threat-modeling.md

Threat Model Analysis for mengto/spring

Threat: Vulnerable Spring Dependency

Description: An attacker exploits a known vulnerability in an outdated Spring Framework library or one of its transitive dependencies. They might scan for applications using vulnerable versions and then leverage public exploits to compromise the application. This could involve sending specially crafted requests or exploiting weaknesses in the library's code.

Impact: Application compromise, Remote Code Execution (RCE), data breaches, Denial of Service (DoS), depending on the specific vulnerability.

Affected Spring Component: Spring Core, Spring MVC, Spring Security, Spring Data, and any other Spring module or transitive dependency.

Risk Severity: Critical to High

Mitigation Strategies:

• Regularly update Spring Framework and all dependencies to the latest secure versions.
• Implement automated dependency scanning in the CI/CD pipeline to detect vulnerable dependencies.
• Use dependency management tools (Maven, Gradle) to manage and update dependencies effectively.
• Subscribe to security advisories for Spring Framework and related libraries to stay informed about new vulnerabilities.

Threat: Bean Definition Injection/Manipulation

Description: An attacker manipulates bean definitions during application startup or runtime, potentially by exploiting insecure configuration sources or dynamic bean registration mechanisms. They could inject malicious beans or modify existing ones to alter application behavior, potentially leading to code execution or unauthorized access.

Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), unauthorized access, application malfunction, data corruption.

Affected Spring Component: Spring Core, Dependency Injection (DI) container, Application Context.

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

• Secure configuration sources and restrict access to configuration files.
• Carefully review and restrict the use of dynamic bean registration.
• Implement input validation and sanitization for any configuration data that might be influenced by external sources.
• Keep Spring Framework updated to benefit from security patches and improvements in bean definition handling.

Threat: Mass Assignment via Data Binding

Description: An attacker sends malicious HTTP requests with parameters designed to modify object properties that should not be directly accessible. Spring MVC's data binding automatically maps these parameters to object properties. Attackers can exploit this to modify sensitive data or bypass security checks by manipulating fields intended for internal use only.

Impact: Data manipulation, unauthorized access, privilege escalation, business logic bypass.

Affected Spring Component: Spring MVC, Data Binding, @ModelAttribute, Controllers.

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

• Use Data Transfer Objects (DTOs) to strictly control which properties are bound from requests.
• Employ @ModelAttribute carefully and explicitly define allowed fields.
• Utilize validation frameworks (e.g., JSR 303/380) to validate input data after binding.
• Use annotations like @JsonProperty(access = Access.READ_ONLY) to restrict property access during deserialization.

Threat: Insecure View Resolution

Description: An attacker exploits dynamic view resolution mechanisms if view names are determined based on user input or external data without proper sanitization. They could inject path traversal sequences or template injection payloads into the view name, potentially leading to information disclosure or Remote Code Execution (RCE) if the template engine is vulnerable.

Impact: Information disclosure, Remote Code Execution (RCE) (in template engines), unauthorized access to files.

Affected Spring Component: Spring MVC, View Resolution, View Resolvers, Template Engines (Thymeleaf, JSP, etc.).

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

• Avoid dynamic view resolution based on untrusted user input.
• If dynamic view resolution is necessary, sanitize and validate user input thoroughly.
• Use a whitelist approach for allowed view names instead of relying on blacklist filtering.
• Ensure template engines are properly configured and updated to mitigate template injection vulnerabilities.

Threat: Spring Security Insecure Default Configurations

Description: Developers rely on default Spring Security configurations that are not suitable for production environments. This could include overly permissive access rules, weak password hashing algorithms (if defaults are not overridden), or disabled security features. Attackers can exploit these weak defaults to bypass authentication or authorization.

Impact: Unauthorized access, authentication bypass, data breaches, privilege escalation.

Affected Spring Component: Spring Security, Security Configuration, Authentication and Authorization mechanisms.

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

• Thoroughly configure Spring Security based on specific application security requirements.
• Review and override default settings to ensure they are secure for the production environment.
• Use strong password hashing algorithms (e.g., bcrypt, Argon2) and configure them properly.
• Implement least privilege access control and define granular authorization rules.
• Regularly audit Spring Security configurations and update them as needed.

Threat: Spring Security Authentication/Authorization Bypass

Description: Incorrectly configured Spring Security rules, missing authorization checks in code, or flaws in custom security implementations lead to authentication or authorization bypass vulnerabilities. Attackers can exploit these misconfigurations to access protected resources or functionalities without proper credentials or permissions.

Impact: Unauthorized access, data breaches, privilege escalation, data manipulation.

Affected Spring Component: Spring Security, Security Configuration, Authentication and Authorization mechanisms, Custom Security Filters/Components.

Risk Severity: Critical to High

Mitigation Strategies:

• Carefully define and test Spring Security rules to ensure they accurately reflect access control requirements.
• Thoroughly test authorization logic and ensure all protected resources are properly secured.
• Use role-based access control (RBAC) to manage permissions effectively.
• Implement proper input validation and sanitization within custom security components.
• Conduct regular security testing and code reviews to identify and fix authorization vulnerabilities.

Threat: Unsecured Spring Boot Actuator Endpoints

Description: Spring Boot Actuator endpoints, designed for monitoring and management, are exposed without proper authentication or authorization. Attackers can access these endpoints to gather sensitive information about the application's configuration, environment, and internal state. This information can be used to plan further attacks or directly exploit vulnerabilities revealed by the endpoints. In older versions or misconfigurations, RCE might be possible.

Impact: Information disclosure, potential for further attacks, sensitive data exposure, potentially Remote Code Execution (RCE).

Affected Spring Component: Spring Boot Actuator, Actuator Endpoints (e.g., /actuator/info, /actuator/env, /actuator/metrics).

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

• Secure Actuator endpoints using Spring Security and restrict access to authorized users/roles.
• Disable actuator endpoints in production environments if they are not needed.
• If actuator endpoints are required in production, expose them only on internal networks or behind a VPN.
• Regularly review and update Spring Boot Actuator configuration to ensure endpoints are properly secured.

Threat: SpEL Injection

Description: User-controlled input is directly used within Spring Expression Language (SpEL) expressions without proper sanitization. Attackers can inject malicious SpEL expressions that are then evaluated by the application, leading to arbitrary code execution on the server.

Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), complete system compromise, data breaches, denial of service.

Affected Spring Component: Spring Expression Language (SpEL), @Value annotation, Spring Security expressions, and any other component using SpEL evaluation.

Risk Severity: Critical

Mitigation Strategies:

• Avoid using user input directly in SpEL expressions.
• If user input must be used in SpEL, sanitize and validate it extremely carefully.
• Consider using parameterized queries or safer alternatives to SpEL where possible.
• Implement input validation and sanitization to prevent injection of malicious SpEL syntax.

Threat: Mass Assignment via JPA Entities

Description: Similar to MVC data binding, JPA entities are directly exposed and updated based on user input without proper control. Attackers can send malicious requests to modify unintended fields in database records by manipulating entity properties through data binding mechanisms.

Impact: Data manipulation, unauthorized data modification, data corruption, potential business logic bypass.

Affected Spring Component: Spring Data JPA, JPA Entities, Data Binding, Repositories.

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

• Use Data Transfer Objects (DTOs) for data transfer between the application and the database.
• Carefully control entity updates and only allow modification of intended fields.
• Use annotations like @JsonIgnore or @Transient to restrict serialization/deserialization of sensitive entity fields.
• Implement proper authorization checks before updating JPA entities.