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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for onevcat/fengniao

Attack Surface: Credential Exposure

  • Description: Accidental or malicious disclosure of cloud storage credentials (API keys, secrets, tokens) used by fengniao.
  • How fengniao Contributes: fengniao requires these credentials to function, making their management a central security concern. The tool's configuration and execution environment are potential points of exposure. The way fengniao handles these credentials (even if it's just passing them through) is a direct contribution.
  • Example: A developer accidentally commits a fengniao configuration file containing a plaintext AWS S3 access key to a public GitHub repository. Or, fengniao logs the credentials to a console in verbose mode.
  • Impact: Complete compromise of the associated cloud storage account. An attacker can read, write, and delete data, potentially leading to data breaches, data loss, and financial damage.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Never store credentials in source code or configuration files.
    • Use environment variables to provide credentials to fengniao.
    • Employ a secure secret management system (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault) to store and retrieve credentials dynamically.
    • Implement least privilege: Grant fengniao only the minimum necessary permissions on the cloud storage service (e.g., write-only access to a specific bucket).
    • Regularly rotate credentials.
    • Monitor cloud storage access logs for suspicious activity.
    • Educate developers on secure credential handling practices.
    • Ensure fengniao itself does not log or expose credentials in any way (e.g., through verbose output or error messages). This is a direct responsibility of the fengniao developers.

Attack Surface: Path Traversal

  • Description: An attacker manipulates file paths provided to fengniao to access or upload files outside of the intended directory.
  • How fengniao Contributes: fengniao takes file paths as input, making it a direct target for path traversal attacks if input validation is insufficient. The core functionality of fengniao involves handling file paths.
  • Example: An attacker uses a path like ../../../../etc/passwd to attempt to read the system's password file. Or, they might try to upload a file to a system directory like /etc/cron.d/ to achieve code execution.
  • Impact: Reading sensitive system files, potentially leading to further compromise. Overwriting critical system files, causing system instability or denial of service. In some cases, achieving remote code execution.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strictly validate and sanitize all file paths provided to fengniao. This is a direct responsibility of fengniao's code.
    • Reject any paths containing .., /, or other potentially dangerous characters or sequences.
    • Implement a whitelist of allowed directories, if feasible. Only allow uploads from these pre-approved locations.
    • Use platform-specific APIs for safe path handling (e.g., pathlib in Python).
    • Run fengniao with the least privilege necessary. Avoid running it as root or with unnecessary permissions.

Attack Surface: Incorrect Permissions/ACLs (Cloud Storage)

  • Description: Files are uploaded with overly permissive access control settings, making them accessible to unauthorized users.
  • How fengniao Contributes: fengniao is responsible for setting the initial permissions on uploaded files. If misconfigured, or if it doesn't provide secure defaults, it directly creates this vulnerability.
  • Example: fengniao is configured to upload all files with "public-read" access, exposing sensitive data to anyone on the internet. Or, fengniao has a bug that ignores user-specified permission settings.
  • Impact: Data leakage, unauthorized access to sensitive information.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Carefully configure the default permissions used by fengniao. Use the principle of least privilege. fengniao should default to the most restrictive settings possible.
    • Provide options for users to specify permissions, but with strong validation to prevent overly permissive settings. fengniao should validate these settings before applying them.
    • Regularly audit the permissions of files stored in the cloud storage service (this is a general mitigation, but fengniao's configuration is the root cause).
    • Use infrastructure-as-code (IaC) to manage cloud storage bucket policies and ensure consistent, secure configurations (again, a general mitigation, but relevant because of fengniao's role).