Objective: Compromise application functionality and/or data by exploiting vulnerabilities related to the Kingfisher image loading and caching library.
Attack Goal: Compromise Application via Kingfisher
[HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.0 Exploit Malicious Image Delivery 1.1 Serve Malicious Image from Compromised/Attacker-Controlled Server 1.1.1 Exploit Image Format Vulnerability (e.g., Buffer Overflow, Heap Overflow) 1.1.1.1 [CRITICAL NODE] Trigger Code Execution on Client Device [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.1.2 Embed Malicious Content within Image (e.g., Stored XSS if image URLs are reflected) 1.1.2.1 [CRITICAL NODE] Steal User Credentials/Session Tokens [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.1.3 Serve Large/Resource-Intensive Image 1.1.3.1 Cause Client-Side Resource Exhaustion (DoS) [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.2 Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attack [CRITICAL NODE] 1.2.1 Intercept and Replace Image Response with Malicious Image (Same sub-attacks as 1.1) [CRITICAL NODE] 1.2.2 Downgrade HTTPS to HTTP (if application doesn't enforce HTTPS strictly)
[HIGH-RISK PATH] 4.0 Exploit Misconfiguration/Misuse of Kingfisher in Application [HIGH-RISK PATH] 4.1 Insecure Image URL Handling 4.1.1 Application Constructs Image URLs from User Input without Proper Sanitization [HIGH-RISK PATH] 4.2 Inadequate Security Policies (e.g., allowing HTTP when HTTPS is expected) [CRITICAL NODE] 4.2.1 Facilitate MitM attacks (as in 1.2)
3.0 Exploit Kingfisher Library Vulnerabilities (Hypothetical - based on common library vulnerabilities) 3.1 Vulnerability in Image Decoding/Processing Logic (within Kingfisher or underlying libraries) 3.1.1 Triggered by Specific Image Format/Content 3.1.1.1 [CRITICAL NODE] Code Execution (if vulnerability is severe)
Attack Tree Path: 1.0 Exploit Malicious Image Delivery
- Attack Vector: Attacker compromises an image server or sets up a malicious server to serve images to the application.
- Breakdown of Sub-Attacks:
- 1.1.1 Exploit Image Format Vulnerability:
- Attack: Serve a specially crafted image that exploits vulnerabilities in image decoding libraries used by Kingfisher or the underlying system.
- 1.1.1.1 [CRITICAL NODE] Trigger Code Execution on Client Device:
- Impact: Attacker gains complete control over the application and potentially the user's device.
- Example: Buffer overflows, heap overflows in image parsing logic.
- 1.1.2 Embed Malicious Content within Image (XSS):
- Attack: Embed malicious scripts (e.g., JavaScript) within image metadata or pixel data. If the application reflects image URLs or metadata without sanitization, this can lead to XSS.
- 1.1.2.1 [CRITICAL NODE] Steal User Credentials/Session Tokens:
- Impact: Attacker can steal sensitive user information, leading to account compromise and data breaches.
- Example: Embedding JavaScript in EXIF metadata that executes when the application displays or processes the image URL.
- 1.1.3 Serve Large/Resource-Intensive Image:
- Attack: Serve extremely large or computationally expensive images to overwhelm the client device.
- 1.1.3.1 Cause Client-Side Resource Exhaustion (DoS):
- Impact: Application becomes unresponsive or crashes due to resource exhaustion on the client device.
- Example: Serving a multi-gigabyte image or an image that requires excessive CPU/memory to decode.
- 1.1.1 Exploit Image Format Vulnerability:
Attack Tree Path: 1.2 Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attack
- Attack Vector: Attacker intercepts network traffic between the application and the image server.
- Breakdown of Sub-Attacks:
- 1.2.1 [CRITICAL NODE] Intercept and Replace Image Response with Malicious Image:
- Attack: Attacker intercepts the legitimate image response and replaces it with a malicious image (as described in 1.1).
- Impact: Same as 1.1 (code execution, XSS, DoS) but achieved through network interception.
- 1.2.2 [CRITICAL NODE] Downgrade HTTPS to HTTP:
- Attack: If the application does not strictly enforce HTTPS, the attacker attempts to downgrade the connection to HTTP.
- Impact: Facilitates MitM attacks (like 1.2.1) by removing encryption and making interception easier.
- 1.2.1 [CRITICAL NODE] Intercept and Replace Image Response with Malicious Image:
Attack Tree Path: 4.0 Exploit Misconfiguration/Misuse of Kingfisher in Application
- Attack Vector: Vulnerabilities arise from how the application is configured or how Kingfisher is used within the application's code.
- Breakdown of Sub-Attacks:
- [HIGH-RISK PATH] 4.1 Insecure Image URL Handling:
- 4.1.1 Application Constructs Image URLs from User Input without Proper Sanitization:
- Attack: The application builds image URLs using user-provided input without proper validation or sanitization.
- Impact: Can lead to Open Redirect vulnerabilities (if the application redirects based on image loading) or SSRF (in server-side contexts).
- Example: User input is directly concatenated into the image URL string without encoding or validation.
- 4.1.1 Application Constructs Image URLs from User Input without Proper Sanitization:
- [HIGH-RISK PATH] 4.2 Inadequate Security Policies:
- 4.2.1 [CRITICAL NODE] Facilitate MitM attacks:
- Attack: The application or its environment is configured to allow HTTP connections when HTTPS is expected for image loading.
- Impact: Enables MitM attacks (as in 1.2) and exposes the application to malicious image delivery.
- Example: Not enforcing HTTPS in application code or server configuration, allowing image URLs to be loaded over HTTP.
- 4.2.1 [CRITICAL NODE] Facilitate MitM attacks:
- [HIGH-RISK PATH] 4.1 Insecure Image URL Handling:
Attack Tree Path: 4.1 Insecure Image URL Handling
- 4.1.1 Application Constructs Image URLs from User Input without Proper Sanitization: * Attack: The application builds image URLs using user-provided input without proper validation or sanitization. * Impact: Can lead to Open Redirect vulnerabilities (if the application redirects based on image loading) or SSRF (in server-side contexts). * Example: User input is directly concatenated into the image URL string without encoding or validation.
Attack Tree Path: 4.2 Inadequate Security Policies
- 4.2.1 [CRITICAL NODE] Facilitate MitM attacks: * Attack: The application or its environment is configured to allow HTTP connections when HTTPS is expected for image loading. * Impact: Enables MitM attacks (as in 1.2) and exposes the application to malicious image delivery. * Example: Not enforcing HTTPS in application code or server configuration, allowing image URLs to be loaded over HTTP.