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Attack Tree Analysis for quick/nimble

Objective: Compromise application using Nimble vulnerabilities (High-Risk Paths Only).

Attack Tree Visualization

  • Root: Compromise Application via Nimble
    • OR
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] 1. Compromise Package Source (Supply Chain Attack) [CRITICAL NODE: Package Source]
        • OR
          • [HIGH RISK PATH] 1.1. Compromise Nimble Package Index [CRITICAL NODE: Nimble Package Index]
            • OR
              • [HIGH RISK PATH] 1.1.1. Account Compromise of Index Maintainer [CRITICAL NODE: Index Maintainer Account]
                • └── Action: Gain credentials of Nimble Package Index maintainer (phishing, credential stuffing, etc.)
              • [HIGH RISK PATH] 1.1.3. Malicious Package Injection/Substitution
                • └── Action: Upload a malicious package or replace an existing package with a malicious one on the index.
          • [HIGH RISK PATH] 1.2. Compromise GitHub/External Repository [CRITICAL NODE: GitHub Repository]
            • OR
              • [HIGH RISK PATH] 1.2.1. Account Compromise of Package Maintainer (GitHub) [CRITICAL NODE: GitHub Maintainer Account]
                • └── Action: Gain credentials of package maintainer on GitHub (phishing, credential stuffing, etc.)
              • [HIGH RISK PATH] 1.2.3. Malicious Commit Injection
                • └── Action: Inject malicious code into a legitimate package repository (e.g., via compromised contributor account, pull request manipulation).
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] 2.1.2. Command Injection in .nimble scripts/tasks [CRITICAL NODE: .nimble Script Execution]
        • └── Action: Inject malicious commands into .nimble file's task or script sections that Nimble executes.
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] 2.2.1. Dependency Confusion/Substitution [CRITICAL NODE: Dependency Resolution]
        • └── Action: Create a malicious package with the same name as a legitimate dependency in a public or private repository, hoping Nimble will install the malicious one.
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] 3.1. Modify .nimble file in Application Repository [CRITICAL NODE: Application Repository .nimble File]
        • OR
          • [HIGH RISK PATH] 3.1.1. Direct Modification (if attacker has write access)
            • └── Action: Directly modify the .nimble file in the application's repository to point to malicious packages or add malicious tasks.
          • [HIGH RISK PATH] 3.1.2. Supply Chain Compromise via Developer Machine [CRITICAL NODE: Developer Machine]
            • └── Action: Compromise a developer's machine and modify the .nimble file before it is committed to the repository.
      • [HIGH RISK PATH] 4. Social Engineering Attacks Targeting Nimble Users/Developers [CRITICAL NODE: Human Factor]
        • OR
          • [HIGH RISK PATH] 4.1. Phishing for Nimble Package Index Credentials [CRITICAL NODE: Index Maintainer Credentials]
            • └── Action: Phish Nimble Package Index maintainers to gain access to upload malicious packages.

Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise Package Source (Supply Chain Attack) [CRITICAL NODE: Package Source]

  • Why High-Risk: This path has a high potential for widespread and critical impact. If the package source is compromised, many applications relying on packages from that source can be affected. Likelihood is medium due to the inherent trust model of package managers.

  • Attack Vectors:

    • Compromising the Nimble Package Index (1.1)
    • Compromising GitHub/External Repositories (1.2)

  • Mitigations:

    • Nimble Dev: Implement package signing and verification.
    • Nimble Dev: Enhance Nimble Package Index security.
    • Application Dev: Dependency pinning, private package repositories, package source review, monitor dependencies.

    1.1. Compromise Nimble Package Index [CRITICAL NODE: Nimble Package Index]

    • Why High-Risk: The Nimble Package Index is the central repository for Nimble packages. Compromise leads to widespread impact. Likelihood is medium due to potential vulnerabilities in infrastructure and social engineering of maintainers.

    • Attack Vectors:

      • Account Compromise of Index Maintainer (1.1.1)
      • Malicious Package Injection/Substitution (1.1.3)

    • Mitigations:

      • Nimble Dev/Index Maintainers: Implement strong authentication (MFA).
      • Nimble Dev/Index Maintainers: Educate maintainers on phishing awareness.
      • Nimble Dev: Implement package signing and verification.
      • Nimble Dev: Enhance Nimble Package Index infrastructure security.

      1.1.1. Account Compromise of Index Maintainer [CRITICAL NODE: Index Maintainer Account]

      • Why High-Risk: Compromising a maintainer account grants direct access to manage packages on the index. Critical impact due to potential for malicious package uploads. Medium likelihood due to phishing and credential reuse.
      • Attack Action: Gain credentials of Nimble Package Index maintainer (phishing, credential stuffing, etc.).
      • Mitigations:
        • Nimble Dev/Index Maintainers: Implement strong authentication (MFA).
        • Nimble Dev/Index Maintainers: Educate maintainers on phishing awareness.

      1.1.3. Malicious Package Injection/Substitution

      • Why High-Risk: Directly injecting or substituting malicious packages on the index leads to critical impact as users installing these packages will be compromised. Medium likelihood if attacker gains access via account compromise or infrastructure vulnerability.
      • Attack Action: Upload a malicious package or replace an existing package with a malicious one on the index.
      • Mitigations:
        • Nimble Dev: Implement package signing and verification.
        • Application Dev: Be aware of package maintainer reputation, consider using specific package versions, monitor for unexpected package updates.

    1.2. Compromise GitHub/External Repository [CRITICAL NODE: GitHub Repository]

    • Why High-Risk: Many Nimble packages are hosted on GitHub. Compromising a popular repository can affect a significant number of applications. High impact, medium likelihood due to potential account compromise and commit injection.

    • Attack Vectors:

      • Account Compromise of Package Maintainer (GitHub) (1.2.1)
      • Malicious Commit Injection (1.2.3)

    • Mitigations:

      • Application Dev: Review package source code, use specific commit hashes, monitor for unexpected repository changes.
      • GitHub: Implement and enforce security best practices for repositories and accounts.

      1.2.1. Account Compromise of Package Maintainer (GitHub) [CRITICAL NODE: GitHub Maintainer Account]

      • Why High-Risk: Compromising a GitHub maintainer account allows for malicious modifications to the package repository. High impact on applications using the package. Medium likelihood due to phishing and credential reuse.
      • Attack Action: Gain credentials of package maintainer on GitHub (phishing, credential stuffing, etc.).
      • Mitigations:
        • GitHub: Encourage maintainers to use strong authentication (MFA).
        • GitHub: Educate maintainers on phishing awareness.

      1.2.3. Malicious Commit Injection

      • Why High-Risk: Injecting malicious code into a legitimate package repository directly compromises the package. High impact on applications using the package. Medium likelihood if attacker gains access via account compromise or pull request manipulation.
      • Attack Action: Inject malicious code into a legitimate package repository (e.g., via compromised contributor account, pull request manipulation).
      • Mitigations:
        • Application Dev: Review package source code, use specific commit hashes, monitor for unexpected repository changes.
        • GitHub: Implement code review processes and security checks for pull requests.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Command Injection in .nimble scripts/tasks [CRITICAL NODE: .nimble Script Execution]

  • Why High-Risk: Command injection vulnerabilities can lead to arbitrary code execution on the user's machine. High impact, medium likelihood if Nimble's task execution is not properly secured.
  • Attack Action: Inject malicious commands into .nimble file's task or script sections that Nimble executes.
  • Mitigations:
    • Nimble Dev: Sanitize inputs to task execution.
    • Nimble Dev: Use safer execution methods (avoid direct shell execution).
    • Application Dev: Carefully review .nimble files from external sources.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Dependency Confusion/Substitution [CRITICAL NODE: Dependency Resolution]

  • Why High-Risk: Dependency confusion can lead to the installation of malicious packages instead of legitimate ones, resulting in application compromise. High impact, low-medium likelihood depending on Nimble's resolution logic and repository configuration.
  • Attack Action: Create a malicious package with the same name as a legitimate dependency in a public or private repository, hoping Nimble will install the malicious one.
  • Mitigations:
    • Application Dev: Use private package repositories where possible.
    • Application Dev: Carefully review dependencies.
    • Application Dev: Use dependency pinning to specific versions.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Modify .nimble file in Application Repository [CRITICAL NODE: Application Repository .nimble File]

  • Why High-Risk: The .nimble file controls dependencies and tasks. Malicious modification can directly compromise the application. High impact, medium likelihood if repository access control is weak or developer machines are compromised.

  • Attack Vectors:

    • Direct Modification (if attacker has write access) (3.1.1)
    • Supply Chain Compromise via Developer Machine (3.1.2)

  • Mitigations:

    • Application Dev: Implement strong access control on repositories.
    • Application Dev: Use code review processes.
    • Application Dev: Protect developer credentials.
    • Application Dev: Secure developer machines.
    • Application Dev: Implement endpoint security.
    • Application Dev: Educate developers on security best practices.

    3.1.1. Direct Modification (if attacker has write access)

    • Why High-Risk: Direct modification of .nimble file is a straightforward way to inject malicious dependencies or tasks if write access is obtained. High impact, medium likelihood depending on repository access control.
    • Attack Action: Directly modify the .nimble file in the application's repository to point to malicious packages or add malicious tasks.
    • Mitigations:
      • Application Dev: Implement strong access control on repositories.
      • Application Dev: Use code review processes.
      • Application Dev: Protect developer credentials.

    3.1.2. Supply Chain Compromise via Developer Machine [CRITICAL NODE: Developer Machine]

    • Why High-Risk: Compromising a developer machine allows for manipulation of the .nimble file before it's committed, effectively injecting malicious code into the application's supply chain. High impact, medium likelihood as developer machines are often targeted.
    • Attack Action: Compromise a developer's machine and modify the .nimble file before it is committed to the repository.
    • Mitigations:
      • Application Dev: Secure developer machines.
      • Application Dev: Implement endpoint security.
      • Application Dev: Educate developers on security best practices.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Social Engineering Attacks Targeting Nimble Users/Developers [CRITICAL NODE: Human Factor]

  • Why High-Risk: Social engineering exploits human vulnerabilities and can bypass technical security measures. High impact, especially phishing for index credentials (critical impact). Medium likelihood as social engineering is a persistent threat.

  • Attack Vector:

    • Phishing for Nimble Package Index Credentials (4.1)

  • Mitigations:

    • Nimble Dev/Index Maintainers: Implement strong authentication (MFA).
    • Nimble Dev/Index Maintainers: Educate maintainers on phishing awareness.
    • Application Dev: Developer security training, awareness of social engineering tactics.

    4.1. Phishing for Nimble Package Index Credentials [CRITICAL NODE: Index Maintainer Credentials]

    • Why High-Risk: Successful phishing of index maintainers grants attackers control over the Nimble Package Index, leading to critical impact. Medium likelihood as phishing is a common and effective attack.
    • Attack Action: Phish Nimble Package Index maintainers to gain access to upload malicious packages.
    • Mitigations:
      • Nimble Dev/Index Maintainers: Implement strong authentication (MFA).
      • Nimble Dev/Index Maintainers: Educate maintainers on phishing awareness.