[3.12] gh-123726: Document caveats of zipfile.Path around name saniti…

…zation (GH-130537) (#130987) gh-123726: Document caveats of zipfile.Path around name sanitization (GH-130537) Add a note to the `zipfile.Path` class documentation clarifying that it does not sanitize filenames. This emphasizes the caller's responsibility to validate or sanitize inputs, especially when handling untrusted ZIP archives, to prevent path traversal vulnerabilities. The note also references the `extract` and `extractall` methods for comparison and suggests using `os.path.abspath` and `os.path.commonpath` for safe filename resolution. (cherry picked from commit a3990df) Co-authored-by: Affan Shaikhsurab <[email protected]>
python · Mar 8, 2025 · 552dad1 · 552dad1
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commit 552dad1
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diff --git a/Doc/library/zipfile.rst b/Doc/library/zipfile.rst
@@ -528,6 +528,14 @@ Path Objects
    e.g. 'dir/file.txt', 'dir/', or ''. Defaults to the empty string,
    indicating the root.
 
+   .. note::
+      The :class:`Path` class does not sanitize filenames within the ZIP archive. Unlike
+      the :meth:`ZipFile.extract` and :meth:`ZipFile.extractall` methods, it is the
+      caller's responsibility to validate or sanitize filenames to prevent path traversal
+      vulnerabilities (e.g., filenames containing ".." or absolute paths). When handling
+      untrusted archives, consider resolving filenames using :func:`os.path.abspath`
+      and checking against the target directory with :func:`os.path.commonpath`.
+
 Path objects expose the following features of :mod:`pathlib.Path`
 objects: