Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
35 lines (30 loc) · 3.46 KB

attack-surface.md

File metadata and controls

35 lines (30 loc) · 3.46 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for snapkit/masonry

Attack Surface: Untrusted Item Dimensions

  • Description: User-provided data influences the size (width, height) of elements arranged by Masonry.
    • Masonry's Contribution: Masonry directly uses these dimensions for its core layout calculations. Incorrect or malicious values directly impact Masonry's processing.
    • Example: An attacker submits a form field that sets an item's height to 9999999px.
    • Impact:
      • Client-side Denial of Service (DoS) due to excessive browser resource consumption caused by Masonry's calculations.
      • Layout manipulation and visual spoofing directly resulting from Masonry's handling of the malicious dimensions.
      • Indirect Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) - if and only if dimensions are used in inline styles without sanitization before Masonry processes them. This is a borderline case, as the XSS itself isn't directly in Masonry, but Masonry's handling of the unsanitized dimensions is a necessary step. I'm including it because of the direct interaction with dimension data.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer:
        • Strictly validate and sanitize all user-supplied data affecting element dimensions. Use a whitelist approach.
        • Implement server-side validation of dimensions.
        • Use a Content Security Policy (CSP) to restrict inline styles (mitigates the indirect XSS).
        • Use getBoundingClientRect() after sanitization (or server-side) to get actual dimensions, rather than relying on potentially manipulated input.
      • User: (Limited direct mitigation, relies on developer implementation)
        • Be cautious about entering unusually large values in forms that might affect layout.

Attack Surface: Untrusted Item Content (Indirect XSS) - Borderline, included for completeness, but with caveats

  • Description: User-generated content is displayed within Masonry grid items without proper sanitization.
    • Masonry's Contribution: Masonry arranges the content, but does not directly execute or interpret it. The XSS vulnerability is in the application's handling of the content, not Masonry itself. Masonry's role is purely presentational. This is why it's borderline. It's included because Masonry is displaying the malicious content, but it's not the source of the vulnerability.
    • Example: An attacker posts a comment containing a malicious <script> tag within a Masonry grid item.
    • Impact: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) – execution of arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the victim's browser.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer:
        • Implement robust input sanitization and output encoding for all user-supplied content. Use a well-vetted HTML sanitization library (e.g., DOMPurify). This is the primary mitigation, and it's not Masonry-specific.
        • Employ a strong Content Security Policy (CSP) to limit script execution.
      • User: (Limited direct mitigation, relies on developer implementation)
        • Be cautious about clicking links or interacting with content from untrusted sources within the grid.