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Update Rust crate tough to 0.20.0 [SECURITY] #7889
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pub name: String, | ||
pub version: Version, |
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Had to do some minor code updates because tufaceous has some changes.
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Edited/Blocked NotificationRenovate will not automatically rebase this PR, because it does not recognize the last commit author and assumes somebody else may have edited the PR. You can manually request rebase by checking the rebase/retry box above. |
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ impl ArtifactsWithPlan { | |||
.repo() | |||
.targets() | |||
.signed | |||
.find_target(&target_name) | |||
.find_target(&target_name, false) |
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Used permissive = false
here per @iliana.
This PR contains the following updates:
0.19.0
->0.20.0
GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2025-2887
Summary
When updating the snapshot role, TUF clients should ensure that any previously encountered targets or delegated targets metadata files continue to be present in new snapshot metadata files. Likewise, the new targets and delegated targets metadata versions must be greater than or equal to the previously encountered versions. While tough will perform this check for targets metadata files, it did not perform this check for delegated targets files.
Impact
tough could fail to detect cases where delegated targets metadata was removed or rolled back to a previous version. As a result, tough could trust and download outdated targets that it should reject.
Impacted versions: < v0.20.0
Patches
A fix for this issue is available in tough version 0.20.0 and later. Customers are advised to upgrade to version 0.20.0 or later and ensure any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes.
Workarounds
There is no recommended work around. Customers are advised to upgrade to version 0.20.0 or the latest version.
References
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory we ask that you contact AWS/Amazon Security via our vulnerability reporting page [1] or directly via email to [email protected]. Please do not create a public GitHub issue.
[1] Vulnerability reporting page: https://aws.amazon.com/security/vulnerability-reporting
Acknowledgement
We would like to thank Google for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process.
CVE-2025-2888
Summary
TUF repositories use the timestamp role to protect against rollback events by enabling an automated process to periodically sign the role's metadata. While tough will ensure that the version of snapshot metadata in new timestamp metadata files was always greater than or equal to the previously trusted version, it will only do so after persisting the timestamp metadata to its cache.
Impact
If the tough client successfully detects a rollback event in which timestamp metadata contains outdated snapshot metadata, the invalid timestamp metadata will still be persisted to cache as trusted. tough may then subsequently incorrectly identify valid timestamp metadata as being rolled back, preventing the client from consuming valid updates.
Impacted versions: < v0.20.0
Patches
A fix for this issue is available in tough version 0.20.0 and later. Customers are advised to upgrade to version 0.20.0 or later and ensure any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes.
Workarounds
There is no recommended work around. Customers are advised to upgrade to version 0.20.0 or the latest version.
References
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory we ask that you contact AWS/Amazon Security via our vulnerability reporting page [1] or directly via email to [email protected]. Please do not create a public GitHub issue.
[1] Vulnerability reporting page: https://aws.amazon.com/security/vulnerability-reporting
Acknowledgement
We would like to thank Google for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process.
CVE-2025-2885
Summary
When updating the root role, a TUF client must establish a trusted line of continuity to the latest set of keys. While sequentially downloading new versions of the root metadata file, tough will not check that the root object version it received was the next sequential version from the previously trusted root metadata.
Impact
The tough client will trust an outdated or rotated root role in the event that an actor with control of the storage medium of a trusted TUF repository inappropriately replaced the contents of one of the root metadata files with an adequately signed previous version. As a result, tough could trust content associated with a previous root role.
Impacted versions: < v0.20.0
Patches
A fix for this issue is available in tough version 0.20.0 and later. Customers are advised to upgrade to version 0.20.0 or later and ensure any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes.
Workarounds
There is no recommended work around. Customers are advised to upgrade to version 0.20.0 or the latest version.
References
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory we ask that you contact AWS/Amazon Security via our vulnerability reporting page [1] or directly via email to [email protected]. Please do not create a public GitHub issue.
[1] Vulnerability reporting page: https://aws.amazon.com/security/vulnerability-reporting
Acknowledgement
We would like to thank Google for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process.
CVE-2025-2886
Summary
Delegations are a mechanism defined by the TUF specification that allow multiple different identities to provide and sign content within a single repository. Terminating delegations and delegation priority give a TUF repository unambiguous control over how overlapping delegations are resolved. tough erroneously will not terminate a search as required, and will accept information from a lower-priority delegation that should have been ignored.
Impact
When interacting with TUF repositories that use delegations, the tough client could fetch targets owned by the incorrect role. An actor which had delegated ownership of a subset of a TUF repository could provide arbitrary contents to tough clients for targets owned by the delegating identity.
Impacted versions: < v0.20.0
Patches
A fix for this issue is available in tough version 0.20.0 and later. Customers are advised to upgrade to version 0.20.0 or later and ensure any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes.
Workarounds
There is no recommended work around. Customers are advised to upgrade to version 0.20.0 or the latest version.
References
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory we ask that you contact AWS/Amazon Security via our vulnerability reporting page [1] or directly via email to [email protected]. Please do not create a public GitHub issue.
[1] Vulnerability reporting page: https://aws.amazon.com/security/vulnerability-reporting
Acknowledgement
We would like to thank Google for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process.
GHSA-j8x2-777p-23fc
Summary
In a TUF repository, the targets role’s signature indicates which target files are trusted by clients. The role can delegate full or partial trust to other roles, meaning that that role is trusted to sign target file metadata. Delegated roles can further delegate trust to other delegated roles. When searching for metadata about a given target, tough failed to detect cyclical role delegations.
Impact
When interacting with TUF repositories which contain cyclical role delegations, tough will fail to detect the cycles and will exhaust its stack while recursively searching the delegation graph. The exhausted call stack will cause the process to abort.
Impacted versions: < v0.20.0
Patches
A fix for this issue is available in tough version 0.20.0 and later. Customers are advised to upgrade to version 0.20.0 or later and ensure any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes.
Workarounds
There is no recommended work around. Customers are advised to upgrade to version 0.20.0 or the latest version.
References
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory we ask that you contact AWS/Amazon Security via our vulnerability reporting page [1] or directly via email to [email protected]. Please do not create a public GitHub issue.
[1] Vulnerability reporting page: https://aws.amazon.com/security/vulnerability-reporting
Acknowledgement
We would like to thank Google for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process.
Release Notes
awslabs/tough (tough)
v0.20.0
Compare Source
Fixes
keyids
when verifying roles (094f0877)Changes
permissive
argument tofind_target()
, allowing the caller to cease a search when a terminating delegation is encountered (c5ee1718)terminating
argument toRepositoryEditor::delegate_role()
andRepositoryEditor::add_role()
to enable adding terminating delegations (598111f8)Configuration
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