attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for swiftybeaver/swiftybeaver

Objective: Compromise Application Logs via SwiftyBeaver

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Compromise Application Logs via SwiftyBeaver ├── 1. Unauthorized Access to Log Data [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 1.1. Exploit SwiftyBeaver Platform Vulnerabilities (if used) [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── 1.1.1. Authentication Bypass on SwiftyBeaver Platform [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ ├── 1.1.1.1. Brute-force SwiftyBeaver Platform credentials. [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.2. Exploit known SwiftyBeaver Platform vulnerabilities (e.g., CVEs). │ │ ├── 1.1.2. Authorization Bypass on SwiftyBeaver Platform [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ ├── 1.1.2.1. Exploit misconfigured access controls (e.g., overly permissive roles). [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ └── 1.1.2.2. Leverage privilege escalation vulnerabilities within the platform. │ ├── 1.2. Intercept Log Data in Transit (if not using platform, or in addition to it) │ │ └── 1.2.1.3. Compromise a network device (router, switch). [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 1.2.2. Exploit Weak Encryption/Protocols │ │ └── 1.2.2.1. Downgrade attack to force weaker TLS versions (if misconfigured). [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 1.3. Access Log Files Directly (if stored locally or on accessible storage) [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1.3.1. Exploit OS-Level Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL] │ │ │ └── 1.3.1.2. Leverage misconfigured file permissions. [HIGH RISK] │ │ └── 1.3.3. Access Network Shares (if logs are stored on a network share) │ │ ├── 1.3.3.1. Exploit weak authentication on the network share. [HIGH RISK] │ │ └── 1.3.3.2. Leverage misconfigured share permissions. [HIGH RISK] │ └── 1.4 Exploit SwiftyBeaver Destination Configuration [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 1.4.1 Weak Credentials for Destination [HIGH RISK] │ │ └── 1.4.1.1 Use default or easily guessable credentials for the configured destination (e.g., database, cloud storage). [HIGH RISK] │ └── 1.4.2 Misconfigured Destination Permissions [HIGH RISK] │ └── 1.4.2.1 Destination configured with overly permissive access, allowing unauthorized read/write. [HIGH RISK] ├── 2. Denial of Service (DoS) Affecting Logging │ └── 2.1. Overwhelm SwiftyBeaver Platform (if used) [CRITICAL] └── 3. Manipulation of Log Data [HIGH RISK] ├── 3.1.2. Compromise SwiftyBeaver Platform (if used) and Inject Logs [CRITICAL] │ └── 3.1.2.1. Use compromised credentials to send fabricated log data. └── 3.2. Delete or Modify Existing Log Entries [HIGH RISK] ├── 3.2.1. Gain Unauthorized Access to Log Files (see 1.3) and Modify/Delete Them. [HIGH RISK] └── 3.2.2. Compromise SwiftyBeaver Platform (if used) and Delete/Modify Logs. [CRITICAL] └── 3.2.2.1. Use compromised credentials to delete or alter log data.

Attack Tree Path: 1. Unauthorized Access to Log Data [HIGH RISK]

• 1.1. Exploit SwiftyBeaver Platform Vulnerabilities (if used) [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL]

  • Description: The attacker targets weaknesses in the SwiftyBeaver platform itself to gain control. This is critical because it's a central point of failure.
  • 1.1.1. Authentication Bypass on SwiftyBeaver Platform [HIGH RISK]
    • 1.1.1.1. Brute-force SwiftyBeaver Platform credentials. [HIGH RISK]
      • Attack Vector: Automated attempts to guess usernames and passwords.
      • Mitigation: Strong password policies, rate limiting, account lockout, multi-factor authentication (MFA).
    • 1.1.1.2. Exploit known SwiftyBeaver Platform vulnerabilities (e.g., CVEs).
      • Attack Vector: Leveraging publicly disclosed vulnerabilities in the platform software.
      • Mitigation: Regular security updates, vulnerability scanning, intrusion detection.
  • 1.1.2. Authorization Bypass on SwiftyBeaver Platform [HIGH RISK]
    • 1.1.2.1. Exploit misconfigured access controls (e.g., overly permissive roles). [HIGH RISK]
      • Attack Vector: Taking advantage of users or applications having more permissions than they need.
      • Mitigation: Principle of least privilege, regular access reviews, role-based access control (RBAC).
    • 1.1.2.2. Leverage privilege escalation vulnerabilities within the platform.
      • Attack Vector: Exploiting a bug that allows a low-privileged user to gain higher privileges.
      • Mitigation: Regular security updates, vulnerability scanning, intrusion detection.

• 1.2. Intercept Log Data in Transit

  • 1.2.1.3. Compromise a network device (router, switch). [CRITICAL]
    • Attack Vector: Gaining administrative access to a network device to monitor or redirect traffic.
    • Mitigation: Strong device passwords, regular firmware updates, network segmentation, intrusion detection.
  • 1.2.2. Exploit Weak Encryption/Protocols
    • 1.2.2.1. Downgrade attack to force weaker TLS versions (if misconfigured). [HIGH RISK]
      • Attack Vector: Forcing the connection to use a weaker, vulnerable version of TLS.
      • Mitigation: Proper TLS configuration (disable weak ciphers and protocols), certificate validation.

• 1.3. Access Log Files Directly (if stored locally or on accessible storage) [HIGH RISK]

  • 1.3.1. Exploit OS-Level Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]
    • 1.3.1.2. Leverage misconfigured file permissions. [HIGH RISK]
      • Attack Vector: Taking advantage of files or directories that have overly permissive access rights.
      • Mitigation: Strict file permissions (least privilege), regular audits.
  • 1.3.3. Access Network Shares (if logs are stored on a network share)
    • 1.3.3.1. Exploit weak authentication on the network share. [HIGH RISK]
      • Attack Vector: Using weak or default credentials to access the network share.
      • Mitigation: Strong passwords, multi-factor authentication (if supported).
    • 1.3.3.2. Leverage misconfigured share permissions. [HIGH RISK]
      • Attack Vector: Taking advantage of shares that have overly permissive access rights.
      • Mitigation: Principle of least privilege, regular audits of share permissions.

• 1.4 Exploit SwiftyBeaver Destination Configuration [HIGH RISK]

  • 1.4.1 Weak Credentials for Destination [HIGH RISK]
    • 1.4.1.1 Use default or easily guessable credentials for the configured destination (e.g., database, cloud storage). [HIGH RISK]
      • Attack Vector: Using default or easily guessable credentials.
      • Mitigation: Strong, unique passwords for all destinations.
  • 1.4.2 Misconfigured Destination Permissions [HIGH RISK]
    • 1.4.2.1 Destination configured with overly permissive access, allowing unauthorized read/write. [HIGH RISK]
      • Attack Vector: Destination is configured with more permissions than necessary.
      • Mitigation: Principle of least privilege, regular audits of destination permissions.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Denial of Service (DoS) Affecting Logging

• 2.1. Overwhelm SwiftyBeaver Platform (if used) [CRITICAL]
  • Attack Vector: Sending excessive requests or data to the platform, causing it to become unavailable.
  • Mitigation: Rate limiting, resource monitoring, robust infrastructure, DDoS protection.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Manipulation of Log Data [HIGH RISK]

• 3.1.2. Compromise SwiftyBeaver Platform (if used) and Inject Logs [CRITICAL]
  • 3.1.2.1. Use compromised credentials to send fabricated log data.
    • Attack Vector: Using stolen credentials to inject false log entries into the platform.
    • Mitigation: Strong authentication (MFA), regular credential rotation, intrusion detection.
• 3.2. Delete or Modify Existing Log Entries [HIGH RISK]
  • 3.2.1. Gain Unauthorized Access to Log Files (see 1.3) and Modify/Delete Them. [HIGH RISK]
    • Attack Vector: Directly altering or deleting log files after gaining unauthorized access.
    • Mitigation: File integrity monitoring, strict access controls, regular backups.
  • 3.2.2. Compromise SwiftyBeaver Platform (if used) and Delete/Modify Logs. [CRITICAL]
    • 3.2.2.1. Use compromised credentials to delete or alter log data.
      • Attack Vector: Using stolen credentials to delete or modify log entries within the platform.
      • Mitigation: Strong authentication (MFA), regular credential rotation, audit logging, intrusion detection.