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Attack Tree Analysis for airflow-helm/charts

Objective: Compromise Application via Airflow Helm Chart Vulnerabilities

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise Application via Airflow Helm Chart Vulnerabilities **(CRITICAL NODE)**
├── OR **(HIGH-RISK PATH START)**
│   ├── Exploit Misconfigurations in Chart Deployment (AND) **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
│   │   ├── Insecure Default Configurations **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
│   │   │   ├── Exposed Services with Default Credentials **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
│   │   │   │   ├── Airflow UI Exposed with Default Admin Credentials **(CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH)**
│   │   │   │   ├── Database (PostgreSQL/MySQL) Exposed with Default Credentials **(CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH)**
│   │   │   ├── Insecure Network Policies **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
│   │   │   │   ├── Allowing Public Access to Internal Services (e.g., Database, Redis, Celery) **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
│   │   │   │   ├── Overly Permissive Ingress Rules **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
│   │   │   ├── User-Introduced Misconfigurations **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
│   │   │   │   ├── Weak Passwords/Secrets in `values.yaml` or Secrets Management **(CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH)**
│   │   ├── Exploit Vulnerabilities in Chart Dependencies (AND)
│   │   │   ├── Vulnerable Container Images **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
│   │   │   │   ├── Outdated Base Images (OS Level Vulnerabilities) **(CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH)**
│   │   │   │   ├── Vulnerabilities in Airflow Core Image **(CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH)**
│   │   │   │   ├── Vulnerabilities in Database Image (PostgreSQL/MySQL) **(CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH)**
│   │   ├── Supply Chain Attacks Targeting Chart Acquisition (Less Direct, but Relevant) (AND) **(CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH START)**
│   │   │   ├── Compromised Helm Chart Repository **(CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH)**
│   │   │   │   ├── Downloading Chart from Unofficial or Compromised Repository **(CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH)**

Attack Tree Path: Attack Goal: Compromise Application via Airflow Helm Chart Vulnerabilities (CRITICAL NODE)

  • Description: The ultimate objective of the attacker. Success means gaining unauthorized access and control over the Airflow application and/or its infrastructure.
  • Impact: Critical - Full compromise of the application, potential data breach, service disruption, and infrastructure compromise.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Misconfigurations in Chart Deployment (HIGH-RISK PATH)

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities arising from insecure configurations introduced during the deployment of the Helm chart. This is a broad category encompassing several specific misconfigurations.

  • Breakdown of Sub-Paths:

    • Insecure Default Configurations (HIGH-RISK PATH):
      • Description: Relying on insecure default settings provided by the Helm chart without proper hardening.
      • Exposed Services with Default Credentials (HIGH-RISK PATH):
        • Airflow UI Exposed with Default Admin Credentials (CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH):
          • Attack Vector: Airflow UI is publicly accessible and the default admin credentials (airflow/airflow) are not changed.
          • Likelihood: Medium
          • Impact: Critical
          • Effort: Very Low
          • Skill Level: Low
          • Detection Difficulty: Easy
          • Action: Change default admin password immediately. Enforce strong password policies.
        • Database (PostgreSQL/MySQL) Exposed with Default Credentials (CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH):
          • Attack Vector: Database service is publicly accessible or accessible from outside the intended network segment, and default database credentials are used.
          • Likelihood: Low
          • Impact: High
          • Effort: Low
          • Skill Level: Low
          • Detection Difficulty: Medium
          • Action: Change default database passwords. Restrict database access to Airflow components only.
      • Insecure Network Policies (HIGH-RISK PATH):
        • Allowing Public Access to Internal Services (e.g., Database, Redis, Celery) (HIGH-RISK PATH):
          • Attack Vector: Lack of NetworkPolicies or misconfigured NetworkPolicies allow public or external access to internal services like databases, Redis, or Celery.
          • Likelihood: Medium
          • Impact: High
          • Effort: Low
          • Skill Level: Low
          • Detection Difficulty: Medium
          • Action: Implement NetworkPolicies to restrict access to internal services within the Kubernetes cluster.
        • Overly Permissive Ingress Rules (HIGH-RISK PATH):
          • Attack Vector: Ingress rules are configured too broadly, exposing more services or endpoints than intended, potentially including sensitive internal services.
          • Likelihood: Medium
          • Impact: Medium
          • Effort: Low
          • Skill Level: Low
          • Detection Difficulty: Easy
          • Action: Review and restrict Ingress rules to only expose necessary services (Airflow UI, potentially API if needed) and enforce proper authentication.
      • User-Introduced Misconfigurations (HIGH-RISK PATH):
        • Weak Passwords/Secrets in values.yaml or Secrets Management (CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH):
          • Attack Vector: Users mistakenly store weak passwords or secrets directly in values.yaml or use insecure methods for managing secrets, making them easily accessible to attackers.
          • Likelihood: Medium
          • Impact: Critical
          • Effort: Low
          • Skill Level: Low
          • Detection Difficulty: Difficult
          • Action: Never store secrets directly in values.yaml. Utilize Kubernetes Secrets, external secret management solutions (Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, etc.), and Helm's secret management features.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Vulnerabilities in Chart Dependencies (HIGH-RISK PATH)

  • Description: Exploiting known vulnerabilities in the container images used by the Helm chart, which are dependencies of the deployment.
  • Breakdown of Sub-Paths:
    • Vulnerable Container Images (HIGH-RISK PATH):
      • Outdated Base Images (OS Level Vulnerabilities) (CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH):
        • Attack Vector: Container images are built on outdated base images containing known operating system level vulnerabilities.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: High
        • Effort: Medium
        • Skill Level: Medium
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium
        • Action: Regularly update container images to the latest stable versions. Implement automated image scanning and vulnerability management.
      • Vulnerabilities in Airflow Core Image (CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH):
        • Attack Vector: Vulnerabilities exist within the Airflow core container image itself.
        • Likelihood: Low
        • Impact: High
        • Effort: Medium
        • Skill Level: Medium
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium
        • Action: Monitor Airflow project for security advisories and update Airflow version promptly when vulnerabilities are patched.
      • Vulnerabilities in Database Image (PostgreSQL/MySQL) (CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH):
        • Attack Vector: Vulnerabilities exist within the database container image (PostgreSQL or MySQL).
        • Likelihood: Low
        • Impact: Critical
        • Effort: Medium
        • Skill Level: Medium
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium
        • Action: Monitor database project for security advisories and update database version promptly.

Attack Tree Path: Supply Chain Attacks Targeting Chart Acquisition (HIGH-RISK PATH START)

  • Description: Attacks targeting the process of acquiring the Helm chart itself, potentially leading to the deployment of a compromised chart.
  • Breakdown of Sub-Paths:
    • Compromised Helm Chart Repository (CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH):
      • Downloading Chart from Unofficial or Compromised Repository (CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH):
        • Attack Vector: Users are tricked into downloading the Helm chart from an unofficial or compromised repository that hosts malicious charts.
        • Likelihood: Low
        • Impact: Critical
        • Effort: Medium
        • Skill Level: Medium to High
        • Detection Difficulty: Very Difficult
        • Action: Always download Helm charts from trusted and official repositories (e.g., https://airflow.apache.org/). Verify chart integrity using signatures if available.