Mitigation Strategy: Input Validation and Sanitization on Both Sides (Go-JS Bridge)
- Mitigation Strategy: Input Validation and Sanitization on Both Sides (Go-JS Bridge)
- Description:
- Identify all Wails bridge data exchange points: Map out every function call and data flow between the JavaScript frontend and the Go backend that utilizes the Wails bridge.
- Define validation rules (Go backend for Wails bridge inputs): For each Go function exposed via Wails bindings and receiving data from JavaScript, define strict validation rules based on expected data types, formats, and ranges.
- Use Go's built-in validation capabilities or libraries like
go-playground/validator
. - Reject invalid data received through the Wails bridge with clear error messages and prevent further processing.
- Use Go's built-in validation capabilities or libraries like
- Sanitize data (Go backend to JS frontend via Wails bridge): Before sending data from the Go backend to the JavaScript frontend through the Wails bridge, sanitize it to prevent potential injection attacks in the frontend context.
- For HTML content passed via the Wails bridge, use Go libraries to escape HTML entities.
- For JavaScript code snippets (if absolutely necessary to pass via the Wails bridge), carefully sanitize or avoid passing code directly.
- Define validation rules (JS frontend for Wails bridge outputs): Implement client-side validation in JavaScript as a first line of defense and to provide immediate feedback to the user before sending data through the Wails bridge.
- Use JavaScript's built-in validation or libraries for form validation.
- Match client-side validation rules with server-side rules for consistency in Wails bridge communication.
- Sanitize data (JS frontend to Go backend via Wails bridge): Before sending data from the JavaScript frontend to the Go backend through the Wails bridge, sanitize it to prevent potential injection attacks in the backend context.
- While backend validation is primary, frontend sanitization adds a layer of defense for Wails bridge interactions.
- Consider encoding or escaping data based on the expected backend processing after it's received via the Wails bridge.
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Wails Bridge (High Severity): Prevents malicious JavaScript code injection into the frontend via data from the backend (sent through the Wails bridge) or user input processed and returned via the bridge.
- Backend Injection Attacks via Wails Bridge (SQL Injection, Command Injection, etc.) (High Severity): Prevents malicious code injection into the Go backend via data from the frontend (sent through the Wails bridge).
- Data Integrity Issues in Wails Bridge Communication (Medium Severity): Ensures data exchanged between frontend and backend via the Wails bridge is in the expected format and range, preventing unexpected application behavior due to bridge communication issues.
- Impact:
- XSS via Wails Bridge: High Risk Reduction
- Backend Injection Attacks via Wails Bridge: High Risk Reduction
- Data Integrity Issues in Wails Bridge Communication: Medium Risk Reduction
- Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Backend validation is in place for critical data inputs in the
user registration
anddata processing
Go packages, specifically for functions exposed via Wails. Frontend validation is implemented for user forms insrc/components/Forms.js
that interact with Wails backend functions. - Missing Implementation: Sanitization of data from Go to JS via the Wails bridge is not consistently applied across all data points. Frontend sanitization before sending data to Go through the Wails bridge is missing. Validation rules need to be reviewed and expanded to cover all data exchange points over the Wails bridge, especially in newer features like
real-time updates
andplugin integrations
that heavily rely on the bridge.
Mitigation Strategy: Minimize Exposed Go Functions (Wails API Surface)
- Mitigation Strategy: Minimize Exposed Go Functions (Wails API Surface)
- Description:
- Review all Wails-exposed Go functions: List all Go functions currently exposed to the JavaScript frontend via Wails bindings. This defines the Wails API surface.
- Assess necessity for Wails exposure: For each function exposed via Wails, evaluate if it is absolutely necessary to be directly accessible from the JavaScript frontend through the Wails bridge.
- Consider if the functionality can be achieved through a different, less direct approach that minimizes the Wails API surface.
- Question if the function unnecessarily exposes internal Go logic or sensitive operations directly to the frontend via Wails.
- Reduce Wails API surface: Remove or refactor Go functions exposed via Wails that are not essential or expose excessive functionality through the Wails bridge.
- Combine multiple Wails-exposed functions into fewer, more generalized functions with controlled parameters, reducing the overall Wails API surface.
- Move sensitive logic to internal Go functions not directly accessible from the frontend via Wails. Expose only necessary, sanitized interfaces through the Wails bridge.
- Implement access control for Wails-exposed functions (if needed): If certain Wails-exposed functions are necessary but should only be accessible under specific conditions from the frontend, implement access control mechanisms in Go.
- Check user roles or permissions in Go within the Wails-exposed functions before executing sensitive operations triggered from the frontend via the bridge.
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Unauthorized Access to Backend Functionality via Wails Bridge (Medium to High Severity): Reduces the attack surface of the Wails application by limiting the number of Go functions attackers can potentially exploit from the frontend through the Wails bridge.
- Information Disclosure via Wails API (Medium Severity): Prevents accidental exposure of internal Go logic or sensitive data through an overly permissive Wails API surface.
- Abuse of Wails-Exposed Functionality (Medium Severity): Limits the potential for malicious actors to misuse Wails-exposed functions for unintended purposes by reducing the available attack vectors through the Wails bridge.
- Impact:
- Unauthorized Access via Wails Bridge: Medium to High Risk Reduction
- Information Disclosure via Wails API: Medium Risk Reduction
- Abuse of Wails-Exposed Functionality: Medium Risk Reduction
- Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Initial design focused on exposing only necessary functions via Wails. However, recent feature additions in
reporting
andadmin panel
modules might have introduced new Wails-exposed functions that need review. - Missing Implementation: A comprehensive review and audit of all currently Wails-exposed Go functions is needed. Specifically, the functions exposed in the
reporting
andadmin panel
Go packages via Wails bindings need to be assessed for necessity and potential over-exposure through the Wails API. Access control mechanisms are not yet implemented for any Wails-exposed functions. The principle of least privilege for the Wails API surface needs to be enforced more rigorously.