    • Avoid Serving Sensitive Files: Do not serve sensitive files as static resources.
    • Input Validation on File Paths: Validate and sanitize file paths if constructed from user input.

Attack Surface: Authentication Bypass due to Misconfiguration (Spring Security)

  • Description: Bypassing authentication due to incorrect or overly permissive Spring Security configurations. Allows unauthorized access to protected resources.
  • How Spring Contributes: Spring Security's flexible configuration can lead to misconfigurations like overly permissive rules or incorrect URL patterns, causing bypasses.
  • Example: Using permitAll() for protected URL patterns or incorrect antMatchers, allowing unauthenticated access to sensitive resources.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to application functionality and data, complete compromise of protected resources.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Careful Security Rule Configuration: Thoroughly review and test Spring Security rules.
    • Least Privilege: Apply least privilege in security rules, avoiding overly permissive configurations.
    • Regular Configuration Review: Periodically audit Spring Security configurations.
    • Secure Actuator Endpoints: Secure Spring Boot Actuator endpoints.
    • Robust Authentication Mechanisms: Use strong, well-tested authentication mechanisms.

Attack Surface: Authorization Bypass due to Role/Authority Mismanagement (Spring Security)

  • Description: Bypassing authorization checks due to incorrect role/authority assignments or flawed Spring Security authorization logic. Allows unauthorized actions.
  • How Spring Contributes: Misuse of Spring Security authorization annotations, incorrect role management, or flawed logic can lead to bypasses.
  • Example: Flawed role assignment logic allowing regular users to get 'ADMIN' role, bypassing @PreAuthorize("hasRole('ADMIN')") protection.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access, privilege escalation, data manipulation, security policy violation.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Robust Role Management: Establish a clear and well-defined role/authority system.
    • Proper Authorization Annotations: Use Spring Security annotations correctly and consistently.
    • Regular Authorization Logic Review: Audit authorization logic for flaws.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Apply least privilege in authorization.
    • Consistent Authorization Checks: Ensure consistent authorization checks across the application.

Attack Surface: Exposed Actuator Endpoints (Spring Boot Actuator)

  • Description: Accessing sensitive information via unauthenticated or improperly secured Spring Boot Actuator endpoints.
  • How Spring Contributes: Spring Boot Actuator exposes endpoints by default, and misconfiguration can leave them unauthenticated, revealing sensitive application details.
  • Example: Unauthenticated /actuator/env endpoint exposing environment variables with sensitive credentials.
  • Impact: Information disclosure, potential for further attacks, unauthorized access to management functionality.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Actuator Endpoints: Always secure Actuator endpoints with authentication and authorization.
    • Disable in Production (If Unneeded): Disable Actuator endpoints in production if not required.
    • Restrict Access: Limit access to authorized users/networks.
    • Customize Endpoints: Minimize exposed information by customizing endpoints.
    • Monitor Access: Monitor Actuator endpoint access logs.