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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for rxswiftcommunity/rxdatasources

Attack Surface: Data Injection (XSS, Data Corruption, DoS)

  • Description: Malicious data is introduced into the data source, leading to severe consequences like code execution or application instability.
  • RxDataSources Contribution: RxDataSources acts as the direct conduit for data to reach UI elements. While it doesn't create the vulnerability, its role in binding data makes it a critical part of the attack chain. It's the "delivery mechanism" for the injected data.
  • Example:
    • An attacker injects a string containing <script>alert('XSS')</script> into a text field that is directly bound to a UITableView cell's text label via RxDataSources. The lack of sanitization before reaching RxDataSources allows the script to be passed to the UI.
    • An attacker sends a very large JSON payload that is immediately used to update an RxDataSources-managed UICollectionView, causing the app to freeze due to excessive UI updates triggered by the library.
  • Impact:
    • XSS: Execution of arbitrary JavaScript in the application's context (Critical).
    • Data Corruption: Modification or corruption of the application's internal data model, potentially leading to further vulnerabilities (High).
    • DoS: Application becomes unresponsive or crashes due to excessive UI updates or data processing (High).
  • Risk Severity: Critical (for XSS), High (for Data Corruption/DoS)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict Input Validation: Implement rigorous validation before data reaches the RxDataSources binding. Use whitelisting and type checks. This is the most crucial mitigation.
    • Data Sanitization: Escape or encode data appropriately before it's passed to RxDataSources, especially if it will be rendered as HTML.
    • Rate Limiting: Limit the frequency and size of data updates sent to RxDataSources to prevent DoS attacks.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): If rendering web content that might be influenced by the data source, use CSP to restrict script execution.

Attack Surface: Unauthorized Data Modification

  • Description: Untrusted code within the application gains direct access to the Observable sequence (e.g., BehaviorRelay, PublishRelay) that powers the RxDataSources data source and modifies it.
  • RxDataSources Contribution: This attack vector is entirely about the exposure of RxDataSources' internal data management mechanisms (the Observable sequences). The vulnerability exists because the application allows direct manipulation of these sequences.
  • Example: A compromised third-party library obtains a reference to the BehaviorRelay that is used as the input for an RxTableViewSectionedReloadDataSource. It then calls .accept() on this relay with malicious data, bypassing all intended application logic and directly altering the table view's contents.
  • Impact:
    • Data corruption within the data source, leading to incorrect UI display and potential application instability (High).
    • Bypassing of security checks and business logic that should have been applied before data reaches the UI (High).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Never expose the underlying Subject or Relay directly. Use asObservable() to provide a read-only view of the data stream. This is the primary defense.
    • Access Control: Use Swift's access control keywords (private, fileprivate, etc.) to strictly limit which parts of the code can access the data source's underlying observable.
    • Code Reviews: Thoroughly review all code that interacts with RxDataSources to ensure that the underlying observables are not leaked or misused.
    • Dependency Injection: Use dependency injection to control the flow of data sources and prevent unauthorized access. Inject Observable instances, not mutable subjects.