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Threat Model Analysis for taosdata/tdengine

Threat: Rogue dnode Injection

  • Threat: Rogue dnode Injection

    • Description: An attacker introduces a malicious dnode into the TDengine cluster. The attacker crafts a program that mimics a legitimate dnode during registration, but then performs malicious actions like injecting false data, intercepting queries, or disrupting cluster operation.
    • Impact: Data corruption, data theft, denial of service, complete cluster compromise. False data could be injected, legitimate data altered/deleted, and queries manipulated.
    • Affected Component: dnode (data node), cluster management logic (within mnode), communication protocols between dnode and mnode.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strong Authentication: Enable and enforce strong authentication for dnodes joining the cluster. Use TLS certificates for mutual authentication.
      • Network Segmentation: Isolate the TDengine cluster on a dedicated network segment.
      • Configuration Monitoring: Regularly monitor the cluster configuration (SHOW DNODES) for unauthorized dnodes.
      • Intrusion Detection: Implement intrusion detection systems (IDS) to monitor network traffic.

Threat: Client Impersonation with Stolen Credentials

  • Threat: Client Impersonation with Stolen Credentials

    • Description: An attacker obtains valid TDengine user credentials and uses them to connect as a legitimate user, gaining unauthorized access.
    • Impact: Unauthorized data access (read, write, delete), depending on compromised user privileges. Could lead to data breaches, manipulation, or denial of service.
    • Affected Component: taosd (server process), authentication module within taosd.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strong Password Policies: Enforce strong, unique passwords.
      • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Implement MFA, especially for elevated privileges.
      • Account Lockout: Configure account lockout policies.
      • Regular Password Rotation: Enforce regular password changes.
      • Credential Monitoring: Monitor for leaked credentials.

Threat: Data Tampering via Authorized Client

  • Threat: Data Tampering via Authorized Client

    • Description: An authorized client (application or user) with write access, intentionally or unintentionally, modifies or deletes data, leading to corruption.
    • Impact: Data integrity loss, incorrect analysis, potential application malfunction.
    • Affected Component: dnode (data storage), write operation handling within dnode.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant minimum necessary write permissions.
      • Input Validation: Implement strict input validation on the application side before sending data to TDengine.
      • Data Auditing: Use TDengine's data subscription or logging.
      • Data Backups: Regularly back up data.
      • Application-Level Checks: Implement application-level data constraints.

Threat: Configuration File Tampering

  • Threat: Configuration File Tampering

    • Description: An attacker modifies TDengine's configuration files (e.g., taos.cfg) to weaken security, alter behavior, or introduce vulnerabilities.
    • Impact: Denial of service, data loss, unauthorized access, complete cluster compromise.
    • Affected Component: taosd (server process), configuration loading logic.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • File System Permissions: Restrict access using OS file permissions.
      • File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): Implement FIM.
      • Configuration Management: Use a configuration management system.
      • Regular Backups: Back up configuration files.

Threat: Denial of Service via Resource Exhaustion

  • Threat: Denial of Service via Resource Exhaustion

    • Description: An attacker floods TDengine with requests or expensive queries, consuming resources (CPU, memory, I/O) and making it unavailable.
    • Impact: Denial of service.
    • Affected Component: taosd (server process), dnode (data node), query processing engine, resource management within taosd and dnode.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Resource Limits: Configure TDengine's resource limits (e.g., max_connections).
      • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting (application side or reverse proxy).
      • Query Timeouts: Set timeouts for queries.
      • Monitoring: Monitor resource usage.
      • Scalability: Deploy a sufficiently large cluster.

Threat: Unauthorized Data Access via Network Eavesdropping

  • Threat: Unauthorized Data Access via Network Eavesdropping

    • Description: An attacker intercepts network traffic between a client and TDengine (or between nodes) to capture data transmitted in plain text.
    • Impact: Data breach, exposure of sensitive information.
    • Affected Component: Network communication channels (client-taosd, dnode-mnode).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • TLS Encryption: Enable TLS for all communication. Use strong cipher suites.
      • Network Segmentation: Isolate the cluster.
      • VPN: Use a VPN for remote access.

Threat: Exploitation of TDengine Software Vulnerability

  • Threat: Exploitation of TDengine Software Vulnerability

    • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in TDengine to gain access, execute code, or cause a denial of service.
    • Impact: Variable, from denial of service to complete compromise.
    • Affected Component: Potentially any TDengine component.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Regular Updates: Keep TDengine updated.
      • Vulnerability Scanning: Scan for vulnerabilities.
      • Security Advisories: Monitor advisories.
      • Secure Coding Practices: (If developing custom UDFs).

Threat: mnode Compromise

  • Threat: mnode Compromise

    • Description: An attacker gains control of the mnode, manipulating the entire cluster.
    • Impact: Complete cluster compromise, data loss/manipulation, denial of service.
    • Affected Component: mnode (management node), all other nodes.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Server Hardening: Harden the mnode server OS.
      • Restricted Access: Limit access to authorized administrators.
      • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Implement MFA for admin access.
      • Auditing: Enable auditing and logging.
      • mnode Redundancy: Deploy multiple mnodes.
      • Network Segmentation: Isolate the mnode.